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This dissertation is based on three years of ethnographic fieldwork and 40 in-
depth interviews with members of the Michigan militia. Militia members are mostly 
white men who believe in an originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Armed with 
rifles, they practice paramilitary exercises and protest various government actions. Militia 
members see themselves as "super citizens" who embody national ideals of freedom and 
equality even as they face public criticism as being violent, socially regressive, and racist. 
My dissertation examines how members respond to changing ideas about equality and 
inclusion while belonging to a group that lauds a mythic vision of the nation where white 
men had exclusive social power.  
 I find that most militia members genuinely try to be egalitarian, and the ways in 




I argue that an idealized national identity, strongly influenced by mythical stories of the 
country's founding, shapes members' responses to a variety of issues. Specifically, I find 
that members use the militia space to test and expand constructions of what it means to be 
a man in contemporary U.S. society even as they reference themes of a traditional, 
hegemonic masculinity when explaining their militia participation. Regarding race, 
militia members tend to be accepting of African Americans, but make very little effort to 
accept Muslim Americans. I argue that members have largely integrated anti-racist norms 
about African Americans, but they fear physical harm and change to an idealized national 
identity from Muslims as a result of past violence and attendant political change. Militia 
members' relationship to authority, primarily embodied by law enforcement actors is 
similarly complex. Members are likely to comply with authoritative actions they 
understand to be legitimate and in accordance with Constitutional principles and defy 
those actions they understand to be illegitimate. This work challenges current 
understandings of masculinity and whiteness, particularly among lower-middle class, 
American men as it shows that men who strongly value a mythical American identity that 
is premised on the social power of white men nonetheless consciously grapple with issues 










Introduction: In the Field with the Militia 
 
 
"They’re great guys. I like sitting down and talking with them and hanging 
out. Bottom line, I like hanging out with them. […] They know that if they 
needed me, they could count on me. And I know that if I needed them, I 
could count on them. That’s what matters."  
- 27 year old Hugo1 
 
 
Hugo is a member of the Michigan militia, which is a group of citizens who discuss their 
shared political perspectives, including a concern about the "direction" their country is 
going, and who arm themselves with rifles to participate in paramilitary training designed 
to prepare them to defend their country should the need arise. Most militia members, like 
Hugo, want to connect with people they can "count on" and with whom they can talk and 
"hang out." Members are searching for a sense comradery and support from others who 
share their interests as they ostensibly gather in defense of their nation.  
Members see their militia participation as a civic duty and as something beneficial 
for their families and communities and for broader American society. Politicians and 
media commentators typically take a more skeptical view of militias and their activities, 
and some militia members have been arrested for allegedly participating in actions 
designed to harm other citizens. The purpose of this manuscript is not, however, to 
engage in this particular debate.  
                                                 
1 All names in this manuscript are pseudonyms. Throughout, I use double quotation marks to indicate exact 
quotes that were audio recorded or communicated via email or other written media. I use single quotes to 
indicate where I reconstructed the speaker's words from memory when writing fieldnotes soon after the 




Instead, I focus on how militia membership is a search for commonality among 
people—primarily white, lower-middle class men—trying to find their footing in an 
evolving society. Militia members have very strong ideas about what it means to take 
care of oneself and one's family, to be a man, and to be an American in today's 
increasingly globalized society where very few people grow their own food or repair their 
own cars, as many of our predecessors did.  
Militia men idealize a mythic story of the U.S.'s founding, where early settlers 
rebelled against a patriarchal, oppressive British monarch and reclaimed the untamed 
land from the native peoples who occupied it. This story's main characters are strong, 
independent, and morally upright, white men who succeeded without women or other 
racial groups. Militia men are not always aware of the gendered and raced nuances of the 
story they invoke. On the contrary, most militia men would be deeply offended at the 
suggestion that they preference white men in any way, and most genuinely try to support 
contemporary American values of equality and inclusion. In other words, militia 
members navigate their identities as lower-middle class, white, American men whose 
understanding of the nation is synonymous with personal freedom, while belonging to a 
group that reinforces traditional, social power-laden understandings of these identities. 
This manuscript analyzes how militia men navigate this contradiction and, in so doing, 
reveals how lower middle class white men understand their Americanness, masculinity, 
and whiteness in contemporary U.S. society.  
Specifically, I analyze two interconnected questions. First, how are different 
identities (e.g., male, white, lower-middle class, American) combined and navigated in 




inclusive of traditionally oppressed groups? That is, the American public has a growing 
acceptance of issues ranging from amnesty for hard-working illegal immigrants to gay 
marriage (Associated Press 2013; Connelly 2012); how do men who historically thrived 
because of exclusion and repression of other groups understand themselves in this more 
inclusive environment? Second, how does social movement participation, in this case, 
participation in the militia, reinforce or change these identities? In other words, does 
militia participation make men question these identities, invest in them more deeply, or 
does it make men's masculinity and whiteness invisible to them?  
The militia gives us a window into a contemporary American political culture that 
is witnessing a strong conservative backlash against broader currents of inclusion (Ruiz 
2012). Many states, for example, are enacting legislation that challenges the spirit, if not 
the letter of Roe v. Wade while others have attempted to crack down on illegal 
immigrants and their presence in the workforce. There is likewise concern from some 
citizens over the nation's status as a world superpower in the wake of an ongoing global 
recession; perhaps especially for baby boomers who grew up lauding heroes of WWII 
and enjoying a thriving post-war economy, this is a jarring shift in both national and 
personal identity.  
Analyzing how people who are strongly invested in a mythic version of 
Americanness understand their place in a changing world is therefore important for 
understanding the broader American political culture and for understanding the lived 
experiences and egalitarian efforts of lower-middle-class, white men2. This case has 
implications for several theoretical areas: masculinity, social movements, social deviance, 
                                                 
2 There are some female militia members, but this manuscript largely analyzes the experiences of militia 




and nationalism. I introduce these literatures below and discuss them in greater detail in 
the following chapters. In short, I argue that idealized Americanness is the lens through 
which militia members make sense of a changing world and changing gendered and raced 
expectations of their behavior.  
  
MASCULINITY, WHITENESS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
White, male citizens militias have a long history in the U.S. and historians consider them 
crucial in some early efforts of the American Revolution where groups of largely 
unorganized townspeople acted together to defend against British soldiers. Historian 
David Hackett Fischer (1995), for example, details how the strong leadership and 
organization of small, independent militias were instrumental in facilitating important 
communications between settlements and thus efficiently warning early settlers of British 
troops' movements. Stories of the Revolutionary War form the foundational myth of this 
country as being established by hard-working, independent, freedom-loving, white men. 
The theme of lone, white, male settlers extends through stories of the frontier—the vast 
West whose land and natives had to be tamed in the name of progress—all the way 
through the creative, entrepreneurial spirit of the Industrial Revolution; it is, in many 
ways, a "warrior dream" to use sociologist James Gibson's term (1994). 
Modern militias understand themselves as acting within the lineage of these early 
colonists and settlers. They believe they are fulfilling a duty to the country and their 
forbearers, and believe they are fighting to maintain personal liberties and a national 
identity that aligns with an originalist understanding of the Constitution and their 




says, "People who join groups like militias are trying to assert their right to define 
Americanism, and in doing so they employ the myths, metaphors, and perceived 
historical lessons of the American experience (2008:30; emphasis added). Militia 
members are, in other words, trying to make sure that their story of independence, 
patriotism and individual success is not "repressed or obscured" by other, competing 
stories that are put forth as part of the national biography (Duara 1995: 164; Zubrzycki 
2006). Militia members in this context have a nostalgia for the past and for supposedly 
simpler times, and believe that real Americans, especially men, are still responsible for 
themselves and their families, and should rely on the government for very little.  
In this manuscript, I avoid terms like "extremist," "preservatist," "right-wing," 
"survivalists," or even "conservative" to categorize the militia. These terms carry strong 
emotive and ideological connotations that were not always present in militia members I 
encountered, and they imply a greater degree of commonality and consistency across 
certain groups than I observed in the field. Further, as Mulloy observes,  
"The argument here is more than that it is those with whom we disagree 
that are usually labeled 'extremists.' It is that the defining of extremists in 
this way actively prevents an examination of the shared characteristics of 
those doing the defining and those so defined" (2004:20).  
 
In other words, if we categorize groups like militias as merely something on the fringe of 
society, rather than as a meaningful part of it, we underestimate how these groups are 
reflective of broader behavioral trends and political currents.  
I use the term "nostalgic" group in this manuscript to avoid some of the negative 
and presumptive connotations of other terms while still acknowledging that militia 
ideology is shaped by a sincere reverence for the past and for the country's principles as 




some idealized and mythologized time frame, a kind of Golden Age, where economic or 
social circumstances were supposedly better than the contemporary time. The specific 
time frame that a given nostalgic group references may vary greatly from the idealized 
frames of other groups. What nostalgic groups have in common is not the specific content 
of their message, but rather a discursive strategy of idealizing a foregone era.  
Militia members certainly have a nostalgic reverence for the country's past, but 
what is less clear is how members understand themselves, particularly their protective, 
masculine identities, in the context of a society that is increasingly globalized, 
technologized, and removed from their idealized frontier history. This case allows for a 
thorough investigation of the complex interplay between masculinity and whiteness in the 
contemporary U.S. because militia members are overwhelmingly male and white, and 
because militia ideology explicitly relies on a mythos driven by white men. Studying a 
group whose overt goal is to uphold a certain understanding of the Americanness also 
allows for an in-depth examination of how nationalism matters for these white, lower-
middle class men. 
Militia commentators often suggest that groups like militias are spurred by a sense 
of threat to white, male social and economic power (e.g., Frank 2005; Hardisty 2000; 
Lipset and Raab 1978; Parsons 1963). This explanation has been proffered, and to 
varying degrees supported, for groups in Europe (the most notable example being 
France's Front National; see Mayer 1998) and the U.S.: the Coughlin movement 
following the Great Depression (Lipset and Raab 1978), the second wave of the Ku Klux 
Klan following Brown v. Board of Education (McVeigh 2009), the John Birch Society 




Figure 1: A man finishes his Level 1 qualifying walk 
along the washed out, uneven road leading to the 
training ground. Photo courtesy of Jeff Kindy. 
opposition to legislation like the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1965 (Bennett 
1988), male opposition to Feminism's 
second wave and women's increasing 
presence in the workplace (Diamond 
1995; Faludi 2000; Rosen 2000), and the 
emergent Christian Right of the 1980s 
(Diamond 1995; Hardisty 2000; 
Himmelstein 1992). The implication is 
that militia involvement is a knee-jerk 
reaction against social progress and 
change and an attempt to maintain power 
rooted in whiteness or maleness. 
The most recent permutation of the status threat argument is sociologist Rory 
McVeigh's (2009) power-devaluation model. McVeigh notes that social power is most 
appropriately construed as an interaction among economic, political, and status-based 
powers. Individuals must experience threat in at least one of these three "exchange 
markets" to become a conservative movement participant (McVeigh 2011). However, 
McVeigh argues that threat is not the full story when explaining mobilization of 
conservative groups whose members often belong to demographic groups that 




McVeigh says, "The theory proposes that power devaluation, resulting from 
structural change, produces shifts in interpretive processes which, in turn, led to 
activation of organizational resources and exploitation of political opportunities" 
(2009:39). In other words, structural changes like increasing immigration or decreasing 
economic certainty make some people view their society with hostility, especially with 
regard to other competing demographic groups. Upon experiencing some new grievance, 
these individuals try to mobilize to protest and create an environment more conducive to 
their success. McVeigh says this is most likely to occur when these individuals believe 
that their ability to institutionally pursue their interests is in decline (McVeigh 2011).  
 The power-devaluation model has thus far not been widely applied beyond the 
Klan's second wave and currently leaves some questions unanswered. What exactly does 
the "interpretive process" entail? What constitutes or sparks a "shift" in this process? 
Why do some people of a given demographic experience this shift, while others do not, 
and why do some people experiencing this shift mobilize, while others do not?  
 This case allows for a greater examination of these questions because militia 
members are predominately white men, who are the demographic group most likely to 
perceive threats to social position due to their historical experiences of power (Garner 
2007), and because theirs is a movement explicitly about preserving a vision of national 
identity. American culture scholar Matthew Countryman (2007) argues that the Civil 
Rights Movement was comprised of local, "indigenous" movements (Morris 1984) that 
responded to the specific needs of their local contexts. In the same way, there are limited 
linkages between militias across state lines, and often limited connections between militia 




organizations that work best within and respond to needs of their local communities. 
They nonetheless share a vision of national identity and a desire to preserve it, and can 
act collectively in the interest of national-level issues or legislation, such as when they 
collectively oppose increased gun control. 
I suggest that, for the militia and perhaps other contemporary nostalgic groups, 
nationalism is the missing element that explains mobilization. It is true that militia 
members often feel societal change happens too quickly, but, in my observations, they are 
not indiscriminately responding to all social change or to increasing equity across social 
groups. As I show in this manuscript, most militia members become concerned when 
they believe specific political or other changes threaten their country or their 
understanding of the nation's identity. They are not, for example concerned with all 
immigration, but with illegal immigration from across the globe because they fear that 
people who subvert legal authority to enter the country will continue to do so once inside 
its borders.  
Further, what status threat and power-devaluation theories overlook is that people 
in the militia, the Front National in France, or the Christian Right in the U.S. may not 
always be aware of the power structures that their belief systems reference. That is, 
militia members do have a nostalgia for a past era, but they do not always recognize how 
other groups would have been greatly disadvantaged during that time. Their desire for a 
literal interpretation to the Constitution, for example, is not always an expressed desire 
for more social power at the expense of another group.  
Political scientist Tali Mendelberg explains how people may use racial code 




stereotypes and racism without overtly appealing to race. They may, for example, discuss 
problems with welfare or fears of crime that implicate racial themes without directly 
discussing any particular racial group. Mendelberg explains that this tactic is used, both 
consciously and unconsciously, to express racialized sentiments without violating social 
norms about equality and acceptance.  
I argue that members' expressed nationalism cannot be dismissed as being merely 
language coded (either intentionally or unintentionally) to disguise more sinister 
sentiments of racism or other forms of repression. Rather, militia members have a 
coherent belief structure and worldview regarding their nationalistic sentiment and their 
understanding of who comprises a good American. In other words, members' sense of 
status threat is not necessarily individualized; it is experienced as a group threat to 
national identity. While there are some militia members who evince symbolic racism 
(e.g., Kinder and Sears 1981) or a strong adherence to an exclusionary, hegemonic vision 
of masculinity (e.g., Connell 2005; Nagel 1998), the majority of members genuinely try 
to live up to the egalitarian vision they understand the nation to have. Their level of 
success varies, and how and when they fail is instructive for understanding how lower-
middle class, white, American men understand the interaction of race, gender, and 
Americanness3.  
I also suggest that it is useful to explicitly connect members' understanding of 
Americanness to theories of crime and social deviance when assessing how militias 
respond to authority. With a few exceptions, participation in private militia activity is not 
                                                 
3 Socioeconomic class is also an important identity category for these men. While the influence of class is 




criminal4; however, spending one's free time dressing in camouflage, practicing military 
maneuvers, and shooting targets with rifles is an unusual and, in many ways, a socially 
deviant expression of strain resulting from a challenged, idealized national identity. Most 
militia men are not, on the whole, socially deviant. They normatively participate in 
society by voting and having jobs and families, and most fastidiously uphold all laws 
because they believe it is their duty as citizens to do so.  
Militia participation is nonetheless a deviant form of political expression in the 
sense that it is uncommon, and that most people would reject it as a legitimate political 
activity. Just as some offenders resort to crime because they are unable to pursue socially 
valued goals through legitimate means (e.g., attaining wealth through a prestigious job; 
Agnew 1992; Merton 1938), some men participate in militias because their voting 
behavior or other normative political activity does not accomplish the social or political 
ends they desire. Militia activity is an embodied attempt to enforce an ideal national 
vision. This means it is important that law enforcement and others who are concerned 
about potential violence from militia groups be aware of how members' idealized 
nationalism shapes their behavior and understanding of law enforcement, and aware of 
how their own interactions with militia members have the potential to produce negative 
social outcome. 
 
MICHIGAN AS THIS STUDY'S SITE 
Michigan is an appropriate site for analyzing how white, lower-middle class, American 
men are responding to an evolving society for several reasons. First, Michigan is one of 
                                                 
4 West Virginia, for example, has a law against "unlawful military organizations" (West Virginia Code 
Chapter 15, Article 1F-7), and one militia group with whom I have contact conducts their training exercises 




the most racially segregated states in the country, and residential segregation is 
particularly high around Detroit (Farley et al. 2000; Sugrue 1993), near where many of 
the most committed militia members either live or work. Michigan's segregation makes 
race and racial animosity particularly salient: when Whites from nearly all-white 
neighborhoods do encounter African Americans (or other racial outgroups), their 
perceptions are likely heavily influenced by crime-based media stories, for example 
(Bjornstrom et al. 2010; Gist 1990; Mastro 2009). Race's salience means that talking 
about race and racial perceptions has less of a stigma, perhaps resulting in more honest 
answers than would be the case in other contexts. 
Second, Michigan's economy has struggled for decades, even before the most 
recent global recession (Adelaja et al. 2010). These conditions make all workers, but 
especially those in the lower socioeconomic classes, acutely aware of their own class 
standing and economic struggles. Fleshing out details of the social power devaluation 
model is facilitated in a context where there are persistent real as well as perceived 
threats. Third and similarly, in an economically strained situation, it might be the case 
that both national and gender identities are pronounced. If, for example, a lower-middle 
class man is chronically unemployed in such an environment, it is probably also difficult 
for him to feel he has achieved the traditional role of provider for his family. It would 
certainly be difficult for him to claim achievement of the idealized American Dream of 
working hard for independence and unhindered material gain. When these shortcomings 
are regularly primed, meaning militia members are thinking about these issues on their 




issues are more genuine, experiential responses, rather than something created for the 
purpose of answering a researcher's questions. 
Michigan is also an ideal site for studying militias for two primary reasons. First, 
Michigan's was one of the first two militias to form in 1994, meaning its patterns of 
behavior are relatively fixed; other states' militias have used Michigan's as a model for 
organization because of this longevity. Second, although ultimately a false connection 
(Duffy and Brantley 1997), the Michigan militia was accused of having links to 1995 
Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. Members have strong incentives as a result to 
reach out to the public to combat this negative image, even 15 years after the bombing 
and subsequent Congressional investigation into militias that cleared them of 
involvement.  
Awareness of public perception means they are more careful to archive their 
activities and that data is more easily accessible than would be the case in some other 
states. This does not necessarily mean that this group is fundamentally different from 
militias in other states. Rather, at least some militia groups outside of Michigan that I 
have spoken with do not want media or researcher presence because they are afraid of 
having McVeigh-esque links falsely made to their groups. Michigan's militia, meanwhile, 
think they have nothing to lose since they have already weathered that experience and 
find it preferable to make their materials available. One SMVM leader in particular has 
told me that the wants as many documents about his group available as possible, 'so 
there's a record of who we are and what we did if the government ever does decide to 






My data for this project are comprised of three facets: interviews, fieldwork, and archival 
materials. I conducted 40 in-depth, open-ended interviews with militia members from 
across the state of Michigan, usually in a public location like a coffee shop, but 
sometimes in a militia member's home as he prepared dinner with his family, or by the 
campfire after a long day of militia training. I had countless less-structured interviews 
and informal conversations with dozens of other members, their wives, and their children. 
I originally intended interviews to comprise a larger portion of my data, but around 
interview number 30 or so, reached a point where I could fairly easily predict the gist of 
respondents' answers to specific questions. I did not have new questions I wanted to 
formally integrate in an interview format and instead prioritized the data from in the field, 
at militia trainings, meetings, and camping events.  
From March 2008 through the summer of 2011, I spent more than 300 hours at 63 
separate events with Michigan militia units across the state. I watched how members 
interacted with each other, with their family members and close friends, and with the 
media at public meetings, at public and private trainings, and at private camping events. I 
listened to them talk about their firearms and preferred training techniques, about their 
families and their concerns for the future, and about personal traumas and triumphs. I 
watched many of them transition through marriages, parenthood, divorces, and deaths of 
family members or close friends. Throughout this manuscript, I seek to understand militia 
members' "lived experiences" (Eliasoph 1998) and let their stories and descriptions speak 




Figure 2 is a map of Michigan with the approximate locations marked for militia 
units that were consistently active during my fieldwork, meaning they had regular 
meetings and trainings for at least 18 of my 40 months in the field; the majority of units 
represented on the map were active during my entire fieldwork. I had contact with at least 
one member in each of these units, and spoke with representatives of each unit about 
issues ranging from their personal beliefs and reasons for militia participation, to unit 
activities and characteristics. The size of the circles on the map reflects the groups' 
relative average sizes during their period of activity. The map does not include smaller 
 




units of two to three people that were active only for very short amounts of time (usually 
two to eight months), many of which I also contacted. 
I also analyzed thousands of pages5 of militia newsletters, handouts, and 
pamphlets to further supplement my understanding of the group. The contents of these 
pages ranged from information about gear and militia training requirements, to 
reproductions of the Constitution, to ongoing news items of interest to members. I 
additionally have access to three different units' private internet forums and frequently 
read conversations and items of interest to militia members there. Finally, I am "friends" 
with many militia members from Michigan and other states on MySpace and Facebook, 
and occasionally drew supplemental material from information members posted to those 
sites. 
My data over-represent the primary militia group in Michigan that has 
consistently been active since the 1990s—the Southeast Michigan Volunteer Militia 
(SMVM). This group sets the tone for others in the state because of its longevity and 
because it maintains the website michiganmilitia.com. Other militias in Michigan and 
militias in other states heavily rely on this group for training materials and other 
documentation, with many units copying word-for-word SMVM's prescribed training 
regimen. All Michigan units that were active during my fieldwork are represented in each 
aspect of my data: interviews, meetings, trainings, camping trips, and written 
communications. Characterizations I make regarding the militia should be understood as 
applicable only to Michigan militia units, rather than generalizable to all militias in the 
country, as militia ideology or activities may vary by region or other factors. 
                                                 
5 Approximately 300 pages are from meetings or trainings that I personally attended. Another 800 pages 
are from newsletters printed prior to the start of my fieldwork. More than 3000 additional pages are from 




No researcher can ever be certain they have observed the "real" representation of 
any population of interest; the data they obtain are influenced by characteristics and 
desires of both the researcher and the participants. When I present my findings and note 
how militia members are remarkably normal people who care about their country, or 
when I talk about how they are less racist, sexist, or otherwise exclusionary than some 
audience members expect, I'm consistently asked whether I think they were merely 
hiding the "truth" from me.  
I don't believe they were. Sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) taught us long ago 
that people rarely present their "true" selves. I am certain that militia members monitored 
the self-images they presented to me, and I did the same. However, I do not believe that 
members could have consistently, completely hidden underlying motives or proclivities 
given the length of time I spent with them, the diversity of contexts I observed them in, 
the variety of data sources I use to contextualize and triangulate my overall understanding 
of the militia, and the members who did reveal unflattering information in spite of 
pressures of social desirability. 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS CHARACTERISTICS OF MICHIGAN MILITIA MEMBERS6 
It is also important to have an accurate mental image of what current members of the 
Michigan militia are like to properly contextualize the remainder of this manuscript. 
White men comprise between 90% and 95% of the movement in Michigan, although 
precise numbers do vary over time, with women somewhat more likely to participate 
during warmer months. From what I have observed, only about 2% of regular militia 
                                                 




attendees across the state are non-white. There are other people of color who attend 
militia events regularly and others who attend a particular public "Field Day" event once 
a year. Many of the white members are in interracial marriages, typically with Asian 
women, and several proudly reference their own racially mixed heritage—great 
grandparents who were Native American, or grandparents who were Asian—when the 
conversation overtly has little to do with race. Such was the case when one member said, 
"I tan easily because I'm one-fourth Asian," following another's remark about needing 
sunscreen during a summer training. 
 The average age of a militia member is about 38 years old, though they range 
from 18 to 60 years old. Twenty four (60%) of the 40 militia members I interviewed are 
married, another six (15%) are never married, while the remaining ten (25%) are 
divorced, separated or widowed. Two thirds of interviewees have at least one biological 
child, and about one fifth of those also help care for at least one child from their partners' 
previous relationships. Three interviewees (8%) are also grandparents. My interviewees 
are more educated than the average U.S. population (see Table 1), but while they do work 
in a variety of occupations, most have delivery, service, or trade jobs like carpenter or 
electrician, making "lower-middle" the best class descriptor of the Michigan members. 
Michigan militia members are far from religiously uniform. Seventeen (43%) of 
my 40 interviewees identify as Christian, while another ten (25%) further specify as 
Catholic. Another twelve (30%) are Atheist or Agnostic, and the remaining interviewee is 
Muslim (2% of the interview sample). These percentages also roughly reflect militia 
members I did not interview but interacted with in the field. Although many militia 




Table 1. Educational Attainment of U.S. Population and MI Militia Sample 
 
U.S. Population* MI Militia Sample 
% With 
Only 




% With At 
Least 
 
High School 31.24% 87.14%   12.82% 97.37% 





28.53% 39.06%   25.64% 28.21% 
 
*Compiled from Census 2010 data 
 
 
supplicating for a return to a Constitutional Republic, religious content is never the focus 
of meeting or training conversation in the majority of militia groups. 
Unsurprisingly, no militia member I have encountered identifies with liberal 
politics, though many claim to have done so in the past, or claim that they would be open 
to liberal members. Two of the people I interviewed even admitted to voting for Barack 
Obama during the 2008 Presidential election, though they say they now regret that 
decision. Nine (23%) of my interviewees identify as Independent, five (13%) as broadly 
Conservative, two (5%) as Republican, fifteen (38%) as Libertarian, and nine (23%) as 
Constitutionalist. Libertarianism is a political position that is sometimes described as 
socially liberal but fiscally conservative. Militia members often interpret it to mean that 
people have a right to do whatever they want to do, so long as it does not interfere with 
anyone else's freedom, and that the government should have a minimal role in regulation 
and in people's lives. Constitutionalists are very similar, though their ideal role of 
government is even more limited to that which a literal interpretation of the U.S. 




 Some Michigan members are strongly anti-abortion and anti-gay marriage. 
However, the majority do support the above interpretation of Libertarianism, meaning, as 
45 year old truck driver Aaron framed it, even if they "don't agree with it personally, and 
no one in [their] family would ever do it," they would not oppose a woman's right to an 
abortion, for example. As with all my characterizations in this manuscript, it is my 
position that these are genuinely expressed beliefs7.  
 
MEETING THE MILITIA 
In contrast to these relatively normative perspectives, militia members are often assumed 
to be dangerous or at least incredibly wary of outsiders. I've joked for some time that I 
need to come up with a better story about how I first crossed paths with the Michigan 
militia because it seems that many people expect to hear about a chance encounter in the 
woods or something equally dramatic. The truth is that in March 2008, I was in my 
Qualitative Methods course at the University of Michigan discussing ethnographies from 
Michael Burawoy (1982) and Teresa Gowan (1997), when I vaguely wondered whether 
the Michigan militia was still around. Later that evening, I discovered that the militia did 
indeed still exist, and they had a large internet presence including a recently updated 
webpage. Luckily, SMVM, was holding a public meeting at a diner just 20 minutes from 
my home a few days after my initial search, and I knew immediately that I had to attend. 
 I first heard of the militia the way most people did, in (ultimately false) 
association with the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, and probably 
would have forgotten they existed had it not been for their cameo appearance in 
                                                 
7 As any freshman political science student will learn, however, beliefs and attitudes may not necessarily 
correlate with action. I explore throughout the manuscript the extent to which members' beliefs translate 




documentary maker Michael Moore's film (2002) Bowling for Columbine. The only real 
expectation I had going in to the meeting was that I would find a group of mostly men, all 
white, who were very enthusiastic about firearms. I was admittedly nervous, primarily 
from not knowing more of what to expect or how I would be perceived. I told three 
people where I was going and what time they should expect me to hear from me, just in 
case something happened. It was several months later that I discovered that many militia 
members followed the exact same procedure the first time they attended a militia event 
because they, too, were nervous about what they might find at the meetings and how they 
would be received by the group.  
 I arrived at the diner about 30 minutes prior to the meeting's published start time 
to make sure I felt comfortable at the location and to have the chance to watch people as 
they arrived. I tried to guess whether each arrival was there for the militia meeting, or just 
eating dinner at the restaurant. As the meeting time approached, a green pickup truck 
pulled into the space next to me, sat for a few minutes, backed out and re-parked in front 
of me. At first I wondered if the driver had been watching me as I sat in the car, perhaps 
thinking I was out of place and trying to determine what I was doing there; but, as the 
truck pulled around, I noticed that its license plate read "FICKLE" and laughed. Two 
large, white, balding men exited the truck simultaneously, and I followed them inside. 
The stereotypically small-town diner served little more than fried chicken fingers 
and hamburgers, whose greasy smell lay heavy in the air when I entered. A group of four 
white men were talking to each other from two different tables in the front corner. They 
wore no camouflage or other obvious signs of militia membership. A handful of other 




presence. Feeling unsure of my identifications in the parking lot, I quietly approached a 
waitress at the front of the restaurant to confirm my assumption of the four as militia 
members before approaching. She shot me a rather conspiratorial look, nodded, and 
equally quietly said "yes." Her confirmation only made me more nervous as I approached 
the group.  
I asked whether they minded if I sat with them, and, wearing a University of 
Michigan sweatshirt, said I was a student who had recently moved to Michigan and 
wanted to know what the Michigan militia was all about. I had trouble participating in 
their conversation—more from their general social awkwardness than from wariness of 
me, I think—until two other, more talkative members arrived. These two answered all my 
questions that night, asked me a few in return, and generally made me feel welcome and 
at ease.  
 I told them I was from the rural South and was somewhat familiar with firearms. I 
explained that several guns were always present in my household growing up, and I was 
taught to respect and safely handle them at a young age. My family lived in an isolated 
area, and it was not uncommon that my father equipped a sidearm "just in case" when 
investigating disturbances on the property, such as when several loud, drunken men on 
horseback wandered into our yard late one summer night. The only occasion my father 
ever fired, or even revealed, the weapon in a defensive scenario was when he arrived 
home early from work one day and discovered an obviously rabid coyote trying to reach 
my pet rabbit. 
 At my father's behest, I obtained a concealed pistol license (CPL) when I 




really thought about it, nor removed it from its case, but I was admittedly glad to know it 
was there one night when my older neighbor and two of his male friends tested whether 
my door was locked, pretending they had confused it with their own. I mentioned these 
stories and my CPL to the militia members as an opportunity to demonstrate my 
familiarity with guns and gun culture.  
 From having read their website, I assumed the militia might enjoy the opportunity 
to help educate people about firearms and related legislation. I asked them for help 
figuring out whether Michigan had CPL reciprocity with my home state, and listened to 
them talk about Michigan's equivalent licensing procedure. This provided an opportunity 
for them to be in a position of relative authority, while still marking me as informed 
about issues of concern to them. 
 The two members I spoke with the most this night became important informants 
throughout my time with the group, and facilitated connections to other units in the state 
and beyond, especially in the early months of my fieldwork. After telling these members 
about my background, I casually asked what they might think of participating in a 
research project so I (and they) could tell the "real" story of the militia. They were both 
open to this suggestion and even seemed excited at the idea as they expressed frustration 
that many existing reports on militias were produced without directly contacting any 
members.  
 Casual conversation slowed as the meeting finally started and a leader asked 
everyone to stand, face the flag, and say the pledge. I had a flash of panic as I had not 
performed this ritual in years, probably since elementary school, and hoped I remembered 




back to me easily as the cadence of the pledge began. Afterward, another member said a 
brief prayer, asking for God to 'Return the country to a Constitutionally-limited 
Republic.' 
 Much of the meeting content this night was related to next month's Field Day—a 
large family function open to the public that units from around the state attend—and 
preparations that needed to be completed to successfully host the event. Leaders also 
discussed the Heller case, where the Supreme Court recently ruled that the Second 
Amendment applied to individuals in Washington, D.C.; militia members were, of 
course, pleased with this outcome. There was a rumor that President George Bush's 
administration might challenge the ruling, and SMVM's leader encouraged people to 
"contact your Congressmen and express your opinions about this." I wrote in my 
fieldnotes that he was very careful to say that people should avoid conveying anything 
that could remotely be construed as any kind of threat, and suggested they instead use 
language regarding the right to bear arms found on the National Rifle Association's 
website or elsewhere online. 
 SMVM leaders also discussed the then-frontrunners for the upcoming 2008 
Presidential election. John McCain, one said, "Only pretends to be a conservative," and 
this remark surprised me a bit as I'd anticipated militia members would be likely to 
endorse McCain because of his military service and former prisoner of war status. Less 
surprisingly, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were respectively labeled "tweedle 
doofus and tweedle doofuser." Leaders were planning, regardless of the election's 
outcome, to have a large post-election public meeting in a central location so people from 




Second Amendment rights would be under threat no matter which of the contenders 
gained the Presidency. After these central points of discussion, the meeting became less 
formal and members continued to talk amongst themselves for another hour or so before 
heading home.  
 Upon leaving the diner, I almost laughed at myself for feeling the need to have 
notified multiple people of my whereabouts, but called my friends and reassured them 
just the same. I was struck by just how much the feel of this group resembled the feel of 
an informal SCUBA divers' club that my father belonged to when I was young: primarily 
men, all of about the same socioeconomic class and general background, who shared one 
overarching interest. In this case it was not viewing aquatic life in its natural habitat and 
pushing oneself to learn better, safer, and deeper diving techniques, but rather focusing 
on political events of interests and learning how to better shoot with a variety of firearms. 
I realized what an unexplored data source the militia might be on everything from white 
masculinity to contemporary nationalism to conservative social movements, and 
immediately began my Institutional Review Board application to formally study the 
Michigan militia. 
 The following month, I attended the Field Day event leaders spoke about at the 
first meeting. This event allowed me to see the space where many militia units trained 
without yet attending a training. Sociologists Raymond Lee and Claire Renzetti have 
observed that members of any population may engage the researcher in various "trust 
tests" (1990:520), attempting to determine how reliable and honest the researcher is. My 
first trust test came as SMVM leaders asked me to collect and keep up with the $5 entry 




handgun to shoot five bowling pins off a table 50 feet away. This was ostensibly a test to 
see if I could be trusted to handle a small sum of money (about $250 total)8, but also 
served to test my basic math and interpersonal competencies as I interacted with each 
contestant. Although I was initially somewhat uncomfortable to be put in this role, I 
realized that I needed to demonstrate my worth, and that this was an easy opportunity to 
interact with members from other areas I had not yet encountered in a way that made me 
seem cooperative and unthreatening. 
 
MILITIA TRAININGS 
I passed this test, and at least one SMVM member who had been skeptical of me in prior 
interactions noticeably warmed to me after this event. I continued attending SMVM's 
public meetings through the summer of 2008 and gradually branched out to meetings 
with units in other parts of the state, too. Although trainings were open to the public, they 
were held on private land and felt more like a protected, private space. I waited until 
SMVM leaders invited me to attend, in October 2008, before doing so.  
Each militia unit in the state of Michigan has one or more locations—usually on 
private land—where they conduct their training and camping exercises. When I started 
my fieldwork, SMVM's trainings took place about 30 minutes south west of Flint on 
private farmland belonging to a WWII veteran who strongly believed in the militia's 
mission. He allowed groups from Michigan, Indiana and Ohio to practice there on their 
own schedule, and had previously supported various militia precursor groups like the 
Posse Comitatus, a group that gathered to discuss legal issues and that believed that 
                                                 
8 The collected money covered part of the cost of the bowling pins and prizes for the event; there were 




Figure 3: The WWII veteran's farmhouse at the site of militia 
training at the beginning of my fieldwork. Photo by Amy 
Cooter. 
 that county sheriffs held 
supreme local legal authority. 
Most militia units in the 
state trained at the farm 
alongside SMVM several times 
a year, usually in February's 
winter survival training and a 
couple of the summer months. 
Most members had to drive at 
least an hour to reach this location, with some traveling for closer to four hours. The site 
included two barns, a gorgeous but deteriorating two-story red-brick farm house (see 
Figure 3) that the farmer rented to tenants after his wife died, a small igloo-shaped hovel 
(see Figure 4) in which he then resided, and several parcels of land that were separated 
from each other by washed-out, uneven dirt paths just wide enough in most places to 
allow the passage of a pick-up truck or a small tractor. Most of the land was rented to a 
local man who used it to grow soybeans and corn, depending on the season. A large tract 
of wooded land that include a creek during the winter months but turned into unusable, 
smelly swampland in the summer and fall was separated from the fields by a strip of 
grassy expanse about 200 yards long by 50 feet wide. This grassy area was the primary 
SMVM training ground, though exercises occasionally took members into the swamp or 
fields.  
Upon arrival at the farm, most people parked behind the white-washed barn in a 




Figure 4: The building on the left is the igloo-shaped 
dwelling the WWII veteran built to reside in after his 
wife died. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
stickers or other markings on militia 
vehicles, but they were somehow never as 
interesting as I'd expected. There were 
many representations of the "Don't Tread 
on Me" Gadsden flag, and Ron Paul 
campaign stickers were common. Other 
than these and one sticker that read, "Be 
careful who you vote for, Hitler was 
picked in a free election," vehicles were largely unmarked. Additionally, fewer of them 
were American-made than I'd ever dreamed, especially being so close to Motor City and 
the legacy of the automotive industry. Even more surprisingly to me, many members had 
nothing but contempt for American auto manufacturers, whom they believed to be 
corrupted by lazy, entitled union workers who made poor quality goods. When my 11 
year old Pontiac needed its first major repair, which prevented me from arriving on time 
to a summer 2009 training, for example, two members laughed  and said, 'That's what 
you get for having a General Motors product!' 
Members geared up in the parking area, putting on head-to-toe camouflage, sturdy 
boots, and gear vets holding around 50 pounds of ammunition, tools, first aid kits and 
other supplies. They then grabbed their rifles and walked to the training ground—
diagonally across the uneven field when it was bare, or a trudging, muddy, half-mile walk 
around it when produce was still growing. A few members who had four-wheel drives 
(mostly Jeeps) braved the mushy, potholed, makeshift road and parked at the edge of the 




to be assisted by another member with a bigger truck, which offered a sometimes comical 
display of both masculinity and comradery. 
Just beyond the secondary parking point was a long-standing fire pit next to a 
picnic table where much of the day's social activity occurred. To the right of this, at the 
edge of the woods, men set up their tents for camping nearly every month, no matter the 
weather. A few men, usually those with military experience, slept completely out in the 
open, in nothing more than military surplus sleeping bags, even in deep snow. A huge 
green military tent, barely visible from this area, was permanently set up, hidden just 
behind the tree line, and held a wood stove and several stacked sleeping cots that were 
rusty, breaking, and did not appear to have been used for at least half a decade. 
According to militia lore, an associate of militia founder Norm Olson lived here with his 
wife for more than a year in the 1990s while evading police for some very minor 
misdemeanor. Farther away, a lean-to with a blue tarp covering the door concealed an 
outhouse, though its presence could not be disguised during hot summer events when its 
odor became unbearable on that side of the training ground.  
A seemingly random assortment of clutter lay between this point and the shooting 
range: the wooden skeleton of another small and apparently unused structure, the hull of 
a speedboat riddled with rust and old bullet holes, and a set of bleachers to allow 
spectators to more comfortably watch others who were shooting at the range. The range 
itself was a tall earthen berm safely angled away from distant neighbors. Plywood 
sheeting, to which paper targets could be tacked, was nailed to a scaffolding of 2x4s. Two 
tables, which were made of knob-less doors, stood about 50 feet back from the plywood 




Figure 5: Two shooters prepare to compete in an event at an April 2008 Field Day as a safety officer 
looks on. Photo courtesy of www.michiganmilitia.com. 
equipment. Strangely, each front corner of the range also had a completely functioning 
door and frame. These served no discernible purpose because people could easily walk 
past the tables onto the range. The reason for the setup with doors had long been 
forgotten by the time I began my fieldwork. 
 A tall flagpole stood to the left of the range, amidst a haphazard stack of 
hundreds of old tires that comprised the left-hand safety "wall" for the range. During 
trainings, the pole always supported an American flag, often with a Gadsden flag below 
it. Each training started with the pledge to the flag, although members running more than 
a few minutes late to the event missed it. The range always had a designated safety 
officer—a member who wore a bright orange vest and announced when the range was 




safety procedures. Members took this role in shifts, so as to share responsibility and allow 
everyone a chance to target practice and participate in other events. People in attendance 
at shooting functions were always told that "Everyone is a range safety officer," meaning 
that anyone, even the children, could and should call "Cease fire!" if they observed 
anything that looked remotely unsafe.  
Trainings also include a variety of non-shooting activities. Often, military 
veterans would share their knowledge of how to break down, clean, and reassemble 
different firearms. Others would conduct navigation classes, teaching people to follow a 
compass heading across different terrain. Members would also learn about moving 
together like a military unit, and would practice first-aid techniques, like using a 
makeshift stretcher to move someone out of harm's way. This was a skill they really used 
at least once when they assisted an overweight member who fell in deep snow and could 
not regain his footing during a winter training. 
To become an SMVM member, an individual must attend at least one training 
session and pass a two-part test. Part one requires potential members to have certain gear9 
on their person while doing a two mile walk in less than 45 minutes, and part two 
requires them to be able to hit eight out of ten shots on an eight inch paper plate from 100 
yards with their rifle. This is known as Level 1. Upon completion, members receive a 
laminated card with their picture and name (though no membership rosters are kept), and 
a uniform patch with their militia unit's name. These items are typically handed out 
during public meetings, and the members who have attained a new level of certification 
are very briefly recognized and applauded. Level 2 of certification requires more gear, a 
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faster walk, and a tighter shot pattern. SMVM set the standards for both levels of 
certification, and units around Michigan, as well as dozens of militias in other states 
follow these protocols, often with no modification10. People who are physically unable to 
complete one or both components of membership are still welcome to attend training, and 
those who do so regularly typically attain honorary membership status as "support" staff, 
who prepare meals and help with other tasks around camp. 
 
MOVING FORWARD 
To analyze how militia members understand themselves in contemporary society, the 
majority of this manuscript is organized around three central components of members' 
identities—Americanness, masculinity, and whiteness. However, I begin by clarifying the 
militia movement's origins and political position in Chapter Two to contextualize the 
movement both historically and politically and to provide the reader with context for 
interpreting the empirical chapters. I discuss how militias today differ from their origins 
in the 1990s, and how they differ from other groups with which they are commonly 
conflated to more fully define the movement. I argue that a frequently-cited framework 
for understanding militias—an "above ground" wing concealing an illegal and dangerous 
"underground" component—is faulty, and advocate a different model for understanding 
how militia units with varying orientations relate to each other. 
Chapter Three begins the empirical assessment and analyzes how masculinity is 
evoked in the militia movement and what it is that men get out of militia participation. At 
first glance, the militia would appear to be a hypermasculine space, where men live up to 
                                                 
10 Examples of modifications include militia units that require all members to have a particular kind of 




the archetype of a protective, independent man that is so embedded in this nation's 
mythos and that excludes women and feminized men. I show how the reasons men 
verbalize for their membership in the militia do correspond with this archetype, but the 
ways they enact masculinity in the militia is much more complicated that this superficial 
description would allow. In fact, many militia men use militia activity to test and expand 
what it means to be a man in contemporary American society. 
Chapter Four analyzes race in the militia movement. The militia is an 
overwhelmingly white space, but prides itself on following American principles of 
equality and inclusion. I give special attention to the how the militia's reaction to African 
Americans and Muslim Americans, which are the two racialized outgroups that are most 
salient to members in Michigan. I focus on how racism is evidenced in the group and 
what implications this has both for the militia and for its members' relationship to modern 
U.S. society. I argue that the militia's valuation of nationalism often makes members 
unknowingly overlook instances of racism in other members and in society as a whole, 
even as they use nationalism as the framework for promoting equality.  
Building on Chapter Three's and Chapter Four's findings regarding the role of 
members' idealized nationalism in shaping their understanding of masculinity and race, 
Chapter Five assesses the militia's relationship to authority and the effects of 
governmental social control on militia activity. I analyze members' responses to socio-
political events that occurred during my fieldwork and argue that the perceived 
legitimacy of authoritative interventions in the militia movement determines members' 
responses to those interventions. Members define legitimacy through a lens of national 




may be increased when law enforcement treat members as criminals without evidence of 
criminal behavior, or when they act without a full understanding of militia members' 
nationalistic vision.  
In the conclusion to this manuscript, I draw lessons gained across the previous 
chapters to assess what militia men can tell us about how lower to lower-middle class, 
white, American men are responding to evolving social norms related to equality and 
inclusion. I also return to power devaluation and suggest some further specifications to 
the model in light of the evidence presented in this manuscript. I then assess what it 
means to uniformly describe groups as "anti-government," and whether that is an 
analytically useful construction as applied to the militia movement. 
Finally, I include an appendix to address previous scholarship on militias. I 
discuss how the findings in this study differ from those in past work and suggest reasons 
for these disparities. I discuss the limitations of assumptions and data sources commonly 
used in previous work, and give special attention to data generated by watch groups who 





Contextualizing the Militia: Origins and Principles 
 
"Let me put it in a simple way if I can: we do not advocate overthrowing 
the government. We advocate taking the government back to what it was 
supposedly supposed to be under the Founding Fathers, which is a 
Constitutional government mainly made up of the people who tell the 
government [what to do] and not the government to tell us." 
- 36 year old Curtis 
 
 
Most people, even many current militia members I have met, first heard about the militia 
in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing when bomber Timothy McVeigh was 
described as a Michigan militia member in numerous media reports. Since then, the 
proffered image of militias has largely remained the same: middle-aged, white men 
dressed in camouflage, running around the woods spouting paranoid conspiracy theories 
while plotting vaguely against the government. Although there was likely at least some 
truth to this depiction in 1995, the overall militia picture today is more complex. This 
evolution in no small part occurred because of the negative attention McVeigh's action 
brought to the movement. 
 This chapter is intended to expand on the introduction's definition of militias and 
to provide the information necessary for fully contextualizing the empirical chapters of 
this manuscript. Militia men may share Libertarian principles or other commonalities 
with other nostalgic groups, but because this is not a comparative study, I hesitate to too 




Background information to allow the reader to contextualize the empirical chapters. I 
discuss the origins of the militia movement—the historical context as well as the events 
and people instrumental in the founding of modern day militias—and how the 
contemporary movement differs from its 1990s instantiation as well as some other 
contemporary groups. I analyze how my observations fit with a relatively new typology 
for understanding different kinds of militia units. 
 
ORIGINS OF THE MILITIA MOVEMENT 
Historical Context 
The contemporary militia started fairly recently in 1994, but nostalgic groups (those with 
a strong reverence for a mythologized past) have a long history in the U.S. They have 
been particularly active during the last century. Briefly considering their trajectory helps 
historicize and contextualize the contemporary militia movement.  
One of the first major nostalgic groups of the last century was the second 
instantiation of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which peaked in the early 1920s. KKK 
members were disproportionately Protestants who feared the encroachment of a greater 
number of Catholic immigrants to the U.S. (Lipset and Raab 1978). Members routinely 
participated in expressive violence to convey their belief that the increasing presence of 
Blacks and Catholic immigrants was denying white people economic opportunities, as 
well as preventing the advancement of "100 percent Americanism" (McVeigh 2009:21). 
The KKK also had a large impact on both state and national level politics in this decade 




Membership in the movement declined as the 1930s approached because, scholars 
believe, of its electoral successes (ibid.). 
The turmoil of The Great Depression in the 1930s led to what is known as the 
Coughlin movement. Political sociologist Seymour Lipset and his associate Earl Raab 
referred to this movement as "America's most distinctively 'fascist' movement" 
(1978:167) to emphasize its centralized leadership and desired suppression of certain 
immigrant groups. Despite the previous decade's rejection for Catholic immigrants 
(Bennett 1988; Countryman 2010), Father Charles Coughlin of Michigan successfully 
used his then-famous radio program as a platform to lambast Communists, praise some of 
Hitler's and Mussolini's policies, and eventually label Jews as "international bankers" 
who were benefitting from Roosevelt's New Deal (Diamond 1995). The movement 
claimed, at its height, as many as five million members, who were encouraged to vote 
according to Coughlin's anti-Communist and anti-Capitalist beliefs. Coughlin's program 
continued until after U.S. involvement in WWII forced him to stop broadcasting anti-
Jewish propaganda, on order of Catholic leadership (Lipset and Raab 1978). 
 Nostalgic groups were relatively silent during the 1940s, and historian David 
Bennett (1998) argues that this was in part because generous New Deal policies and 
general wartime solidarity made it difficult to have a sustained portrayal of any 
immigrant group as un-American. However, the nascent anti-Communist ideology of the 
era would amplify in the 1950s in the form of McCarthyism. While not a movement per 
se, McCarthyism can be understood as a backlash response to the idea that America was 
losing economic power relative to emerging Communist threats in Russia, China and 




sentiment was especially true for people who were newly upwardly mobile following the 
war (Bennett 1988), and McCarthyism of course had very real consequences for people 
who were blacklisted or otherwise investigated as potential Communist traitors to the 
American way of life.  
The Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 eliminated 
segregation in public schools and spurred another wave of KKK and other white-led 
protest activity and violence. The John Birch Society, for example, formed in 1958 as 
ostensibly as an anti-Communist, non-racist organization, and experienced much popular 
support (Cox 1992). However, the Society's version of supporting nationalism often 
faded into pure nativism, and leaders often proffered both anti-Semitic and anti-Black 
ramblings. These exclusionary speeches were guised, respectively, as now-familiar 
"Bilderberger" or "New World Order" conspiracy theories11 and opposition to the need 
for civil rights legislation that sounded very similar to more recent anti-Affirmative 
Action statements (Diamond 1995; Lipset and Raab 1978). Willis Carto, a WWII veteran 
whose war experiences sparked an interest in foreign policy, started, also in the late 
1950s, a less well-known organization called the Liberty Lobby that similarly relied on 
anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, and New World Order conspiracism to attract followers 
disenchanted with their changing society (Diamond 1995). 
Birchers, Liberty Lobbyists, and a still-active KKK all supported Alabama 
Governor George Wallace's pro-segregation platform in the 1964 Presidential election 
(Diamond 1995). The catalyst for this support and for racialized violence more broadly in 
this time was, of course, the Civil Rights Movement and legislation like the Civil Rights 
                                                 
11 Both Bilderberger and New World Order conspiracy theories are still bandied about some nostalgic 
groups today. Both refer conspiracies to the idea that some mysterious group of wealthy, international elites 




Act of 1964. Additionally, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 resulted in an 
increase in immigration from non-European countries (Bennett 1988). These changes 
collectively made many Whites feel that their place in the economic and racial hierarchy 
was threatened, and this threat was compounded for many men who felt further 
threatened by Feminism's second wave and women's increasing presence in the 
workplace (Diamond 1995; Faludi 2000; Rosen 2000); it was, according to journalist 
Barbara Ehrenreich (1990), a "fear of falling," or of losing social position relative to a 
past era. 
In the 1970s, the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam, effectively losing the war. Similar 
to the response to the 1950s Communist threat, many Americans felt national power was 
slipping, and this feeling was only amplified by the 1973 oil embargo and subsequent 
shortage (Bennett 1988; Diamond 1995); as Bennett says, these new "limits on resources 
in the land of opportunity" (1988:342) threatened many people's belief in American 
Exceptionalism and their ability to attain the American Dream.  
The proposed Equal Rights Amendment and increasing abortion rights further 
compounded this instability and destabilized traditional gender relations, according to 
sociologist Sarah Diamond (1995). The emergent Christian Right successfully harnessed 
these sentiments of alienation to become the dominant nostalgic force of the 1980s. It 
was also a major factor in the election of Republican President Ronald Reagan, a man 
revered by many politically conservative people as a kind of cowboy hero who knew the 
value of hard work and masculine individualism. The nostalgic element is most clear for 
the Christian Right in their attempt to fight the expansion of women's rights and 




Researcher Jean Hardisty (2000) notes how organizations within the Christian Right—the 
Promise Keepers, for example—advocated a continued stark, division of labor between 
the sexes as a way to maintain Christian principles. 
Behavior motived by racial exclusion was also present in this decade in various 
racist groups who practiced violent, racially-motivated outbursts (Hamm 1993). For 
example, after several failed political attempts, known KKK member David Duke ran a 
successful bid for the Louisiana House of Representatives in 1989, indicating at least 
some degree of widespread tolerance for overt racist ideology (Ridgeway 1995). Duke 
remained in the public eye during the 1990s12, winning enough votes to force a runoff in 
the primary election for Louisiana governor, and again pushing the KKK's ideology into 
the public spotlight.  
 
Formative Events for the Militia Movement 
Other nostalgic groups in the U.S. certainly had specific grievances, but most of these 
groups are understood to be backlash movements against broad social change that was 
more inclusive to women and non-whites. While early militia members may have been 
uncomfortable with some of these same broad social changes, there are three very 
specific events that sparked the start of the contemporary militia movement in 1994: 
separate government sieges in Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas, and firearms 
legislation in the form of the Brady Bill. Most militia authors (e.g., Chermak 2002; 
                                                 
12 Racist groups as a whole, however, suffered negative attention in this decade, largely as a result of a 
successful civil suit against one notable neo-Nazi group at the hands of the Southern Poverty Law Center 
(Ezekiel 1995). The Center sued Tom Metzger's White Aryan Resistance on behalf of the family of an 
Ethiopian immigrant who was brutally murdered by the group's adherents. The suit bankrupted Metzger 





Crothers 2003; Freilich 2003; George and Wilcox 1996; Levitas 2004; Mulloy 2008; 
Stern 1996) argue that these events were necessary conditions for the formation of the 
militia movement, meaning that militias should not be understood as merely a backlash 
against social progress. A fourth event, the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma 
City in 1995 was equally important for shaping the course of the movement. I discuss 
each of these events in detail below. 
 
Ruby Ridge 
The first event was the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) siege of the Weaver family 
in Ruby Ridge, Idaho. Randy Weaver was ex-military, had at least superficial ties to neo-
Nazi organizations, and had moved with his wife and three children to a remote cabin in 
Ruby Ridge to be distant from a society they saw as corrupt and likely headed for a 
Biblical apocalypse (Crothers 2003). Prior to the siege, Weaver had a decade-long 
involvement with the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) 
stemming from allegations a neighbor made following a land dispute as well as possible 
illegal firearms handling.  
A grand jury indicted Weaver for making and possessing illegal firearms in 
December 1990, after the ATF initially made false statements about Weaver's criminal 
history; this happened after Weaver refused to act as an informant against a local neo-
Nazi organization ("Raid" 1995). A series of procedural delays and miscommunications 
from the court resulted in a bench warrant being issued for Weaver in March 1991, but it 
was not until 1992 that U.S. Marshals started to stake out the Weaver home in an effort to 




 Although the sequence of events at the beginning the siege is somewhat disputed, 
the results of day one were very clear: one federal agent was dead, Weaver's teenage son 
who had gone outside to retrieve the family dog was dead—shot in the back—and an 
adult male family friend, Kevin Harris, was wounded (Crothers 2003). FBI hostage 
rescue arrived following the agent's death, leading to more bloodshed on day two of the 
siege. This time, Weaver himself was shot by a single bullet while tending to the body of 
his dead son. As he fled back into the house, more FBI sniper bullets followed, and one 
went straight through the head of Weaver's wife, who was indoors and holding their ten 
month old daughter (ibid.). Weaver, his two young daughters, and family friend Harris all 
surrendered a week later. A jury eventually acquitted Weaver of all charges except failure 
to appear at his original court hearing and violating bail conditions.  
 Much of the nation was horrified as they watched these events unfold on the 
nightly news. Many people saw the events of Ruby Ridge as a sign that the government 
could not be trusted and might act violently toward its own citizens with little 
justification or provocation, as a sign of tyranny in what was supposed to be the land of 
the free (Walter 2002). People were specifically upset about three things. First, that 
charges leading to Weaver's interaction with federal authorities were exaggerated and, in 
part, likely retribution for his refusal to act as an informant. Second, that federal agents 
would surround and essentially hold hostage a private citizen and his family on his own 
land, especially when he was not accused of dangerous offenses. Finally, that, given these 
conditions, federal agents would use a "shoot on sight" directive and murder a teenager 




The Department of Justice performed an investigation of the siege, while the 
Senate held hearings and ultimately found that federal agents had in fact acted 
unconstitutionally and with excessive force. Several federal agents were professionally 
disciplined for their roles in the siege, but none were criminally prosecuted. Weaver, his 
daughters, and Harris all eventually received substantial civil damages from the federal 
government (Crothers 2003).  
 
Waco 
Well before the Department of Justice and Senate investigations of Ruby Ridge were 
complete, a second siege began in Waco, Texas in early 1993. This time, a religious sect 
known as the Branch Davidians, led by David Koresh, was suspected of child abuse and 
illegal weapons possession. Just as with Ruby Ridge, it later became clear that most the 
allegations used to justify an initial raid of the Davidian compound in February 1993 
were exaggerated (Kopel and Blackman 1997). Additionally, news of the raid reached the 
media and eventually Koresh before it happened, allowing the Davidians to prepare by 
arming and securing themselves within the sect's compound, which the raid's blueprint 
could not accommodate. Four ATF agents were killed in the ensuing firefight, as were 
sixteen Branch Davidians. The FBI took control of the scene, and a fifty-one day siege 
followed while Koresh tried to bargain for time to finish his religious treatise (Crothers 
2003). Some children were released from the compound during the siege, but little 
overall progress was made.  
A second raid began April 19, 1993, resulting in fires throughout the compound 




investigations concluded that the FBI had acted improperly, this time losing evidence and 
not acting within clearly-defined hostage scenario protocols (Kopel and Blackman 1997). 
Happening so soon after Ruby Ridge and only a week after Weaver's trial had begun, 
many people's fears of a tyrannical government only increased. As politics and 
government professor Lane Crothers notes: 
"Thus believers in the evil of the federal government not only had 
evidence of what government might do to anyone who deviated from its 
rules—especially regarding guns—but also had proof of who the primary 
actors in the coming oppression would be" (2003:99).  
 
The Weavers and the Davidians became not heroes, as some have described (Levitas 
2004), but rather martyrs for a burgeoning movement of people motivated by patriotism 
and a sense of eroding national identity. 
 
The Brady Bill 
Just seven months after the Waco siege's violent end, the people who were most worried 
about their ability to protect themselves from government tyranny felt even more 
threatened when President Bill Clinton signed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act into law. The law went into effect in February 1994 and set certain limits on the sale 
of handguns. Its major result was to implement required criminal and psychiatric 
background checks for individuals purchasing firearms, and it also instituted a mandatory 
five day waiting period between purchase and receipt of a handgun until background 




Figure 6: A portion of the weapons present at a 
summer training session; all are unloaded. Photo 
from http://s657.photobucket.com/profile/SMVM 
It is worth noting that most militia 
members with whom I have interacted 
would prefer that criminals and deranged 
individuals not have access to any type of 
firearm, but they, as well as other non-
militia, pro-gun rights advocates, strongly 
believe that any restriction on the widest 
possible interpretation of the Second 
Amendment (the right to bear arms) is 1) 
unconstitutional and 2) likely to lead to 
other limitations on Second Amendment as well as other "intrinsic" rights. This 
was the same belief structure that undergirded opposition to the Brady Bill13. 
These concerns were only amplified by the impending Federal Assault Weapons 
Ban, which ultimately passed in September 1994 and made it illegal to possess a 
variety of semi-automatic weapons made after September 1994 without additional 
collectors' licensing (Churchill 2009). 
Just after the Brady Bill passed into law and while the Assault Weapons Ban was 
still making its way through Congress, the Militia of Montana formed in February 1994. 
The Militia of Montana was the first of its kind, though the Michigan militia's future 
leadership—primarily Norman Olson and Ray Southwell—were already discussing 
starting their own group. Olson and Southwell held a planning meeting in March 1994. 
The official first militia meeting happened April 22, followed by the first training the last 
                                                 
13 Some people in the broad gun-rights community also interpret anti-gun rights legislation as potentially 




weekend of April 1994, as original documents14 from Olson indicate, and the Michigan 
Militia Corps of Wolverines (MMCW) was born, (fax from Olson to several MI sheriffs, 
April 7, 1995; fax from Kenneth Adams to "all Brigades," April 14, 1995; letter from 
Olson to Bob Burns, Undated; handout from Olson of upcoming training dates, April 29, 
1994).  
Importantly, some authors place the emergence of the modern militia movement 
prior to 1994. This is due to three factors. First, some authors (e.g., Stern 1996) imply 
that the militia had to have an earlier start date because attorney Linda Thompson from 
Indiana sent a fax in response to Waco over the American Patriot Fax Network (APFN) 
asking that all members of the "Unorganized Militia" assemble at the Davidian 
compound as a show of support. However, this was in fact an early, and ultimately failed, 
attempt to start a national militia from the ranks of the APFN—a loosely organized group 
of individuals who started corresponding during the Randy Weaver trial out of concern 
over the government's actions at Ruby Ridge.  
Thompson has been portrayed as a proverbial queen of the militia movement 
(e.g., Kaplan 1995; Wright 2007), and while she did very publicly try to inject herself 
into the movement, internal militia documents tell a slightly different story. Thompson 
only connected with the APFN when Koresh apparently gave one of its leaders, Gary 
Hunt, his power of attorney, and Thompson offered her assistance (Crothers 2003). Many 
militia leaders were glad of the attention Thompson brought to early movement efforts 
and some still praise the "true story" documentary she compiled of the Waco siege; 
                                                 
14 In this manuscript, I cite these documents as personal communications to give more detail as to their 
origin. After I finished my initial review of the documents I received from Mr. Olson, I put them in 
electronic format for my personal use, then donated them to the Bentley Historical Library in Ann Arbor, 




however, leaders were actually very wary of her motives and methods. Few of them 
seemed to know who she was in the early days, and faxes across on the APFN seem to 
indicate an acrimonious relationship with Thompson, at best (faxed copies of documents 
regarding a lawsuit between Thompson and a militia figure named Joseph Ditzhazy, 
February 4, 1995; a fax from Ditzhazy calling Thompson a "charlatan," and accusing her 
of "questionable or illegal activity," March 20, 1995; an email from Thompson to Olson 
accusing him of "being played like a violin," "doing damage to the movement," and 
"losing any and all credibility," May 5, 1995). Olson told me that, to his knowledge, 
Thompson was never affiliated with any militia group, but instead tried to insert herself 
into national debates of militia interest (personal communication, January 29, 2011). 
A second source of a misidentified militia start date is a lack of access to original 
militia documentation, which Norm Olson gave me, that shows meaningful conversations 
to initiate militias did not occur until 1994. Third, and most importantly, there is 
frequently a conflation between the militia and various precursor groups. Specifically, 
many authors (e.g., Crothers 2003; Ferber 1999; Ferber and Kimmel 2004; Kimmel and 
Ferber 2000; Stern 1996; Wright 2007) do not adequately differentiate between militias 
and other so-called patriot groups, a problem I explain in more detail below.  
 
Oklahoma City Bombing 
The militia movement was extraordinarily successful during its first year of life in 1994, 
with militias active in at least thirty-six states (Stern 1996:96), and garnering membership 
in the thousands in Michigan alone (Churchill 2009). Just a year later, however, April 19, 




midnight ride—brought the movement to its proverbial knees. On this date, Timothy 
McVeigh, an Army veteran of the first Gulf War detonated a bomb in a federal building 
in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, many of them children. McVeigh was initially 
linked to the MMCW, and though the FBI later cleared the militia of all involvement 
(e.g., Duffy and Brantley 1997),15 some academic and media reports alike continue to 
make the connection. This was (and often continues to be) a major strain on the 
movement.  
Attorney and researcher Kenneth Stern notes that four different militia reactions 
emerged following the Oklahoma City bombing: 1) complete group dissolution, 2) no 
structural change but avoidance of the label "militia," 3) membership growth, and 4) 
change from an open, public orientation to a secretive, underground status (1996:209). 
While it is likely that all four reactions did distinctly occur in some militias around the 
country, the MMCW—the militia at the center of negative attention—responded a bit 
differently. A core group, concentrated in the south-eastern part of the state remained 
largely intact, keeping "militia" in its name while disavowing the "Wolverines" 
connection. As 47 year old, white collar worker Adam said,  
"Well, we coulda changed the name. But then I think, in that 
circumstance, I would be surrendering. That would be giving in. And I 
was not one to give in."  
 
However, some members, including co-founder Olson, did leave after public 
statements and televised Senate hearings on the militia created some embarrassment. In 
short, Olson initially attributed the bombing to a terror attack by the Japanese, based on 
                                                 
15 Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirator Terry Nichols did attend either one or two militia trainings. 
However, two militia members I have talked with who claimed to be in attendance when McVeigh and 
Nichols were present further claim that the two were quickly asked to leave after handing out racist 




information received through the APFN (fax from Debra von Trapp to Norm labeled "Re 
Japanese Bombing/Oklahoma," April 24, 1995; fax from von Trapp to APFN, titled 
"Oklahoma Bombing Linked to Japanese Retaliation for U.S. Gas Attack," April 24, 
1995). Olson tried, without much success, to start other smaller militias independent from 
the remaining original members, before moving to Alaska in 2004. Other members who 
left the group in 1995 did quit altogether, while yet others operated in more exclusive, 
more secretive militias, including Mark Koernke, a former University of Michigan janitor 
who gained notoriety via short-wave "patriot" radio. 
At this point, the Michigan militia became a movement in abeyance (Taylor 1989; 
Zwerman el al. 2000): although members' underlying belief structure largely stayed the 
same, the socio-political climate was not conducive to militia activity, and remaining 
activity became increasingly difficult to observe. There certainly were notable incidents 
of militia members in the news during this time where, for example, leaders very publicly 
protested government regulations of privately owned land or staged stand offs on behalf 
of individuals refusing to pay income taxes (for example, a "press release" from Olson 
titled "Feds Rule Against State in Manufactured Housing Feud: Homeowner's Defiance 
Has Town Zoning Board Crying Uncle," August 14, 1995). Incidents like these were 
largely headed by one or two former leaders (often Olson), trying to reinvigorate the 
movement.  
There were also a few cases of self-identified militia members, including 
Koernke, evading police or being arrested for illegal weapons possessions (Chermak 
2002). Again, however, these were actions taken by rogue individuals or small groups 




At most a few hundred, and perhaps more likely a few dozen, people in Michigan would 
have identified as militia members through most of the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Current members who have been involved since the movement's inception 
report16 that the next major surge in militia activity happened as "Y2K" neared, when 
mass chaos was predicted from computing systems that were not designed to identify the 
year 2000. People apparently sought out the militias' knowledge about food storage and 
other forms of self-reliance in the event of mass computing systems' shutdown. 
Documentation from that time confirms that Y2K was a very popular topic of 
conversation, and leaders were presumably discussing what attendees wanted to hear. 
When January 1, 200017, arrived with none of the previously predicted dire consequences 
to the world's computing or financial systems, these new members reportedly stopped 
participating. As thirty-five year old Edward, who works in construction, observed: 
"They were I guess if you want to say 'disillusioned' with the fact that after 
2000 when the world didn't explode, that people took their shit and went 
home basically. You know? They're like 'Aww, shit I stocked up for 
nothin' and the world didn't explode!' And people didn't stick with it [the 
militia]…they were starting to feel like it wasn't needed and nothin' was 
ever gonna happen…" 
 
Members similarly report a temporary surge in attendance following the 9/11 attacks, as 
people were upset that their country had been attacked and wanted to learn ways they 
could defend themselves and their families. 
                                                 
16Because of a lack of membership or attendance records, it is impossible to verify reports of participation 
that happened prior to my fieldwork. Perceptions of militia activity among long-term members are still 
important for how they understand their movement and its catalysts, even if their reports are not 100% 
accurate or verifiable in retrospect.  
17Importantly, this bump in attendance occurred before the 2000 election cycle began. Leaders report that 
there was no subsequent membership increase in anticipation of the end of President Clinton's 
administration in the following year, and no documentation I have seen reflects a concern with the 




The period of movement abeyance did not truly end for the militia, however, until 
early 2009, following months of unrest over the Iraq War, the beginning of a global 
economic recession, the inauguration of the first black President, Barack Obama, and the 
release of a controversial Department of Homeland Security report on "right wing 
extremism." Summer 2009 brought attendance at militia events that was easily double 
that of the previous year and left one leader saying, 'This is what the militia should have 
looked like 15 years ago!' In my observations, attendance as of early 2011 decreased 
somewhat, but was still consistently higher than pre-2009 levels.  
 
MILITIA PREVALENCE IN MICHIGAN 
It is commonly accepted among militia scholars that Michigan has been a critical site of 
militia activity both in the '90s and today, but reasons why militia activity is so prevalent 
in this state relative to other states are less clear. Criminologist Joshua Freilich (2003) 
quantitatively assessed state-level covariates of militia participation in the '90s, finding 
that high rates of gun ownership, high presence of active and veteran military and of law 
enforcement positively correlated with states' militia activity. Freilich also found that 
female empowerment, defined as women's median income relative to men's, was 
negatively correlated with state's militia activity. These findings support qualitative 
claims, such as those made by sociologist James Gibson, that link militia activity to 
cultural valuation of a certain mythical, near "warrior," masculine identity (1994). 
 It is not my goal to reproduce Freilich's analysis for the 2000s or attempt to 
confirm his findings for the most recent version of the militia movement. Although 




agencies is the best possible approach to a quantitative, state-level analysis, watch group 
data remains problematic, as I discuss in detail in the Appendix. A qualitative 
understanding is more appropriate for the research questions here. It is still worth noting, 
however, a few basic characteristics about Michigan that may influence militia 
membership in that state. 
In 2010, Michigan was the only state with negative population change from 2000, 
according to the Census (2011), and was the state with the highest unemployment rate 
from 2006 to 2009, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010). These data would 
support Freilich's premise of militia members (and others in Michigan, of course) as 
being particularly financially strained. Additionally, the latest report from the American 
Community Survey on gendered earnings indicates that on women's earnings as a percent 
of men's earnings, Michigan ranks the 9th lowest state (Semega 2009). This would fit with 
Freilich's findings that low female empowerment is correlated with more militia 
presence.  
However, other data are problematic for generalizing Freilich's findings to the 
modern Michigan militia. Estimates compiled from the Department of Veteran's Affairs 
indicate that Michigan ranks 41st for the number of Gulf War veterans, and 45th for the 
number of Vietnam veterans (2007); when controlling for state population size, Michigan 
still only ranks 9th and 21st respectively. Using the number of hunters each state licenses 
as an alternative proxy for gun ownership18, Michigan sold the third most licenses in 
                                                 
18Quantitative estimates of gun ownership typically use the number of FBI background checks conducted 
by each state. This is a problematic measure of gun ownership, and I use the number of state hunting 
licenses as an alternative proxy here. Each state reports the number of individual hunting license purchasers 
each year to the Fish and Wildlife Service. These numbers reflect residents of the state in question, as well 




2010, just behind Pennsylvania and Texas, according to data compiled from the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service (2011). However, when controlling for state population sizes, 
Michigan ranks only 19th, behind several western and southern states. It would seem then, 
that state-level statistics are inadequate for explaining the current militia presence in 
Michigan. 
Two factors that Freilich's (2003) study did not attempt to incorporate as possible 
determinants of state-level militia activity that I nonetheless believe may be important are 
crime levels and perceived government corruption19. Several Michigan cities are known 
for their high crime rates, and Detroit in particular is nearly synonymous with murder and 
other violent crime (Briscoe and Hunter 2013). Michigan also has a long history of 
political corruption, and The Center for Public Integrity, for example, gave Michigan an 
"F" and ranked it the 44th best state on a recent measure of state corruption derived from 
330 different factors (2012). Michigan news stories commonly refer to corruption at all 
levels: a mayor removed from office and charged with numerous felony offenses 
(Thomas 2012), school board members charged with embezzling funds (Williams 2010), 
a police chief removed from office because of his involvement sex scandals (Yaccino 
2012), police officers prosecuted for stealing items out of evidence (Wilczynski 2012), or 
an officer convicted of killing his pregnant girlfriend (Associated Press 2012).  
In this context, it is unsurprising that Michigan militia members, who are already 
watchful of government action, feel the need to protect themselves and do not trust the 
                                                                                                                                                 
reflective of an idealized and masculinized frontierism in which the militia believes than is the background 
check measure.  
19 Freilich does include a measure of "political turmoil," defined as the percent of each state's vote cast for a 
third party candidate in the 1992 Presidential Election, and finds that it is positively correlated with militia 
activity; however, I believe this measure suffers from a problem of endogeneity as is likely picking up the 




government or its agents to act in their best interest. This also fits with sociologist 
Jennifer Carlson's (2012) study of male gun owners. Carlson argues that part of what gun 
owning men are expressing through their possession of and practice with firearms is a 
desire to critique the State's police powers. Carlson's participants, who generally took 
care to distance themselves from any perceptions of militia involvement (personal 
communication, March 5, 2012) tended to either be concerned with the State's inability to 
protect them or with a need to be protected from the State. In other words, these non-
militia gun-owning men reflected both concerns that militia men also seem to have 
regarding State ineptitude and corruption. 
A final factor that I believe to be important in the prevalence of militias in 
Michigan is charismatic leadership. As much as sociologists have moved away from 
considering the role of charismatic leaders in social movements in recent work, strong 
personalities should not be ignored in either the origination or perpetuation of the militia 
movement. Other contributing factors aside, it is difficult to imagine that the militia 
would have taken root in Michigan specifically without the presence of outwardly warm 
and persuasive figures such as Norm Olson (or in Montana, John Trochman), or that 
would have continued without contemporary leaders with similar personalities. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CONTEMPORARY MILITIA AND THE 
MILITIA OF THE 1990s 
 
Although in many ways a continuation of its 1990s instantiation, the militia movement 
today nonetheless has several important differences from those origins, all derived from 
lessons following both successes and failures in the '90s. First, in the words of a key 




[…] smarter and calmer, less prone to knee-jerk reactions." In other words, they are better 
informed about both legal and political issues relevant to the movement, are less likely to 
become involved in altercations between the government and private citizens, and less 
likely to be confrontational with law enforcement than they were in the past. My 
interactions with past members, present members, and members involved in both time 
frames strongly support this claim, as does documentation from both periods. 
 A second difference between the militia movement of today and that of the '90s is 
that little remains of its previously strict hierarchical structure. In the '90s, it could be said 
that there was one unified Michigan Militia—MMCW. It had a state commander, a 
county commander for most of Michigan's 83 counties, and multiple brigades per county, 
the number of which was based on overall participation, with each having a brigade 
leader. Brigades operated relatively independently on a month-to-month basis, though the 
state leadership tried to set standards for general training procedures, and leaders met for 
both county- and state-wide meetings a few times yearly. As the language here suggests, 
all members held a "rank" parallel to that of military branches that reflected their position 
in the hierarchy, regardless of prior military involvement. 
 Today, the exact number of distinct militia groups at any given moment is 
difficult to establish. While there is no state-level structure, and much less adherence to 
rank labels, different militia groups still train with each other regularly. Additionally, if 
someone decides to start a militia in their own area, it is not uncommon that they receive 
attention from three or four members for several months before those newcomers lose 
interest or are simply too busy to participate; in that instance, the original founder of the 




Figure 7: Members from five different units chat and look at new gear during a break at a fall training. 
Photo by Amy Cooter. 
active militias (by my definition, ones that host trainings and have at least three members 
who participate in most trainings) one month may dramatically vary from the count the 
following month.  
However, there are twelve distinct groups that have experienced a high degree of 
stability and participation during my fieldwork, the largest and most stable of which is 
SMVM. This group has the most direct leadership ties to the earlier MMCW group and  
capitalizes on that legacy to maintain legitimacy within the overall movement20. SMVM's 
trainings are the most attended in the state of Michigan, and members from other units 
come to them for training and leadership input, not the other way around. Additionally, 
militias in other states are in frequent contact with SMVM; many used SMVM's training 
                                                 
20 There are approximately two dozen individuals across the state trying to reinitiate the old MMCW and 
its hierarchical structure, but so far, the majority of these people primarily stay involved in distinct local 
militias. Only one group of about eight to twelve members is consistently training under the "Wolverines" 
banner, but this certainly is not the state-wide participation of the '90s, capable of maintaining an all-county 
presence. The state commander of this group was recently ousted after barely a year of service, further 




manuals, and, around once a year on average, a militia unit from another state will 
participate in an SMVM training after making a lengthy drive to do so. 
 Cross-training is in no small part catalyzed by the third major difference between 
the movement of today and that of the '90s: communication facilitation through the 
internet. Primary militia communication in the '90s happened among leaders over faxes 
or landline telephones, with county leaders passing important messages on to brigade 
leaders, who in turn passed them to brigade members. Information of interest to the entire 
movement could frequently be heard over shortwave radio stations, like Koernke's 
"Liberty Tree Radio" and at occasional gatherings during gun shows or similar events, 
which were the primary site for face-to-face member recruitment according to those 
active in the militia at that time (also see Gallaher 2003).  
Today, leaders do communicate—though more informally—with each other about 
major issues at leadership meetings or via cell phones, and communication to all 
members in this less hierarchical structure happens instantaneously over the internet. 
Message boards, usually private, are the primary interface, supplemented with occasional 
emails or social networking messages as relevant. Attempts at in-person recruitment to 
the militia still happen, but now recruitment attempts are largely limited to members' 
existing networks of family and acquaintances. They are also largely unsuccessful in 
producing new members. Only one of my interviewees knew someone involved in the 
militia prior to joining himself. 
There is also virtually no successful recruitment at gun shows or other non-militia 
public events in today's militia. Newcomers are instead attracted through webpages such 




YouTube. Potential recruits then either contact leaders via email addresses listed on these 
sites, requesting more information, or simply show up to a local militia meeting in their 
area, information about which is listed on those sites.  
A final crucial difference between the militia of today and its first iteration is its 
overall size. Instead of the thousands of members in its heyday in 1994-1995, I estimate 
that there are no more than 500 active militia participants in the entire state of Michigan 
today. I emphasize "estimate" here because no membership rosters are maintained and it 
is impossible to know with certainly how many militia members there are in any given 
state. I define a member as a person who attends meetings or training functions at least 
four times a year. Members, by my definition, need not necessarily have passed the Level 
1 qualification. This is because some groups' most consistent attendees are people who 
are "support staff" who are physically unable to complete the Level 1 requirements, who 
nonetheless spend considerably more time than most members contributing to the group 
by, for example, preparing written materials for others' use or by planning and preparing 
meals for members who attend trainings.  
Militia leaders provide a dramatically different answer to the question of overall 
militia size—anywhere from 2,000 to 10,000 members, depending on the respondent. 
However, they tend to count as members either all people who have ever met the 
qualifications for membership, or people who have met the qualifications in the last one 
to three years. It is not uncommon for people to show up to one or two trainings, meet the 
membership requirement and obtain their membership card, and then not return to future 
trainings. I find it much more reasonable to only count individuals who have been 




once-connected individuals, however, as people who sympathize with the militia's 
message and who could return to militia participation if political or other circumstances 
induce them to do so. 
 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MILITIAS AND OTHER NOSTALGIC GROUPS 
 
Some authors and militia members alike describe militias as being part of a larger "patriot 
movement," of likeminded individuals who express their love for the nation in slightly 
different ways. This term is most often used disparagingly, however, by watch 
organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center to refer to a cluster of nostalgic and 
politically conservative organizations (e.g., "Cross Talk" 2010). The common element 
across groups that fall under this term is that they all strongly believe the U.S. and its 
Constitution need to be protected from threats to their fundamental identities. The sources 
and severity of these threats, as well as desired solutions to them vary dramatically across 
different groups in the movement.  
There is often little communication or political action, alongside large amounts of 
discord between groups described as being part of the patriot movement, such that unified 
movement status across groups is highly questionable. For example, some groups falling 
under this label claim strong religious motivations while others do not, and many groups 
have no firearms training whatsoever. Other authors have also recognized the distinction 
between groups of the patriot movement groups and suggested we need more nuanced 
labels for different groups with different behaviors and ideologies (e.g., Berlet 2004; 




In Michigan, militia members have few ties to other groups that fall under the 
umbrella term "patriot movement," even relatively mainstream groups like the Tea Party. 
It is true that militia members and Tea Partiers alike may support Libertarian political 
perspectives, and that militia members tend to favor Tea Party candidates like Ron Paul. 
However, it is very rare that militia members participate in Tea Party events, or vice 
versa. They also only rarely participate in the Oath Keepers organization, which is a 
network of former and current law enforcement and military personnel who swear to 
uphold the Constitution, even if their superiors order them to violate it. Militia members 
likewise vow to support the Constitution, and many are former military, but only one 
member I encountered claimed to be a part of the organization—an act which requires no 
more than going to a website, signing up for free, and printing an instantly generated 
membership card. 
Further, only one fifth of my interviewees are involved in the National Rifle 
Association. The majority of militia members see the organization as "too political," or as 
making too many political concessions rather than forcefully defending the Second 
Amendment. More members express a preference for a lesser-known, but harder-line 
organization called Gun Owners of America. Still others support Jews for the 
Preservation of Firearms Ownership—a group that advocates gun ownership as a way to 
avoid a second Holocaust—even though no Michigan Member I encountered claims 
Jewish heritage.  
The reason that most members are not involved in multiple political outlets with 
similar goals is often because they say they do not have the time or money to do so. 




work, attend two or three militia functions a month (ranging from 12 to more than 30 
hours of participation a month, depending on the events), and spend their remaining free 
time with their families. Militia participation reflects, for them, the ideal expression of 
their political perspectives while offering physical activities that members find enjoyable 
and that most of the above organizations cannot offer. For most members, the physical 
enactment of their ideology is something they say they find essential, and something that 
is relatively unique to the militia among other ideologically similar groups. 
The one exception to this lack of cross-participation in other groups is the Open 
Carry movement. This movement encourages law abiding gun owners to visibly carry 
their handguns in places they are legally allowed to do so. Their argument is, first, that if 
this right to open carry is not exercised, states may move to restrict it as well as other 
Second Amendment rights, and, second, that if other law abiding citizens see normal 
people with handguns, they may begin to be less fearful of them and recognize gun 
owners as reliable and trustworthy fellow citizens. Militia members uniformly support 
these positions and many routinely openly carry their handguns when conducting daily 
business. Participation in this "movement" notably requires no additional time 
commitment and thus allows militia members to be involved without compromising time 
spent on other activities or requiring additional financial expenditures.  
There are two groups with which militias are most often conflated that merit 
further differentiation here. The first is white supremacist and other racist groups. Racist 
groups' major guiding principle is the belief that Whites are intellectually and culturally 
superior to all other races. These groups often advocate violence toward non-Whites and 




future of the white "race," and of the nation itself. As Chapter Four shows, Michigan's 
militias are not racist at the group level, meaning that individual members may still 
harbor varying degrees of racism, but that racism is not a goal for militias as a group (also 
see Berlet 2004; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2009; George and Wilcox 1996). In fact, 
Detroit's sizable neo-Nazi population has derisively dismissed the Michigan militia as 
working against white interests by encouraging minority membership and as probably 
being aligned with their "Jewish enemies" ("Michigan Militia" 2008).  
The second group with which militias are often conflated are the Minutemen who 
patrol the southern border of the U.S. and watch for illegal immigrants. Members of the 
Minutemen often wear camouflage and carry firearms while talking about illegal 
immigrants' negative impact on the economy and broader culture of the U.S. (Shapira 
2011). It is understandable that, at first glance, Minutemen would be assumed to be the 
same as militia groups, but there are very important differences that set the groups apart.  
First, Minutemen do not participate in any kind of paramilitary or weapons 
training. Sociologist Harel Shapira conducted an ethnography with several segments of 
the Minutemen in Arizona and reported that, contrary to public perceptions, firearms are 
almost never involved in Minutemen activities (ibid.). Individual Minutemen 
occasionally target shoot at nearby shooting ranges, but never practice as a group and do 
not routinely use their weapons to confront people they observe watching the border; 
instead, they use high tech night vision and other equipment to observe from a distance 
and alert border patrol and other law enforcement (ibid.). In contrast, training is crucial 
for militia members who believe they should use their shared time to keep their weapons 




Figure 8: A militia member prepares to shoot at a target during a competition at a public range. Photo by 
Amy Cooter. 
in which they are needed. Collective training is thus essential for militia status, in my 
definition. 
Second, the Minutemen exist solely to combat and protest illegal immigration. 
Many militia members I encountered supported the Minutemen's goal of limiting illegal 
immigration, but none had illegal immigration as their sole concern21. Instead, militia 
members follow and are invested in a variety of socio-political issues. There is also 
evidence that the Minutemen's singular focus on illegal immigration gives them greater 
linkages to white supremacist populations than I have observed in the militia. Several 
notable figures involved in both the Minutemen and racist organizations have been in the 
news in the last few years, usually following a violent crime (e.g., Myers 2012). 
                                                 
21 No Michigan militia members ever became involved in the Minutemen effort, but a militia unit I have 
contact with in Florida spent a week with a Minutemen unit at the Arizona border in an effort to network 
and to express support for their actions. Members of that Florida unit told me the Minutemen were "doing 
good work," but confirmed the Minutemen never trained together and were less equipped than militia 
members to deal with other problems; one member said the time spent in Arizona was "pretty boring," and 




It is important to note that some Minutemen units, some white supremacist 
organizations, and other groups may occasionally use the term "militia" to describe 
themselves, even though they would not qualify as such under my definition. For 
example, the Militia of Montana obviously includes "militia" in its name, and has even 
been described as a "prototypical" militia (Kimmel and Ferber 2000:586). The Militia of 
Montana was incredibly prolific and ideologically influential in terms of producing 
training texts and video tapes that are of interest to nation-wide militia groups to this day. 
However, the Militia of Montana had no meaningful training component and no 
organized firearms proficiency requirements (personal communication, Norm Olson, 
January 29, 2011), making "militia" an inappropriate label for this group in my view.  
 
THE CONTEMPORARY MILITIA AS A PATRIOTIC ORGANIZATION 
Militia members nearly uniformly describe their role as that of citizen soldiers. They see 
themselves as the last line of domestic defense should military forces either 1) need 
assistance during times of disaster, or 2) themselves become an enemy through attacking 
American citizens or otherwise neglecting their duties. Few Michigan militia members I 
encountered believe the second role is truly feasible and realistically understand the sheer 
technological, man-power and other resource disadvantages militia units would face in 
any real conflict with any military.  
Many do not believe this second role would ever happen, but want to be ready 
"just in case." As one leader frequently tells newcomers: 
'You don't buy car insurance because you plan to drive into a wall! You 
don't buy a fire extinguisher because you plan to set your kitchen on fire! 
You don't join the militia because you expect trouble; you do it to be 




Similarly, few Michigan members express they want any kind of confrontation with the 
government to ever occur. To the contrary, many members (including 15 or 38% of my 
interviewees) are military veterans and believe they have an accurate understanding of 
the sheer military power of the U.S. government. Those who are not veterans, or those 
who have not seen direct combat, rely on the war stories told by veteran relatives to insist 
that war is terrible and that they never want to see anything approaching it within the 
borders of their country. I discuss this second goal further in Chapter Three, and argue 
that it should be understood as a symbolic defense of nationalistic ideals. 
The first role, acting with the military in times of domestic disaster, is much more 
central to militia identity. Most do not expect foreign troops or black helicopters from the 
United Nations—a conspiracy theory traditionally attributed to militias—to encroach 
upon U.S. borders, though they would like to think they are to some degree prepared to 
help if that nonetheless happens. Instead, militias are much more focused on relatively 
mundane disasters: floods, snowstorms, and power blackouts, for example. Militia 
members say it is their role in the event of disasters like this to help take the pressure off 
National Guard and emergency responders so that they may better use their resources for 
people in serious need. Members who have enacted this philosophy proudly tell these 
stories as illustrative examples. For instance, one member speaks of using his generator 
to power an elderly neighbor's oxygen concentrator during a Detroit power blackout that 
lasted several days, saying this saved the woman a trip to the hospital and allowed one of 
Detroit's limited ambulances to instead make a call where it was truly needed. He says 
more neighbors used to do these kinds of things for each other, in "old fashioned 




Militia members say these relatively mundane emergencies are events for which 
everyone should be prepared, but pride themselves on the fact that they actually make a 
concerted effort to do so, while believing that the average American does not. Most 
Michigan members do store extra water, non-perishable food and first aid supplies, but 
very few of them reach the near-hoarding levels that are sometimes associated with the 
militia. Most say they have adequate stores to sustain themselves, their immediate 
families, and possibly a few neighbors for five to ten days should a local disaster prevent 
their going to the grocery store; however, there are very few who say they store enough 
for a year or more, as is often the case with dedicated, self-proclaimed survivalists 
(Mitchell 2002). 
Then, there are the guns. Militia members I formally interviewed had a median of 
three firearms per person in their household22. It is impossible to know how this number 
compares to that of the non-militia, "average" American because ownership statistics do 
not exist for any type of firearm. Even new dealer firearm sales are not reasonably 
tracked by any agency; the National Rifle Association, a pro-gun lobby, and the Brady 
Campaign, a strongly anti-gun lobby, both use FBI background checks as a proxy for gun 
sales ("Guns" 2010, "NICS" 2010). However, FBI background checks are used for a 
variety of other purposes, including some rental agreements and job applications, and 
many gun sales, including those between private individuals, do not require background 
checks. These checks also do not capture older firearms that may be passed down to 
family members across generations. Although background checks might be the best-
available proxy, they remain an abysmal measure of firearms ownership.  
                                                 
22 I asked interviewees how many firearms were in their households, and, separately, how many people 





Figure 9: A member holds a metal target and a bullet of 
the same caliber to show the holes in the target during a 
snowy winter training. Photo courtesy of Jeff Kindy. 
Regardless of how their gun 
ownership compares to that of other 
people, it is clear that firearms 
training is central to militia members' 
identities. Sociologist Geneviève 
Zubrzycki (2011) argues that 
mythologies, including those that 
form national identities, are visually 
represented and embodied to make them real for their believers. Zubrzycki argues that the 
Polish people have used events like the "war of the crosses" at Auschwitz to visually and 
symbolically reclaim an historicized identity of Poles as Polish and as Catholic, rather 
than Jewish (2006). For militia members, firearms are a central part of the act of 
constantly defining and reclaiming a national story. Guns are sacred secular symbols of 
the militia's vision of the nation because they are tools and symbols that directly represent 
a mythic past and valued rights earned by the blood, sweat, and bullets of an ideal, 
mythic American man. As the front page of www.michiganmilitia.com states: 
"A well-armed citizenry is the best form of Homeland Security and can 
better deter crime, invasion, terrorism, and tyranny. Everyone is welcome, 
regardless of race, creed, color, religion or political affiliation, provided 
you do not wish to bring harm to our country or people. If you are a 
United States citizen (or have declared your intent to become such), who 
is capable of bearing arms, or supports the right to do so, then YOU ARE 
the MILITIA!" 
 
The first sentence of this statement highlights the centrality of firearms. The 
second sentence proclaims that everyone is welcome, but the third qualifies this by again 




use23 or support using firearms are militia-worthy. This is because militia members view 
it as the civic duty of all citizens to protect their country and believe there are times this 
might only be possible with the aid of firearms. Although this again perhaps harkens to 
images of foreign troop invasion, the underlying belief structure is more nuanced. Militia 
members believe that someone using a firearm in self-defense during a home invasion, 
for example, is in fact participating in the defense of their country, too, by defending its 
ideals and doing what is necessary to protect oneself, one's family, and the very principle 
of "the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."  
Members' feeling of civic duty cannot be overstated. Although they do not use 
this term, members see themselves as super citizens24 whose mission it is to uphold the 
essence of Americanism as they understand it. Their vision of the nation rests on 
individual liberty and self-determination, and on citizenship as a set of day-to-day 
practices that attest to one's commitment to the nation (Isin 2009; Billig 1995). Members 
strongly believe in the American Dream of having success in proportion to one's effort 
and labor, even though the Dream's promise has not come true for any of them. In his 
study of underemployed black men, sociologist Alford Young (2006) found that the men 
who had more experiences with racism and who traveled outside their immediate 
neighborhoods the most were least likely to believe in the Dream. Black men with the 
lowest incomes and the most limited economic opportunities most embraced the Dream. 
In a similar fashion, militia men have limited social circles and, overall, limited 
                                                 
23 Although not explicit here, "capable of bearing arms" means both someone who knows how to safely 
handle a firearm and someone who is legally allowed to do so. 
24 My usage of "super citizens" differs from that of Kate Nash's (2009) description of people who are 
granted extended or transnational human rights because of their economic or political power. Militias are 
super citizens in that they understand themselves to most ideally embody the principles that Americans are 




experiences outside the state of Michigan; they certainly have very limited experiences 
with racism, either directly or witnessing others experience it. Members' relatively 
limited worldview resulting from these experiences allows them to attribute their failures 
in achieving the Dream to personal deficiencies, rather than seeing them as part of a 
broader structural discrepancy with the myth they so support.  
Militia members pride themselves on being lawful citizens who carefully follow 
even those laws with which they disagree, such as laws banning certain grips or other 
accessories from being attached to certain firearms. Members vote at every opportunity, 
and understand their militia participation as a way to be prepared to serve their 
communities in the event of emergencies ranging from snowstorms to terror attacks. 
Militia members see themselves as more dedicated to the country and its principles than 
other Americans because of their militia involvement, but their version of super-citizen 
nationalism resonates with groups on the political right (e.g., Tea Partiers, Oath Keepers, 
etc.) who hold a similar "originalist" vision of a country that adheres to a literal 
interpretation of the Constitution; they reject the idea that the Constitution can 
legitimately be interpreted beyond its four corners without amendments or other 
legislation that go through proper legislative channels. "Americanness," for militia 
members, is best defined as the degree to which a person stands up for and embodies 
originalist Constitutional values. I found that the contemporary militia is best understood 
as a group of people who feel unrepresented by both major political parties and who see 
their militia involvement as a way to both protest the system and to remind the 





A MILITIA TYPOLOGY 
Some militia researchers have observed a distinction between what they term 
"underground" and "above ground" militia groups. Underground groups operate secretly 
and privately with a high degree of mistrust of outsiders. This is often because what they 
are doing is illegal or at least unpopular, and possibly subject to State repression 
(Zwerman et al. 2000). The implication is typically that groups are operating 
underground so that they may continue participating in illegal behavior while evading 
authorities. Above ground groups, in contrast, are considered to be less dangerous, 
largely legal, and relatively transparent in their motives as well as methods (ibid.).  
Reality is not this clear cut, however. So-called above ground groups may indeed 
have websites and easily identifiable members but nonetheless be movement outliers in 
terms of their ideology. One of most recent militia groups to garner notoriety, the Hutaree 
in southern Michigan, had publicly accessible websites and YouTube videos that clearly 
showed members' faces and sometimes real names, but they were arrested and tried for 
allegedly plotted to kill police officers, which is an "underground" strategy. Additionally, 
above ground groups may have many members who do not come to public events, not 
because they do not want to publicly acknowledge militia affiliation, but because distance 
or work schedules prevent their participation. These people stay in touch via message 
boards or email, and would be, by the classical definition, "underground" members in an 
above ground group, which makes little contextual sense.  
A final reason to view this model with skepticism is that, by definition, 
underground groups are impossible to count and accurately assess. It is very easy to claim 




indicate for political and other reasons. Some reports on militias and other unpopular 
groups may be exaggerated to garner financial support for watch organizations (see 
Chermak 2002 for a discussion), and social scientists wanting an accurate assessment of 
militias or other movements who are similarly labeled should be wary of relying on this 
concept. 
A more useful distinction, which corresponds with my empirical observations, is 
made by historian Robert Churchill between "millenarian" and "constitutional" militias: 
"Constitutionalists began to organize militias on the basis of public 
meetings and open membership. They saw the growing threat of state-
sponsored violence as a symptom of a corrupt and abusive government, 
and argued that the militia, if public, could act as a deterrent against 
further government abuse. Millenarians began to organize on the basis of 
a closed cell structure hidden from public view. Their vision was 
millennial and apocalyptic: they saw militia organization as the only way 
to survive an imminent invasion by the forces of the New World Order" 
(2009:188; emphasis added). 
 
Millenarian militias, in other words, much more closely match the stereotypical image of 
militias as secretive, dangerous, focused on paranoid conspiracy theories, possibly 
religiously-motivated, and racially or otherwise exclusionary. These seem to have greater 
potential for violence and more links to racist or other problematic groups. They may also 
have less of a focus on political involvement than constitutional militias. Constitutionalist 
militias more uniformly resemble the definition of militias I laid out above and represent 
the majority of militias in Michigan.  
Millenarian and constitutionalist militias should nonetheless be understood as 
ideal types because constitutionalist militias may still have members who strongly 
believe in a variety of conspiracy theories, and because millenarian militias may overtly 




be more internally uniform and have more in common with each other than with 
millenarian militias, and vice versa. This distinction does not hold so clearly for the 
traditional above/below ground model.  
Churchill's model also places focus on militia ideology, which is a major causal 
factor in how likely a given militia is to operate transparently, thus giving the model more 
explanatory power. To be clear, "millenarian" is not parallel to "underground," nor is 
"constitutionalist" parallel to "above ground." Returning to the example of the Hutaree, 
their ideology was very religiously- and conspiratorially-motivated, but was nonetheless 
readily and publicly available through the internet. This defies the above/below ground 
typology, but is explained perfectly under the millenarian label.  
Importantly, Churchill's model implicitly contradicts a claim usually made by 
authors using the above/below ground model as broadly applied to nostalgic groups 
generally (e.g., Stern 1996): that above ground groups maintain a positive public face 
while nearly always having a below ground component to do their dirty work. By 
focusing on group ideology, it becomes clear that millenarian and constitutionalist groups 
frequently cannot cooperate because the rift is simply too large. Michigan's militias are a 
very clear example of this. The constitutionalist groups see themselves as proactive 
monitoring agencies for the millenarian groups. They maintain superficial contact with 
millenarian groups to know their upcoming plans, and may report these plans to law 
enforcement authorities when they perceive a possibility of threat.  
Contrary to previous authors claiming that such "snitching" happens when above 
and below ground groups have a falling out (Stern 1996), the ideological component of 




constitutionalist militias have fundamental disagreements that rarely lead to a cooperative 
situation that could be breached, but constitutionalist militias believe it is their civic and 
personal duty to help protect their communities. They accordingly think it is their 
responsibility to report information to authorities when they suspect there is a viable 
threat of dangerous or illegal action that could lead to someone being hurt. Contacts to 
the FBI from two different Michigan constitutionalist militias were major factors leading 
to the infiltration and eventual arrest and indictment of the millenarian Hutaree (Baldas 
2012; Higgins 2010). 
Understanding this ideological difference that separates millenarian from 
constitutionalist militias is critical for a complete picture of exactly what the modern 
militia movement is. This in turn, is important for understanding basic characteristics of 
who militia members are and what they hope to accomplish and how they interact with 
the changing social world around them. Some of my claims here regarding militia origins 
and demographics differ somewhat from previous militia researchers. I discuss these 
differences and reasons for them in the Appendix. My primary focus in remaining 
chapters is on constitutionalist groups and members because they represent the majority 
of the movement in Michigan. They are also the members most trying to adhere to 
evolving social norms.  
In the next chapter, I show that the reasons men say they join the militia all fall 
into four broad categories, each of which may be understood through a lens of traditional, 
American masculinity that is informed by notions of masculine protectors. I contrast the 
masculinity implicit in men's stated motivations for joining the militia with non-




functions. I argue that the militia is similar to historically all-male groups like the boy 
scouts in facilitating masculine bonding, but, in contrast to these earlier groups, the 
militia also provides a safe space for experimenting with masculinity and masculine 






Militia Masculinity: Protectors of Country, Family, and LGBT Populations? 
 
 
'This is more than a group of guys who get together and play GI Joe. This 
is about family, it's about community, it's about people.' 




U.S. history is replete with male-only organizations including the Boy Scouts that support 
the explicit goal of "fostering manly strength [while countering] corrupting and 
debilitating effects of urbanization and social change" (MacLeod 1982:3). Organizations 
like this continue to foster self-conceptions that conform to traditional gender roles and 
stereotypes (Denny 2011; Mechling 2001). At first glance, it would appear that 
contemporary citizens' militias, comprised largely of patriotic white men who want to 
return to an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, would be a successor to this 
lineage. Assessing masculinity in a predominately-male group that consciously references 
a protective "warrior," or "super citizen" image allows for an in-depth investigation into 
how American men understand masculinity in contemporary society. In this chapter, I 
analyze how militia men reference a hegemonic masculinity that values toughness and 
independence when asked to describe their reasons for joining the organization while 
enacting a much more emotive and untraditional masculinity in the field. This 





 This chapter also analyzes the role of children and women in the militia. Militia 
men want both their children and their significant others to be more involved in militia 
activities, and are often disappointed when they are not. Despite being committed to 
egalitarianism and expanded masculinity, I argue that militia men are often unaware of 
how the gendered nature of their activities may prevent women's and children's full 
participation. 
 
WHITE, AMERICAN MASCULINITY 
There is a large body of scholarship on how masculinity, like femininity, is a fluid 
construct. It is time and context dependent (Gutmann 1996; Tomsen 1997), varies across 
socioeconomic classes (Messerschmidt 1993) and racial groups (Staples 1982), and, as 
sociologist R. W. Connell notes, "Different masculinities are produced in the same 
cultural or institutional setting" (Connell 2005:36). Most scholars nonetheless agree that 
in each time and place there is some version of hegemonic masculinity toward which men 
feel pressured to aspire (see Connell 2005; Mosse 1998; Nagel 2004). The degree to 
which men are successfully able to match this hegemonic model depends on their racial 
and class positions (Gutmann 1996). 
Some authors (e.g., Connell 2005) are critical of attempts to define masculinity in 
essentialist or positivistic terms. They rightly note that with such variation in masculinity, 
it is difficult to claim that men truly "are" a certain way, or that their particular behaviors 
in one context are really masculinity's defining features. What is sometimes overlooked 




this context, it becomes important to understand how men represent their masculinities 
and to understand and the foundational stories they reference in these representations.  
The hegemonic masculinity that is prevalent in America's mythos is that of a 
physically and mentally tough, independent man who provides for his family. Early in 
this nation's history, the definition of "male" was rooted in property ownership—
especially land ownership—and thus had substantial overlap with understandings of 
whiteness since only Whites could legally own property in many places (Garner 2007). 
Ownership was a real as well as symbolic indicator of independence and responsibility in 
an era where slavery, indentured servitude, and share cropping were common (ibid.). The 
taming and conquering of the land, as well as the native peoples who possessed it, using 
innate toughness and hard-earned resources was indicative of essential manhood, 
according to historian William Cronon (2003). Firearms become important characters in 
these stories as they helped men fulfill the roles of conquering the frontier and providing 
for their families. 
The Revolutionary War was a break from England's paternalistic monarchy and a 
clear indication of early colonists' desire to demonstrate independence and self-
sufficiency. Tales from this time period take on a mythic status, glorifying the role of 
men-as-warriors at the nation's founding (Gibson 1994; Kohn 2004; Mulloy 2008). As 
Susan Faludi notes, war is "federal masculinity insurance" (2000:25), and provides men 
with a model of what nationalized manhood looks like. Women are rarely mentioned at 
all in these tales, and when they are, they are supporting cast members to the men who 




The key marker for manliness shifted to economic success following the 
Industrial Revolution when many people moved to cities to participate in the nation's 
changing markets. Reminiscent of Max Weber's (1905) writings on the Protestant Work 
Ethic, sociologist Michael Kimmel says economic success as a goal in itself led to the 
notion of "self-made" (2005:9) men, whose personal success or failure was judged by 
their ability to climb the economic hierarchy. In the post-Civil War era, large factories 
were still the prevailing industrial force, but few owned their own means of production 
and upward mobility was increasingly difficult. 
As Kimmel notes "masculinity was experienced as increasingly difficult to prove" 
(2005:100) as other groups entered what was supposed to be the white, male proving 
ground. These men experienced nostalgia for past, supposedly simpler times (Coontz 
2000), and there was a return to activities in the "rugged outdoors" as a way to not only 
demonstrate, but relearn a traditional masculinity (Kimmel 2005:135). Private male-only 
clubs and other organizations including the Boy Scouts, founded in 1910, were started 
with the explicit goal of "fostering manly strength [while countering] corrupting and 
debilitating effects of urbanization and social change" (MacLeod 1982:3). American 
studies professor Jay Mechling's (2001) study of the modern Boy Scouts illustrates how 
these notions of instilling manliness are still central to this organization today. 
Around the same time these male clubs were starting, enlistment in WWI 
provided a more conventional way to again enact a traditional masculinity, as did 
participation in new and enlarging job sectors that resulted from the war. WWII soon 
provided another chance for military participation, and in its wake came various GI Bills 




had decades past. Women, who had entered the workforce in great numbers during the 
war, were strongly encouraged to return to the kitchen so that men could retake their 
"proper place" in those jobs.  
Most members today were born in the 1950s or later, but their collective 
memories uniformly include the events and repercussions of WWII. Almost all militia 
men—95% in my interview sample—have male relatives who fought during this war and 
remember hearing first-hand stories of its costs and victories. They share these tales at 
militia trainings as much to serve as a point of commonality over which to bond, as to 
keep the memories of those who fought alive. These mythical stories serve as lauded 
examples of just use of force as well as of America's supposed superior technological and 
moral advancement relative to other nations. WWII's few remaining living veterans, as 
well as those now deceased, are vaunted as paragons of patriotism and moral uprightness, 
and as true heroes fighting for freedom and basic human rights who should be models for 
modern citizenship.  
White men's ability to participate in acceptable expressions of masculinity via the 
labor market remained relatively unthreatened until the Civil Rights and Women's 
Movements. Increasing competition on the labor market and changing gendered 
expectations in the home meant that there were fewer outlets for expressing traditional 
masculinity. The early stages of heavy U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War probably 
appeared to be a way to normatively participate in this arena again. As sociologist James 
Gibson notes, "America has always had a war culture" (1994:16), and the nation's 
historical record of military involvement implicates not only a traditional masculinity, but 




injustices and reflects a certain deservingness to win war through "the country's 
fundamental goodness and power" (Gibson 1994:10).  
Losing Vietnam reflected not only the military's failure, but the impotence of the 
ideal warrior version of American masculinity that so undergirds the national paradigm. 
As sociologist Joane Nagel succinctly says, "…These men are not only defending 
tradition but also defending a particular racial, gendered, and sexual conception of self—
a white, male, heterosexual notion of masculine identity" (2004:407). Relatively few 
militia members of today served in Vietnam25 (though this number was likely higher in 
the militia of the 1990s) but members nonetheless revere Vietnam's veterans, too. 
Because Vietnam was essentially a loss for the powerful and resource-rich U.S. against a 
relatively small and distant Communist threat, the sentiment here is rather different. The 
militia views Vietnam veterans with more a sense of sympathy than of adulation, in that 
they see them as men trying to do their job, supporting their country, only to be betrayed 
by a lack of adequate resources to win the war, or to be reintegrated in society upon their 
return home (also see Gibson 1994; Schlatter 2006).  
Little analytical work has been done on the more recent conflicts in the Middle 
East and their ambiguous outcomes, but the same theme of unfulfilled warriorhood is 
certainly reflected there as well. Some militia members, or their children, have 
participated in more recent military conflicts in the Middle East. Most, though not all, 
militia members see these wars as ultimately justified and honor their veterans, but view 
                                                 
25 Zero interviewees participated in Vietnam, but Vietnam veterans are active in militias in Michigan. I 
have interacted with half a dozen self-identified Vietnam veteran militia members during training sessions 
and public meetings across the state. It seems to be the case that Vietnam veterans are more likely to 
participate in militia units that are more newly-formed, but have greater ideological and interpersonal 
connections to the militia of the 90s. Their units may be more likely to be of the Millenarian type and may 




the politics and governmental involvement as more parallel to that of Vietnam than of 
WWII. This was exemplified when one group in the western part of the state kicked out a 
new member who kept picking fights over the content of the trainings. As Roy, a veteran 
in his late 30s, explained: 
'He had real problems getting along with people. Him and [the unit's 
leader] both have really strong opinions and always got into it. His 
Humvee took a direct hit in Iraq and pretty much all of his squad was 
killed. He was the one who had to drag their bodies outta there. That's 
what must have set off the PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder]. We 
learned a lot from him, but just couldn't keep him around. It was too much. 
Too much goin' around in his head, still.'  
 
Regardless of their personal opinions of particular wars, militia members nearly 
uniformly believe that part of the function of war more generally is to defend an idealized 
understanding of individual freedom and liberty, particularly within the borders U.S., 
even if that war is half a world away. They further believe it is a patriotic and moral duty 
of young men to participate in war as a defense of these principles and of the nation. 
Family histories of involvement in past wars heighten this belief among militia members, 
and their militia participation is in no small part an expression of this same patriotism for 
many members.  
 
WHY MEN JOIN THE MICHIGAN MILITIA 
I initially set out to understand why militia men professed to join the organization to 
understand their rationales for being part of this particular movement. However, I 
realized their expressed reasons could be better understood as a lesson on how they frame 




personal preparedness, comradery, and political expression. All four reasons reference 
the hegemonic vision of a tough, independent man.  
 
Reason 1: Sense of Duty to Country or to Family 
Duty to Country 
About one-third of the membership and two-thirds of the leadership of the militia have 
military experience, so it is unsurprising that the most commonly expressed reason (from 
17 interviewees) for joining was a sense of duty to country. Walter, a 59 year-old retail 
worker, states this duty very clearly: 
"Part of it is a sense of duty. I was in the Navy for 10 years, and when I 
joined, I took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution. And there 
was no time limit on it. To me, this is just the next logical step."  
  
Walter, as many other members, tells me he has "always" felt a duty to serve his 
country and the Constitution—the document he sees as protecting the country's values 
and Walter's way of life. Nearly all members had male relatives who served in the 
military in WWII. Family stories about this war and its global impact are frequent topics 
of conversation at militia events and help reinforce the image of the U.S. as a moral and 
technological superpower. Walter sees it not only as a duty to his country, but as part of 
his legacy, as a duty to his family, to help ensure the values that his forbearers fought for 
remain intact. For Walter, this is a life-long oath. Once he was honorably discharged, he 
continued to volunteer in his community in other ways before being drawn to militia 
membership.  
Members like Walter think that militias help the country by providing a civilian 




'I heard a rumor the other day that the new Governor intends to cut back 
on funding to the National Guard. People really shouldn't be upset by this 
when we're out there, willing to do the same task for free!' 
 
Members do not truly believe they could or should replace the National Guard, but rather 
that the organizations have two shared goals. The first is assisting local communities in 
times of disaster. The second is being prepared to assist if the country is ever invaded by 
foreign forces. Both goals reference the protector archetype, embedded in America's 
mythic masculinity. 
The first goal of assisting communities, which I introduced in Chapter Two, is a 
practical and achievable one. Militia units around Michigan have assisted local law 
enforcement in various search and rescue efforts, have participated in clothing drives for 
underprivileged schools, and have more individually assisted neighbors during 
snowstorms and blackouts. Forty-seven year old member Calvin, a city worker, told me 
that he joined the militia because he wanted to share tactical knowledge from his military 
training with civilians so that they could be better adept at helping their own 
communities. He believes that military knowledge would help people help themselves 
during emergencies and would allow first responders to save their resources for more 
serious situations. Calvin's belief references the mythic masculinity of the independent 
protector, and he says he wants to instill the importance of that role in others. 
The second goal of defending the country's borders against foreign invasion is 
unrealistic and, at first glance, excessively paranoid. However, it is more accurately 
understood as a symbolic defense of the nation. Most militia members in Michigan 
recognize that invasion is a remote possibility, and understand that, if it happened, they 




as unique and nearly sacred, and they sometimes have difficulty articulating modern fears 
regarding globalization and the supposed erosion of a "unique," elite national identity. 
Members feel they have little ability to influence the political and technological 
developments that increase the U.S.'s involvement with other nations, and thus revert to 
something more familiar, to scripts that were effective in historical instances of national 
tribulation. They phrase their angst in terms of a traditional, masculine model of war with 
a concrete enemy who can be fended off through physical altercations.  
The sense of duty to country is very similar for many members who did not have 
military experience. Jessie noted: 
"I did go to college instead of joining the military, unlike most of my 
family. But I guess I always wanted to get involved in somethin' like this. 
So now, you know, now I'm 21, I can get all the equipment I need [to be 
involved in the militia], and so [it's the] best time to do it." 
 
Jessie and two interviewees who could not join the military because of health issues seem 
to exhibit a sense of guilt about their lack of military involvement. Much of this guilt 
stems from their seeing military participation as a duty to country as well as family, but 
Jessie's guilt is apparently amplified by the fact that he was a first-generation college 
student. Just like many families in Michigan, most of Jessie's had always worked in the 
auto industry. Historically, most of the auto industry jobs were relatively high-paying 
with good security and benefits (Vinyard 2011). The industry has suffered in recent years 
because of increased competition from international car companies and because of the 
2008 recession. When Jessie's parents finished high school, there was little need for 
higher education to obtain a steady job as part of this then-vast industry, and they may 
still struggle to understand how drastically Michigan's economy and job prospects have 




 Anthropologist Kathryn Dudley's (1994) description of Wisconsin auto factory 
workers' valuation of manual labor over intellectual labor is applicable here; at least some 
working and lower-middle class workers seem to dismiss non-manual work as not being 
"real" or respectable labor. Jessie probably felt like he was not living up to his family's 
work ethic and prescribed masculinity by obtaining a degree and seeking a desk job, 
instead of one with a high degree of physical effort. During our interview, Jessie talked at 
length about his father's and paternal grandfather's military experiences, and it is likely 
that he felt he was not living up to the hegemonic, masculine ideal that their military 
experiences embodied. In other words, he may have felt like he was somehow less of a 
man, and may have even been ridiculed by male family members, for trying to enter a 
more intellectual career; Jessie spoke wistfully of sitting on the sidelines, unable to 
participate and be accepted, during his male relatives' holiday bonding sessions over their 
respective military experiences.    
Less than a year after my interview with him, Jessie was laid off as the newest 
employee in a company that was strained under the continuing recession. He spent two 
months looking for other jobs before enlisting with the Air Force, despite having 
severance and unemployment benefits that could have sustained him for several more 
months. Militia leaders talked about his enlistment with pride, saying, "He's going on to 
bigger and much cooler things." Jessie's militia involvement did not alone push him to 
join the military, but it certainly legitimated and reinforced his family's valuing the 
military as a respectable job option. 
Respectability and success are not defined by primarily by economic gain for 




people authority or social power, as was the case in sociologist Alford Young's study of 
un- and under-employed African American men in Chicago (2006). Militia men are not 
trying to break into a normative economic system as Young's participants strived to do, 
but instead are in some ways trying to get out of it. Most militia men do not particularly 
enjoy their jobs and do not enjoy having strict work schedules or bosses to report to, as 
these interfere with members' ability to be wholly independent. Militia men work to 
obtain money to cover their expenses, and many dream of eventually saving enough 
money to purchase a large swath of property in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan that is 
removed from large populations and their attendant social obligations. Militia men are 
more similar to sociologist Michèle Lamont's (2002) working class, white, male 
participants who defined success and morality in terms of self-discipline, and who find 
dignity in performing work-related tasks well and with integrity. Jessie's military service 
is unlikely to make him wealthy, but it is respectable labor that pays the bills while 
allowing him to honor his country and his family.  
 
Duty to Family 
Duty to country is not the only sense of duty that draws members to the militia. Five 
interviewees said they joined the militia to learn how to better protect their families.  
"I feel it's my position to be the protector, the defender. I've always been 
concerned about you know, my family, making sure that we have what we 
need when we need it, blah, blah, blah. After we moved out of the city, the 
power was unreliable because there was a lot of building going on, and I 
decided, you know, maybe I should get a list together of what we have on 
hand, what we need on hand should something happen and we're out for 
an extended period of time. I looked at www.ready.gov, the American Red 
Cross site, I looked at a few other sites, and while everyone was real quick 




your neighbor. So, I went to the one group that I remember from the media 
who probably knew about weapons [laughs]."  
 
George, a lifelong Michigan resident, sought out the militia for their knowledge about 
firearms during a period when he was searching for information on how to protect his 
family from a variety of possible dangers. Extended power outages, natural disasters, 
accidents, terrorist attacks (in the wake of 9/11), and home invasion all were among his 
concerns in his new home. George's use of "blah, blah, blah" after explaining his desire to 
protect his family indicates his awareness of how deeply the protector role is embedded 
in the dominant masculine script; he did not need to elaborate the parameters of the script 
because he believed I was already familiar with.  
Although a less common theme in interviews than duty to country, duty to family 
was a regular topic in the field. Militia leaders often discuss how the men who come to 
training need to think about whether they are prepared to take care of their wives and 
children—not just themselves—in the event of an emergency. In some ways, leaders are 
teaching, or at least reinforcing, how to be care-taking fathers and husbands. Members, in 
accordance with a mythic, American masculinity, feel part of their duty is to teach their 
family, and especially their kids, to think about preparedness for a variety of situations. 
Leaders often insist that advancing technology undermines peoples' self-sufficiency and 
ability to think for themselves, and much of their advice to other members regarding 
children's preparedness centers on this idea. 
At first glance this attitude may seem to be reminiscent of the early literature on 
nostalgic groups, as regressive, and little more than a knee-jerk reaction to change and 
progress (for a discussion, see Bennett 1988:6). In actuality, the militia embraces various 




sense,' as 41 year old Lloyd likes to say. There is friendly competition among members 
for who has the newest gizmo: a new laser sight for a gun, a military-style sleeping 
hammock for use at the next campout, or walkie-talkie set for communicating with other 
members during trainings. Discussion of these tools and toys is strongly reminiscent of 
more accepted, masculine car shop discussions of who has the biggest rims or fastest 
engine. Trainings or meetings essentially stop while everyone gathers around so the new 
item can be demonstrated in every detail. There are always excited proclamations of, 'Oh 
man, that's sweet!' and more quiet consultations on where another member could 
purchase such an item, often followed by yet another's indicating where they saw similar, 
perhaps lower quality, but more affordable products. 
Militia members also enjoy keeping up with computer and cell phone technology. 
Members who can afford them always have the newest models, much to the obvious envy 
of some who cannot. Many members around the state, including four of my interviewees, 
are employed as computer specialists, and SMVM was one of the first militias in the 
nation to have a presence on YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, and other websites. None of 
this seems to be the behavior of a group who opposes technological advancement. Their 
warnings about technology and preparedness instead have a practical and usually realistic 
goal, as exemplified in this quote where Lloyd encourages members to avoid overreliance 
on technology and think about their children's safety: 
'Most of my kids have cell phones. Most of your kids probably have cell 
phones. Make sure they still memorize important phone numbers. With the 
way you program in everything these days, half the people out there 
probably don't even know their own number! You don't have to remember 
anything anymore! Be sure the kids at least know your cell number, your 
work number, in case something happens. Write it down on a piece of 





Reason 2: Personal Preparedness 
The second reason interviewees said they joined the militia was for their own 
preparedness (from eight interviewees). This category is distinct from the first, most 
common reason for militia participation, where members feel a kind of altruistic or civic 
duty to be prepared on behalf of others. Members who say they were interested in their 
own preparedness do not invoke protecting the country or loved ones. Instead, they say 
they are motivated by their own safety, or by a desire to improve their own preparedness 
skill set.  
Twenty-four year old Freddie, a cable TV technician, for example, remembers an 
armed robber breaking into his parents' home at Christmas when he was a toddler. He 
said this experience gave him a life-long desire to be prepared and study survival skills 
for a variety of scenarios.  
"I mean, I'm not living in fear and worried, but…I have just enough fear to 
be aware that these things happen, to want to be prepared." 
 
Another member prioritizing personal preparedness is a widower, whose wife died from 
unexpected complications during surgery just a few months after giving birth to the 
couple's only child. Yet another stumbled upon his mother's gruesome murder scene—a 
case that is still unsolved ten years later. Regarding his militia participation, he said: 
"Well, I've always been an independent, self-sufficient person, and I 
thought that maybe I could learn how to be better towards that end, you 
know, from these guys."   
 
 None of the above three members indicated that their traumatic experiences led to 
their militia involvement. However, it is interesting that all three traumatic events involve 
threats to hegemonic masculinity. Each event represents an instance where the man in 




unreasonable to attribute their militia membership to these events alone, but militia 
involvement does give these men a sense of personal security and masculine affirmation 
that was denied in these traumas.  
The remaining five interviewees who mentioned personal preparedness did not 
reveal any similarly traumatic events in their life that might contribute to their militia 
involvement, but notably, these members are among those most likely to espouse some of 
the traditional conspiracy theories prevalent in the militias of the 1990s. This, too, seems 
to indicate some individual insecurity that leaves these members searching for a source of 
personal support. Fifty-two year old Daryl provides an example of this. His concern is 
rooted in a sense of losing socioeconomic footing that seems, in his broader interview, to 
reflect both a worry about his ability to continue to be a traditional, male provider for his 
family, and a distrust of the government: 
"I would say they're all just on the same agenda. I mean if you look at it, 
you had President Clinton who set up executive orders for George Bush to 
give him plenty of power if he needed to shut down the air waves—
[freedom of] speech—if he needed to declare Martial Law. And then you 
had George Bush. He just set everything up, executive orders for Obama 
so he can carry on the agenda, which is, to me, is the New World Order, 
which is globalization. They want to turn everything into a big 
corporation. And I think they wanna get rid of the middle class. And I 
don't care if they're rich and wanna be rich. Leave us alone and let us have 
a chance to, to prosper the way we want to, you know?  I mean they've got 
all the money they want. Why do they have to have the rule to make 
everybody slaves? You know, we don't want to be slaves." 
 
Daryl sees himself as speaking on behalf of a threatened middle-class, though it is 
dubious whether he can claim that position in the class hierarchy with his low-level, 
dangerous, automotive industry job. Sociologist David Halle (1984) argues that many 
working-class men who do not know the intricacies of politics, only its stories of 




elites working toward the same "agenda" to engage in class warfare. A more accurate 
description may be that Daryl, just as many other men in his position, feels threatened by 
governmental policy he cannot control or influence, which in turn threatens his to provide 
for his family and to choose the job he wants, and makes him into an economic "slave." 
 
Reason 3: Comradery  
The third stated reason for joining the militia is rooted in the search for a different kind of 
support: a sense of belonging or comradery. Ten interviewees mentioned this reason. As 
30 year old Mark very clearly said, "One day I realized that I always belonged here, I just 
didn't know it." Those members who have been involved for five years or more, like 
Lloyd, are especially likely to perceive substantial commonalities among other members. 
"These are just some interesting things I have noticed over the years. The 
percentage of people involved in the Militia that are left-handed, or 
ambidextrous is disproportionately higher than the general population. The 
people involved in the militia that have had to work with their hands on 
things that require attention to detail like models, or painting little war 
game miniatures, or electronics is very much disproportionately higher 
than the general population. I have been at several meetings, more staff 
type meetings we had, you know, 9 or 10 people there. The number, of 
those people at those staff type meetings that have blue eyes is far, grossly 
disproportionate to the rest of the population. Not all of us, but there is a 
large percentage of science fiction fans. We tend to be gadgety—you'll 
find we have a greater interest in high tech stuff. We're very technically 
addicted. I think a militia guy will read Popular Science, Popular 
Mechanics far much more than just about anything else. There of course is 
a big history interest but I mean, that's almost an automatic. You could get 
a paper out of that right there."  
 
It is not uncommon that members of any social group feel connected to one another, but 
some of these characterizations have a near-mystical quality that seems unusual. It is true, 
however, that more than 10% (the estimated proportion of left-handed people in the 




Figure 10: A militia member plays his 
harmonica as the group and one of their 
children takes a break near the end of a long 
day of training. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
eyes. Some militia members interpret these 
commonalities to mean there is something 
intangible yet meaningful that bonds them 
together.  
 Other markers such as a common 
interest in history are, as Lloyd says, easier 
to explain. Militia men are nearly uniformly 
invested in the mythologized story of the 
nation's inception and its founders, and 
enjoy watching and comparing notes on 
History Channel shows regarding these 
topics. Many men similarly enjoy the 
Military Channel and similar shows that detail large, risky, or cunning military 
maneuvers of past conflicts. Training leaders sometimes draws on these events for the 
elaborate back stories he creates to spark members' imaginations during training.  
 Richard, who is 42 years old, married, and perhaps more circumspect than the 
average member about his participation laughingly noted, "I want to be part of the militia 
because it's fun. I like to dress up!" As seriously as members profess to take training, the 
first time I attended training exercises, I could not help but note how most members 
seemed to enjoy the process of gearing up as much as the exercises themselves. The 
head-to-toe camo and gear certainly serve a practical function within the context of 




and poison ivy, all of which are found in the areas where militias train, and the gear vests 
keep compasses, rifle magazines, and first aid supplies close at hand.  
However, no militia member I have encountered has only the minimum required 
equipment for their first level of certification. All go to elaborate efforts to have the 
newest gear, and, as with their other gadgets, the enjoyment they receive from obtaining 
and using the gear goes beyond the practical. For example, most members have multiple 
sets of camouflage, usually one in Army green and tan for summer training in the woods 
and grassy areas, one in white and grey for winter exercises, and sometimes a desert 
brown pattern, to match sandy training spots, or certain fall training locations. Men who 
show up in fatigues that do not match the seasonal environment receive a good deal of 
friendly ridicule, and generally return to next month's training more appropriately attired.  
As another example, members qualified for Level 2 are required to carry several 
high-calorie military rations called Meals Ready to Eat (MREs). These are sold on Ebay, 
at Army Supply, and GI Surplus stores, and are quite expensive, ranging from $5 to $10 
each, depending on the desirability of the contents. Each approximately 20 ounce packet 
is conspicuously stamped with, "U.S. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY, COMMERCIAL 
RESALE IS UNLAWFUL," although no law actually exists prohibiting their sale. A few 
members make their own MREs with home vacuum sealer units, but these expire much 
faster than the ones commissioned by the government.  
The second level of militia certification ostensibly requires carrying several 
MREs so that the member will have access to food if there is a real emergency and they 
are stranded or are assisting with some disaster for a few days. Members often consume 




Figure 11: A member practices a shooting drill as another waits his 
turn during a frigid February training. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
because of the cost and hassle of purchasing them. Additionally, as Calvin once 
explained to some members without military experience, MREs are designed to ensure 
that soldiers in the field do not need to use the bathroom frequently, to 'Plug you up,' as 
he gleefully proclaims.  
Eating MREs in the field is thus not a pleasant experience and must therefore be 
another symbolic act of participation and bonding. Heating the plastic pouches in boiling 
water over an open fire and complaining about the taste of the macaroni and cheese meal 
or lime-flavored, powdered drink mix is part of the theater of militia training—part of 
"dressing up." It also allows men who ate MREs during military service to relive those 
days and to enact a certain authenticity necessary for bonding with each other, while 
extending the same sentimentality to younger members who were not enlisted. Zubrzycki 
observes that "images are agents of socialization" (2011:24) because they provide a 
concrete representation of an abstraction. "Dressing up" allows militia members to 
visually remind each other (as well as militia observers) of their idealized abstraction, the 
mythological representation 
of the nation to which they 
aspire, while instructing 
new members on the 
expected way to comport 
oneself while in the group.  
"Dressing up" thus 
helps members bond with 




organization seem real and important, especially during times when members continue to 
meet and train without overt political threats to their ideology. Full militia regalia may 
look ridiculous or scary to outsiders, and may be part of the reason why militias remain 
small in size despite having numerous potential members in gun rights advocates or Tea 
Partiers who share their Libertarian perspectives. This would be a detriment under most 
theories of social movements; however, it also subtly helps militia members ensure that 
people who participate in their activities fully support the militia's goals and vision of the 
nation. 
 Historian Evelyn Schlatter (2006) and sociologist Richard Mitchell (2002) are two 
authors who have discussed comradery among members of nostalgic groups—those who 
reminisce about an idealized past. But one thing that has not been discussed in the 
previous literature is how many of militia activities are motivated by and oriented toward 
enjoyment. Camping and target practice are activities at the center of militia activity that 
are also inherently fun for members. People who have never shot a rifle may 
underestimate the degree of physical and mental acumen required to do so accurately. 
Practicing accuracy while making adjustments to the rifle and scope, or while 
experimenting with different brands of ammunition is not dissimilar from honing one's 
skills at a sport; indeed, there are dozens of competitive shooting organizations in the 
U.S., and international competitions including some events at the Olympics include 
shooting because of the skill required for accuracy and efficiency.  
All these forms of fun from firearm proficiency, to camping, to the categories of 
shared interest that Lloyd mentioned—gadgets, working with your hands, and Popular 




masculinity and a mythic vision of national identity. Firearms were necessary for fighting 
wars at the beginning of this nation, but also for wrangling the frontier and providing for 
your family, all of which were traditionally men's jobs. This is reflected in anthropologist 
Abigail Kohn's commentary on recreational shooters:  
"Baby boomers can reengage through ritual what they feel is lost through 
the over-civilizing processes of obtaining white-collar jobs, Winnebagos, 
and houses in wealthy neighborhoods. Guns are an integral part of this 
ritual because guns are the quintessential symbol of 'regeneration through 
violence'—the means to tame the wilderness and ensure a moral victory 
over decadence and over-civilization" (2004:99). 
 
Camping includes the notion of "getting back to nature" or "roughing it, and 
proving that you can still survive and be content away from the comforts and 
conveniences of society. As one militia member regularly comments regarding camping 
in bad weather, 'Yeah, it was cold. And rainy. Yeah, it sucked. But you can look back and 
say, "I did that. I accomplished something."' Another observes, 'The only time I feel like 
myself is out here.' Working with your hands and being interested in science and 
technology are also stereotypically male traits. Undoubtedly then, part of the reason these 
activities over which militia men bond are fun is because they again serve as mutual 
expressions of hegemonic masculinity.  
 
Reason 4: Political Expression 
This masculinity is rooted in an idealized, mythologized version of national identity. By 
participating in the fun, manly activities of a group whose stated goal is to defend the 
nation, some militia men are trying to express that they still uphold the values present at 
the founding of the country. Members (including eight interviewees) who say they join 




government that people remain invested in this particular conceptualization of national 
identity.  
Two interviewees, including 36 year old Curtis, a truck driver, were persuaded to 
join after President Obama's inauguration: 
"I mean I've always had some kind of, you know, wanting to know for myself 
what the militia is. But this administration just kind of added to my curiosity. This 
administration's Socialist stance on everything. Communist, whatever you want to 
call it."   
 
Chapter Four further discusses members' response to Obama, but it is worth noting here 
that concerns of Socialism and Communism are replete in militia literature from 
President Clinton's era. This particular commentary is a reflection of militia members' 
displeasure with the Democratic Party, rather than merely a codeword (Mendelberg 2001) 
for Obama's race.  
Most of those members citing political motivations for joining the militia had a 
general disdain for the government that was not directed toward any one political party, 
as 34 year old Shaun, who works in health care, explains: 
"Well, my biggest thing was I felt the government was overstepping their 
bounds. When I lived in California…to put it bluntly, the shit I saw the 
government do pissed me the fuck off. And so when I moved here, 
Michigan wasn't as bad, but I saw them following California's lead, which 
a lot of states are doing. And that's just state governments, that doesn't 
even include the federal government. I don't think the government knows 
what the Constitution is anymore. If they followed the Constitution, I 
probably wouldn't be as active. But they don't, so."  
 
Few of my interviewees identified with either major political party, and most members 
feel these parties do not represent their nostalgia-driven interests. It is clear not only from 
interviews but also dialogue at militia functions that most members are concerned about 




pushing the U.S. farther away from that idealized, originalist vision. Some profess a 
strong dislike for both major parties, using the derogatory term "Republicrat" to reflect 
this sentiment. As 50 year old William said, "It's the one-party-divided-into-two-shades 
political system, okay?" Daryl's quote in the last section regarding losing middle class 
status exemplifies this notion as well. Interestingly, ideas like William's and Daryl's may 
reflect an over-simplified or highly idealized view of American politics, but nonetheless 
challenge statements from sociologist Michelle Fine and her colleagues, who that say 
men like this "…refuse to look up and fetishistically only look 'down' to discover who 
stole their edge" (1997:1). Militia men do "look up" and at least partially attribute their 
economic problems to political leaders and policies, rather than to women or other racial 
groups. 
Militia leaders say the very fact that the government knows people are out doing 
militia training on a regular basis reminds them that, "people are watching." Meaning, 
people are interested in new laws that impact them, and want to ensure that the 
government does not act beyond its authority. It is certainly true that law enforcement 
personnel are aware of the militia and its activities, and there is some evidence that the 
militia has just the impact here that leaders claim it does. The 2009 Department of 
Homeland Security (Department of Homeland Security 2009) report details a rise in 
"rightwing extremism," and urges local law enforcement to educate themselves on issues 
of ideological importance to militia members so that they are better equipped to handle 
interactions with them, ranging from regular traffic stops to real confrontations. 
Only one interviewee referred to the events of Ruby Ridge and Waco as relevant 




passing at some point during their interview. Literature that attributes great significance 
to these events, as described in Chapter Two, is still correct, however. As mentioned in 
that chapter, most members who are involved today were not involved in the 1990s. 
Different events of social importance have occurred in the intervening time are likely 
more salient to newcomers, yet have similar themes of lack of trust in the government 




All four stated reasons for joining the militia are rooted in traditional constructions of 
masculinity. Men who evoke a sense of duty to country or family are resting on notions 
of men as warriors and protectors. Those who reference personal preparedness seem to 
experience some sort of insecurity in the form of a threat or devaluation to these 
identities. Militia men who say they join because they want to find comradery with like-
minded individuals seem to want some affirmation of masculine identity. Men who see 
their militia involvement as a form of political expression are acting in symbolic defiance 
of a government they see as pushing the country away from its heritage, which is deeply 
embedded in the mythos of the traditional, white, U.S. male.  
Most militia men would be offended at the notion that they are involved in the 
militia out of some search for masculine expression. Many nonetheless seem to be 
referring to this archetype when they take up arms and talk about their responsibility to 
protect their family and to learn about a variety of methods for doing so. This does not 




any of them. During my fieldwork, I certainly encountered a few male militia members 
who clearly subscribed to traditional gender norms. For example, 45 year old Kyle, a 
truck driver, said: 
"I believe that a woman's got a right to choose, and then on the other hand 
I feel that, you know, takin' a baby's life isn't right either. And you're 
probably goin' to get mad—my wife gets mad—but I think if women were 
more responsible with themselves and their bodies, we wouldn't have the 
problems we have in this world. And that makes a lot of women mad. I 
don't know how you feel, but it's just you know, it's like the game is, like 
the fox and the hound, the way I look at it. You know, you know the guy 
saw the fox, the girl, and some girls are just so stupid. You know, and I 
mean some girls are very respectable about themselves you know– I'm 
sorry but I do blame a lot of the problems in society on female behavior 
[laughs]."   
 
Kyle took care to indicate that he thought I was "respectable," but his stance on 
women and their sexual behavior was by far the most extreme I encountered in the 
militia. Kyle's militia unit is the only one in the state with substantial membership and 
longevity that thinks women should not be militia members, though more units with this 
ideology existed in the 1990s. It is certainly possible that other men were more guarded 
and trying to give more socially acceptable answers during our interviews. However, I 
was often the only woman at a training event, and even within my first few months in the 
field, the men were not afraid of engaging in scatological and sexual humor in front of 
me (including one member's self-deprecating jokes about his own apparently small 
penis). Overall, sexualized comments were rarely directed at me, as most male members 
seemed to either accept me as "one of the guys," or to treat me more protectively and 
paternalistically.  
Many more militia men, especially SMVM leaders and others with military 




Figure 12: A member shows his 
softer side as he holds the new 
family pet under his jacket for 
warmth during an April Field Day. 
Photo courtesy of 
www.michiganmilitia.com.  
existing literature on working to lower-middle class, white men might predict. Below, I 
include examples of this more emotive side of militia men that come from encounters at 
their trainings and other events. These selections demonstrate how masculinity in the 
Michigan militia is more complex than their reported motivations for membership would 
suggest. 
 
Hegemonic Masculinity Challenged 
Men in the Michigan militia typically find one to three other members with whom they 
develop particularly close friendships. These are almost always connections that did not 
exist before these men joined the militia. One component of militia organizational 
structure facilitates these connections by requiring county leaders to check in each month 
with each member in their area. They ask a variety of questions about preparedness 
supplies (ranging from, "How many rounds of ammunition do you have?" to "Do you 
have an iPod?"), but also leave time and ledger space for personal and family issues. 
Smaller friendship networks regularly call and text 
each other for occasional recreational activities beyond 
militia exercises, and they often carpool to training. At 
trainings, any militia man who is experiencing financial 
problems, issues with coworkers, or especially 
disagreements with significant others, finds many 
sympathetic ears.  
The men are also attentive to each other's 




Walter, a retail worker with military experience, consistently encourages everyone to stay 
hydrated during long hikes, is to be expected given the militia's focus on preparedness 
and physical activity during training. Other instances, like when one member drove an 
extra three hours after training had started to retrieve another man's forgotten diabetes 
medication, indicates a more personal and genuine concern for each other's well-being.  
Other contemporary men's organizations promote an interest in more traditionally 
"feminine" care for one another. Gender studies professor Judith Newton (2004) and Jean 
Hardisty (2000), founder of Political Research Associates, both did field work with the 
Christian men's organization Promise Keepers. While these authors come to different 
conclusions about the social value of this organization, both observe that it provides a 
space for white, conservative men to embrace more traditionally feminine characteristics 
like vocalizing affection for each other and their families. Promise Keepers carefully 
frame their emotional expressions in ways that preserve their heterosexuality and their 
dominant place in the household even as they include an explicit appeal for men to 
express their feelings to one another and to their wives (Heath 2003). 
 The militia does not include emotional expressivity as an overt goal, and complete 
openness among members is rarer and less self-aware in the militia, perhaps as a result. A 
summer 2010 training day at a state park was one occasion, however, when such 
openness was evident, and it provides interesting insight into militia men's gendered and 
emotional lives. This day, around 30 people were in attendance, including representatives 
from three different militia units, five people from two different international news crews, 
the wife of an SMVM leader, and a few of their kids. It had been one of the hotter days of 




attendance had completed a two to six mile walk (depending on their gear, health, and 
what qualification level they were trying to attain). This area was adjacent to and in full 
view and hearing of a parking lot where two dozen non-militia campers, mountain bikers 
and hikers were preparing to use the nearby trails and other facilities. 
 Lloyd had been talking casually with Sam, a 42 year old married father of three, 
about the training as Sam stood at a table with his back turned to Lloyd. Sam was 
reorganizing his gear vest and Lloyd was making an adjustment to his rifle sling under a 
nearby tree. Without a change in cadence or inflection, Lloyd called to one of his young 
daughters, 'Could you bring me that multi-tool, baby?' Sam instantly responded, 'of 
course!' and took the tool to Lloyd before returning to his task at the table while Lloyd's 
daughter looked on and laughed.  
 Sam certainly knew that the affectionate label was not directed at him and 
intended to be amusing as he helped his friend. However, Sam's inflection did not 
change, as straight men sometimes do when they are mocking gay men. An hour or so 
later after I thought the exchange had been forgotten, I approached Sam as he was in the 
midst of explaining to Lloyd, Lloyd's wife, and six other male members that, 'Men in our 
society have a lot of trouble expressing their love for one another!' 
Two of the nearby men looked slightly uncomfortable, or perhaps just unsure of 
Sam's meaning, but everyone else seemed to be completely unperturbed by Sam's 
statement. I chuckled a bit at this exchange because Sam's comment and the majority 
response to it were so unexpected and defied what most of the literature would predict 
regarding men's introspection about masculinity in a mix-gender, public space. Sam, 




serious!' I quickly assured him that I knew he was serious, and that I completely agreed 
with him. I planned to elaborate, but at that point Lloyd interjected.  
Lloyd said that he agreed, too, that the militia should serve to bring people closer 
together, and he mentioned SMVM's mission statement that proclaimed to accept 
everyone. Much to the surprise of those who had not been involved in the militia since its 
inception as Lloyd had, he added, 'We even used to have a transsexual! Bob is now 
Barbara.' At this point, another member, Adam, loudly called for Sam's attention from 
about five yards away. When Sam turned, Adam blew him a kiss. Everyone laughed 
about this and soon returned to more familiar topics of conversation. 
Later that day when no one else was near, I asked Sam about when he first started 
to think that society unfairly constrained men's mutual expressions of affection. He told 
me that he had spent time in South Korea when he was younger, and it was part of the 
culture there for males who were really good friends to hold hands as they walked. Sam 
never thought much of it until a male friend grabbed his hand as they were strolling 
through town. Sam indicated his first reaction was to recoil, but the friend reminded him 
of the area's different cultural standards. Sam relaxed, and by the end of their walk, he 
said he realized it had been an enjoyable experience. He was able to have human contact 
in a foreign country without having 'to worry about being called gay.' He later reinforced 
this message in an email to me, after I emailed him to thank him for his insights and 
invited him to share more of his perspective. He noted that a lack of experience with 
other cultures led to many American men having a relatively limited repertoire for 
expressing affection: 
"I feel that our society has no outlet for 'brotherly love,' without being 




them and will miss them. Most people can't understand that, they find it as 
a weakness. I feel it's one of my strengths, to feel so strongly about 
another person, that I show it emotionally. I guess what I learned in Korea 
when I was still very young has molded my beliefs. 99.9% of Americans 
don't get to, or try to understand other cultures and why they do the things 
they do."  
 
While Sam is somewhat unique in his willingness to openly discuss masculinity 
and affection to such a great extent, he is not alone in complicating what white, American 
masculinity looks like in the Michigan militia. Tad, for example, a happily married, 45 
year old who works with computers, makes no effort to hide his love for the color pink—
a stereotypically feminine color. He proudly showed off his new, bright pink iPhone case 
one night at a meeting and showed the rest of his table how it matched his Hello Kitty 
computer background. He later ordered a militia t-shirt, normally seen in black or Army 
green, in bright pink and wore it regularly to trainings.  
A few of the members who attend infrequently, or who attend meetings but not 
trainings seemed unsure if Tad's behavior was sincere, or if he was trying to joke and 
evoke a reaction from them. Tad's wife confirmed his genuine interest in the color at the 
only meeting she attended when someone commented on his "bold fashion choices," and 
she indicated the color was plentiful in their home. The regular members accepted Tad's 
pink accoutrements with a shrug, with one commenting, 'That's awesome.'  
Even so, it was very difficult for me to imagine what the reception must have 
been like for an openly LGBT person. With Lloyd's help, I contacted Barbara, who 
transitioned after becoming involved in the militia. She indicated that her reasons for 
eventually leaving the militia had nothing to do with her transsexual status or the militia's 
reaction to it. I asked how the militia responded when she first attended an event as a 




but her vivid recall two and a half years later implies it was at least memorable, if not 
uncomfortable for her.  
"Being transgender was not an issue. I showed up with my wife to help out 
just before their Tax Blast a couple years ago, and I had longer hair and 
they asked about it. So I showed them my driver's license (which I had 
gone down to the Secretary of State looking my female best to take my 
Driver License renewal picture for). I was also wearing my green 
MichiganMilitia.com T-shirt and you could make out my (at that time) 
size A breasts underneath, and I explained that I had been taking female 
hormones under a doctor's prescription for the past couple of years, and as 
a result I was wearing a sports bra under my t-shirt. Then, as I recall, they 
asked if I was still going to be married to my wife, and I said yes, and they 
asked if I could still shoot a gun, and I said yes, and they said they didn't 
care about the transgender stuff and would rather not hear any more about 
it. Typical guy's reaction..." 
 
Militia members first questioned how Barbara's transition would impact her 
marital status (a marker of adherence to traditional gender norms) before asking whether 
it would impact her militia participation. The order here is important since the militia 
mission statement welcomes any citizen as long as they are "capable of bearing arms," 
and members typically prioritize firearms familiarity above all else. Members may have 
interpreted Barbara's maintaining her marriage as a signal that she was still "really" a 
man, or at least fulfilling a masculine role. As long as she did not draw attention to her 
transgender status in the field by continuing to talk about it, they were still accepting of 
her presence. Had Barbara been single or in the midst of divorce, it is unclear what her 
reception would have been.  
Regardless, it is not convincing that this was a "typical guy's reaction." Friends 
and family of transgendered individuals may, of course, ask similar questions (or 
questions with similar implications) and at least superficially accept their transition. 




high rate of violence, and that their assailants are most often men (see Stotzer 2009 for an 
excellent review of this literature). It is not clear that "typical" men who are only loosely 
connected to transgendered individuals would have this relatively accepting attitude, and 
it is unlikely that Promise Keepers, for instance, even with their explicit premises of 
"male romance" (Newton 2004:38) would have tolerated Barbara's presence (see Heath 
2003). Even minimal acceptance is not the expected behavior from a group like the 
militia that, at first glance, appears to be hypermasculine and resistant to evolving social 
norms regarding equality because of its all-male space that overtly references an 
historical timeframe where social power was incredibly limited for all groups except 
white men.  
Most militia members genuinely attempt to adhere to values of equality and 
freedom of choice, defined by the national mythos they so admire. Members' reactions to 
Barbara, Sam and Tad are not isolated incidents, but instead are salient examples that 
demonstrate how militia members try to follow their stated Libertarian principles even on 
issues that may call into question central parts of their own identities. Although Michigan 
militia men express a strong adherence to a tough masculinity of yesteryear, their 
experimentation and openness with each other reveals a more complicated relationship to 
masculinity and masculine expression that challenges claims that men in all-male groups 
are consistently pressured to enact a single, hegemonic masculinity.  
 
MILITIA FAMILIES 
This relatively open masculinity is also evident in militia men's relationships with their 




Figure 13: Kids often find the day's 
events either tiring or boring. This boy 
fell asleep amidst the adults' ongoing 
conversation at a summer training. 
Photo courtesy of Jeff Kindy.  
members' wives, girlfriends, and children attended, though some of my interactions with 
family members also occurred online, or in members' homes. In short, children are 
incorporated in militia training, with both boys and girls participating in target shooting, 
hikes through the woods, and overnight camping events with their fathers. Women have 
an overall lack of participation in the militia, and I suggest that women are often less 
comfortable in militia training environments because of both gendered and environmental 
factors. Women also frequently prioritize childcare or other concerns about training, even 
if they ideologically agree with the militia's goals.  
 
Children in the Michigan Militia 
Children who participate in militia functions are 
most often children of unit leaders, not regular 
members. They range in age from three to sixteen 
years old, with most being from nine to twelve years 
old. Children attend monthly meetings rarely, and 
are usually visibly bored (playing with handheld 
gaming devices or audibly sighing when a new 
person stands up to speak) when they do so. The 
adults talk for several hours at these events about 
plans for upcoming militia trainings and about political or other news stories. The 
children are expected to sit quietly and not disturb the adults during these conversations, 
which often proves to be a difficult task. Children who attend trainings often participate 




Figure 14: Several militia members and their children 
practice a military-style evacuation during a spring 2012 
training. Photo courtesy of www.michiganmilitia.com. 
near the campsite. The younger ones find bugs, splash and swim in a creek, or play tag, 
while the older ones gossip about school friends or complain about missing their 
videogames or a phone call from a new boyfriend.  
Militia parents typically let their children decide whether they want to attend a 
particular training, and it is often the case that some children from a given family attend, 
while their siblings stay home or participate in their own social activities. The children 
usually enjoy spending time with their parents in this environment and think it is "cool" 
to ride ATVs or to target practice under very close supervision. Several children 
described their parents' militia involvement as "important" to different media outlets, 
which suggests that militia members discuss and reinforce their militia involvement at 
home, and that some children have also come to believe it is important, even if they take 
the training events less seriously than their parents. 
 
Junior Militia Corps 
Only legal adults 18 years of age 
are older are eligible for militia 
membership, but in 2011, SMVM 
started a "Junior Militia Corps" 
(JMC) to more formally integrate 
their children into their monthly 
training activities. Members from 
units across the state brought their 




symbolic support of the group, but no other unit has thus far established a children's-
focused unit.  
In practice, the JMC simply provides more organized activities for children to do 
when they attend militia training, rather than merely playing on the sidelines. For 
example, children were the focal point of the spring 2012 training with a faux-Muslim 
enemy "Farouk-Al-Salit," discussed further in Chapter Four; the set up story for this 
exercise was that the children were on a field trip and needed to be evacuated before 
being attacked by terrorists. The children participated in an evacuation drill, 
unsuccessfully suppressing giggles and occasional chatter but still having a good time, as 
militia members participated in a group maneuver that some had learned in the military. 
With unloaded rifles, one member watched from behind, while others watched from the 
front and sides as the group slowly advanced down a dirt road and away from the cabin 
rented for the weekend.  
SMVM leaders have a more ambitious goal in mind with the group beyond fun, 
however. This goal is reflected on a webpage they have advocating the involvement of 
young people in the militia, encouraging them, among other things, to exercise, eat fruits 
and vegetables, to stay in shape, to not spend too much time playing video games, and 
instead "get out and play and live and think for yourselves" ("JMC" 2011). SMVM 
members see their children as the "next generation of militia members." The JMC is a 
symbolic as well as practical step toward this goal of future militia membership, even 
though most militia children I've informally spoken with acknowledge that they are not 
sure they would continue militia participation later in life, especially if their families were 




This desired long-term mission is also undermined by the fact that most members 
do not purchase the requisite gear for their children. After a reporter asked one leader 
about his family's militia participation, he sensibly explained there was no point in 
purchasing camouflage clothing that his kids would outgrow in a few short months; 
however, these members also lack cold weather sleeping bags or other gear that members 
consider to be essential for basic disaster planning and could often be purchased in adult 
sizes for children to grow into. Despite to overt, primary objective of gaining skills 
toward general preparedness via their militia participation, most militia parents would be 
completely unprepared to support their families if their stated, hypothetical worst-case 
scenario occurred and they had to survive for a prolonged period in the winter without 
electricity or other resources as a result of societal breakdown.  
The members I asked about this contradiction abandoned discussions of their role 
as the family protector and instead answered in terms of personal choice, saying that if 
their children exhibited a "real" commitment to militia involvement, they would then help 
them purchase the necessary equipment. While it may be true that militia parents would 
prefer that their children choose continued involvement in the militia, it remains an 
unsatisfactory resolution to the contradiction of lack of preparedness equipment for the 
whole family. Some men may certainly have financial difficulties in obtaining all the gear 
they would need to fully outfit all members of their families, but the near absence of 
personalized gear that most militia children have is, in my estimation, most clearly a 
reflection of how militia participation is primarily for the adult men and the activities that 





Women in the Michigan Militia 
There are very few women who regularly participate in Michigan militia activities at all. 
Those who do participate tend to be wives or girlfriends of men who have been involved 
for quite a long time—usually at least a year. Women connected to the militia rarely have 
their own rifles or other gear unless they complete Level 1 qualification and become full 
members. Even then, most women  do not purchase their own equipment, but instead use 
surplus materials—even camouflage clothing—that were already in their husbands' 
possession. It is most often the case that women who attend training stay near the 
campsite, chatting with each other and watching their children, rather than gearing up and 
target practicing or running through the woods with the men.  
The women who do "get dirty" (those who fully participate in the training 
activities) receive a great deal of respect from the men. Lloyd still talks proudly about a 
woman who was a member around 2001, before she and her family moved out of state 
and started a militia unit of their own in the new location. She participated in every 
training event (along with her husband), eventually ended up as a training leader, and 
brought her two young children along to every event. The children played nearby for 
much of the day, but their mother incorporated them into training activities when 
possible. An SMVM leader emphasized that this woman, 'really did it. She was really in 
it instead of just participating because her husband was, like I think my own wife might 
do.' This leader worried that his own wife was not as invested in the militias' goals for 
their own sake, as he would prefer, but was instead merely supporting his interests.  
In my time in the field, only one militia wife consistently attended at least half of 




Figure 15: "Chuckwagon" prepares lunch for militia members in 
attendance at a summer training, as another member's wife looks on. 
Photo courtesy of Jeff Kindy. 
events for a little over a year before doing the necessary target shooting and two mile 
hike to complete the Level 1 qualification26. Since qualifying and thus earning her place 
in the group, I have not seen her participate in further shooting or other activity outside of 
camp, implying that she perhaps completed the qualification only to satisfy her husband's 
wishes. This woman says she attends because she genuinely enjoys spending time with 
her husband in a relatively relaxed setting and letting their kids run around in the open 
areas where camping takes place. She often helps prepare food for the men who are in 
attendance, but the primary cooking duties rotate among three male members who do not 
typically participate in trainings because of various physical ailments.  
Other women were involved during the course of my fieldwork, but their militia 
tenure was much more short-lived. One woman, for example, attended and participated 
very consistently for over a year, until after her husband successfully ran for a local 




means they raise 
chickens, goats, cows, 
and a few small crops 
for their own use. She 
reported that it was an 
increase in these 
                                                 
26 In contrast, most of the men who joined the militia during my fieldwork completed the Level 1 




responsibilities after her husband's win that made her not have time for the militia, rather 
than a concern about the public perception of their militia involvement. Another woman 
in her twenties became one of the more active members in her unit in the southern part of 
the state and cursed and bantered with the male members like a sibling, but abruptly 
stopped participating when she started a serious relationship with a non-militia member 
co-worker.  
 Despite many attempts over my three years in the field, I was only able to 
formally interview two women who were involved with the militia. Nearly all of my 
requests were very politely turned down when all the other women, even those who 
attended militia functions several times a year, said something similar to Sandra who 
remarked, 'Oh I just feel like I don't know enough about it. [My husband] can tell you 
everything you need to know!' I continued to receive valuable data through informal 
discussions with wives and other women at various militia functions, but none felt 
comfortable sitting for an interview or anything that felt formal or put them in a position 
of relative expertise. This indicated to me that these women understood the militia and its 
activities to be a very masculine (and perhaps intimidating) space, despite male members' 
attempts to include their wives and girlfriends. 
Of the two women I formally interviewed, 42 year old professional Ashley 
forthrightly replied when I asked her about her level of participation at training:  
"I enjoy the participation. I mean a lot of it is the skill and the fitness part 
of the walks. I guess I like the challenge of keepin' up with the guys 
[laughs]. And just the rifle and pistol shooting, and just learning those 
skills and improving there." 
 
The other female interviewee, 50 year old Carole, a computing specialist, similarly 




"I think there's a lot of women that just don't shoot guns or do any, you 
know. They don't do a lot of the things I do [laughing]. They ask me, you 
know, 'Why do you bother growin' a garden when you can go to Wal-Mart 
and get all of the stuff?' So a lot of other girls that I do know that hunt and 
fish and do all of that, maybe they just never considered that they could 
actually come out." 
 
Both women were among those who were accepted and respected as full members, as 
women who could banter with them, and fully participate in training. Both female 
interviewees reported that they felt completely accepted by these men, as Carole shows in 
an exchange with her 42 year old husband Phil who is also a member.  
Carole: "I thought they were very, very cool and normal." 
 
Phil: "And we were out there doing our two mile [hike], you know, and I 
said, 'Come on!' because I got there before her and Calvin wouldn't let me 
give her a hard time at all. She had infinite time left to go, you know. And 
I'm like, 'You're not going to make it!'"   
 
Carole: "And it was funny." 
 
Phil: "He wouldn't let me give you a hard time. I betcha if it was a guy he 
would have let me give you a hard time." 
 
In this couple's understanding of this interaction, Calvin was not acting out of a sense of 
chivalry, because Phil, Carole's husband, would fulfill any presumed male protector role 
for her, and because Phil was clearly joking about Carole's need to hurry to successfully 
finish the qualification. Instead, the couple felt that Calvin was trying to ensure that 
Carole felt comfortable and welcome in the majority-male group, instead of feeling 
pressured to complete the hike at a pace on par with her physically larger and stronger 
husband.  
 Phil and Calvin both may have been more aware of trying to make Carole feel 
comfortable in the field than most of the men would have been. Most militia men seem 




distributed at a 2010 public meeting expressed this sentiment while using gendered 
appeals regarding self-protection:  
"Ladies, I know you might think this is some kind of macho hobby, or 
'gun phase' that your husbands, sons, brothers or fathers might be going 
through, but believe me, your welfare and protection are the most 
important thing to us, and it breaks our hearts when we fail to convince 
you of the serious need to get in some self-defense and home-defense 
training." 
 
Many militia men become very frustrated that their wives and girlfriends do not become 
involved, but eventually "give up" asking them to accompany them to militia events. 
When I asked Sam whether his wife supported his militia involvement, he replied, "No. I 
do what I wanna do and she does what she wants to do and, you know? We're both adults 
so I go my way, she goes her way." Similarly, Harold noted that his wife is supportive of 
his militia involvement, "[As] long as I leave [her] out of it. She doesn't want to be 
bothered with all of my 'nonsense,' as she puts it." Some male members joke about 
having "militia wives," who are in fact married to other members, but who more closely 
fit their image of an ideal spouse who supports their militia involvement than do their real 
partners. This means that the women who are most accepted in the group are often those 
who act least stereotypically feminine27.  
Female militia members and their partners' desired role for their partners within 
the group challenges the gendered framework found in other majority male, nostalgic 
groups. That is, researchers of groups similar to the militia have previously explained 
how women in their groups similar to the militia are largely expected to follow traditional 
                                                 
27 When I was in the field, I was primarily viewed as "one of the guys," and very rarely received any 
flirtation or sexual innuendo. I believe this is, in part, because I often fully participated in training exercises 
and thereby downplayed my femininity. At the same time, I don't think my being accepted by militia men 
was solely responsible for making it difficult for other women to talk to me. They would often chat with me 
about non-militia issues, and several were comfortable enough with me to ask me to watch their children if 




gender roles. Survivalist women could participate in some exercises, but were largely 
expected to perform support functions like cooking, in sociologist Richard Mitchell's 
(2002) study. Similarly, women in the border-patrolling Minutemen organizations tend to 
be assigned the role of camp coordinator and cook, while the men are the ones who do 
the potentially dangerous and physically taxing work of watching for illegal immigrant 
crossings in sociologist Harel Shapira's (2011) study of such groups at the U.S.-Mexico 
border.  
Acceptance of women who most blend into the group and violate stereotypical 
expectations of femininity is also the opposite of the "mascot" member role that 
sociologists like Laura Adams (1999) discuss, where unique members are put forward 
and heralded by the group because of their difference. In the case of the militia, the 
women who are most lauded are those who most blend in and who are most similar to 
male members in terms of their dedication to training. Women's militia participation also 
more subtly challenges Michael Kimmel's (2009) analysis in Guyland, which explains 
that in many male social circles, women must adhere to certain roles or play by certain 
social rules to be accepted. Although women are most accepted if they fully participate, 
non-participating women are still welcomed and encouraged to attend non-training 
activities and be present at the campsites; tangential involvement is better than none in 
militia men's opinion.  
Perhaps ironically, however, an out of state female member named Elise, a 33 
year old student, found exaggerating her femininity in certain ways useful for getting 
newcomers interested in the militia. This woman was, by far, more invested in the militia 




traveling, apparently are her own expense, to make face-to-face connections with other 
states' militia units in an ultimately failed effort to start a national-level militia structure. 
When addressing the Michigan militia units at the meeting, Elise spoke very deferentially 
and respectfully about the male leaders of her unit, and of the military experience they 
had but she lacked, highlighting their masculinity as contrasting her feminine "puniness" 
in the process. She nonetheless suggested that she tried to downplay her femininity in the 
field as she explained that she believed the group had fully accepted her:  
"Members of my militia have become family. […] There are a few 
physical areas I have trouble with— most center around having the upper 
body strength of a girl, but none of them have ever mentioned it or made 
fun of me for not being able to do certain things. Mainly, I try as hard or 
harder than many of them so I am given a certain level of respect, just for 
being a hard ass. If I was at all whiny or weak my treatment may well be 
quite different. […] I tend to think it's more about [them] being supportive 
of everyone, than it is of being respectful of me because I'm female." 
 
Elise told me that she had recently attended the meeting of a unit in another state 
and had noticed how a female member with an infant seemed most effective at 
communicating with non-members, especially women. She said that she thought the 
mother-child relationship and the woman's talking about the militia while her infant was 
present made the group look less intimidating, and like it really was about families and 
not just men with guns. Nine months after this conversation, Elise had a baby—her first 
child—with the leader of her militia unit.  
 Much more commonly, Michigan militia members' wives are simply disinterested 
in the ideology or practices of the militia. They often described their partners' militia 
activity as "important," but could rarely articulate why this was so. When I asked them to 
clarify, most referenced their partners' beliefs, thus indicating militia involvement was 




for preserving the country as their partners' would undoubtedly want to hear. Women's 
disinterest sharply contrasts the emotional and ideological investment that sociologist 
Kathleen Blee found in female members of the racist and nostalgic Ku Klux Klan (2003). 
Women in the Klan, who did not always join merely because of their male partner's 
involvement in the organization, nearly uniformly became increasingly invested in racist 
ideology throughout their tenure in the group. Many of Blee's participants expressed 
ambivalence about racial violence or discrimination, but nonetheless indicated that their 
involvement in the Klan had been important for showing them how the world "really" 
works, or the "truth" of white supremacy. 
Militia women seem not to share their partners' sense of political urgency and 
generally do not internalize the militia's ideological perspectives, even after many years 
of sporadic involvement with the group. Militia women do not particularly enjoy 
campouts or the physical activities, including shooting, that their husbands enjoy. One 
wife, for example, very nearly fell asleep during the first monthly meeting she attended at 
the moment her husband was being applauded for qualifying Level 1 and receiving his 
membership card. She never returned, and her husband later sighed as he told me that she 
had not known what to expect going into the meeting, but was so bored that she would 
likely never attend any other militia function. Another wife who grudgingly attended the 
2008 Field Day noted that she didn't usually come to militia functions because: 
'It's just not my thing. Some men have poker games on the weekends. I 
wouldn't want to do that either. This is like his poker. I have other 
interests. Other things to do.'  
 
I still find it somewhat startling that a wife, especially a disinterested one, could 




understandable that many wives, especially those with young children, may feel unable to 
participate in anything with such a regular time commitment on weekends. Women's 
disinterest in the militia as a leisure activity may also be part of a broader trend where 
women participate in less dedicated leisure activity than men generally (Deem 1982).  
 
Environmental Factors 
Concerns rooted in physical comfort that may be more important barriers for some 
women's participation, too. It is easier and more comfortable for men to take care of 
bodily functions during a long camping weekend than it is for women. This is particularly 
true when the campsite is on remote private property in cold Michigan winters when 
many layers of clothing must be removed to perform these basic tasks. Militia leaders 
rented two porta-potties for the 2008 Field Day event as a result of this very concern. 
Some of their own wives had apparently complained about using the outhouse—a rickety 
lean-to with a blue tarp for a door—and the leaders thought this might make women more 
comfortable, and more likely to spend the day at the event. I heard several of the militia 
men express that they, too, were happy to have an option besides the outhouse that year, 
but, they all seemed to forget this the following year, as no apparent effort was made to 
rent them for 2009's Field Day. 
The men, especially those who were in the military, routinely banter about bodily 
functions at militia events. The men apparently know this may be off putting to some of 




wife or kids are present28, but they seem unaware that even jovially-intended messages 
here may have implicitly excluded some women's participation. At a monthly public 
meeting just prior to the primary winter training where the men practice survival skills 
they would need if stranded outdoors during a snowy Michigan February, for example, 
Calvin—the man who was previously attuned to Carole's potential discomfort in the all-
male group—discussed how to monitor hydration in the winter: 
'When I was in the military, doing this stuff in the winter, they taught the 
guys to go pee as a group, and to watch the color of your buddy's urine to 
watch for potential problems, for someone in the process of getting 
dehydrated and didn't know it.' 
 
Neither Calvin nor the other men present at the meeting seemed to recognize that this 
strategy might not be applicable to the women in the audience, whom they had attempted 
to recruit to the upcoming winter training earlier in the same meeting.  
I asked both Carole and Ashley why they thought more women were not as 
involved in the militia as they were, and both indicated that they believed there was an 
element of intimidation or fear of an all-male environment that prevented many women 
from participating. Ashley additionally believed that a lot of women felt uncomfortable 
with their level of familiarity with guns or military culture and assumed one or both 
would be required for real militia participation. She told me during our interview:  
"One, is there are a lot fewer women than men that are comfortable with 
guns. Number two, just the military fitness part of things, a lot of women 
aren't comfortable with. […] I think the other thing is, unless you're going 
with your husband or boyfriend or something, there's that intimidation of 
going on your own. You're awfully brave to do that."  
 
                                                 
28 Scatological language was not generally toned down in this way when I was the only woman present, 
probably because I was one of the few women who would "get dirty" by fully participating in militia 




Figure 16: The flag at the range is set to half-staff 
during the training following the WWII veteran's 
funeral. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
A lack of comfort with guns or physicality may have been underlying other women's 
resistance to sitting for a full interview with me; although they did not always articulate 
it, they probably felt a lack of expertise with militia-related tools and information and 
likely did not want to risk inadvertently misrepresenting something their husbands or 
boyfriends cared about so deeply. 
 
WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION AFTER TRAINING MOVED TO PUBLIC LAND 
Twenty months into my fieldwork, in 
November 2009, women's participation 
in the Michigan militia changed. The 
WWII veteran who owned the farmland 
where militias across the state regularly 
trained died. Months prior, when the 
veteran was in ill-health, militia leaders 
had begun looking for alternate 
permanent locations. SMVM hosted one 
more training at this site shortly after 
the veteran's death, conducted a short 
memorial service including a 21 gun 
salute (an honor reserved for war 
veterans), and helped clean up the property one final time before moving their trainings 




The state park location provides a much more expansive terrain for practicing 
group movements and allows for greater year-round participation from wives and 
children. During the cooler months, large cabins with bunk beds, a heater, and a detached 
but well-maintained outhouse are available for rental. This is a more attractive location 
for people who do not want to be out all weekend training in frigid Michigan winters. In 
the summer, the state park has nearby biking and hiking paths, canoe rentals, and 
swimming areas that provide diversions for family members uninterested in shooting or 
paramilitary exercises. 
The new shooting range, however, is located several miles away at a different 
entrance to the state park. Militia members have much less flexibility over what shooting 
exercises they may conduct here because of various range rules. Most substantially, all 
activity at the range must stop as shooters move back ten feet from the firing line and the 
range officer examines every firearm to ensure that it is unloaded with the slide locked 
open (to show it is empty) before anyone is allowed downrange. It takes several minutes 
to walk to where the targets are posted (25, 50, or 100 yards, depending on which section 
of the range the shooter is using), check the targets, hang new ones, then walk back. The 
range officer then performs another safety check to ensure that everyone is behind the 
firing line before again opening the range for shooting. This procedure may take more 
than 20 minutes to complete, and can happen as often as every 15 minutes of shooting 
time, depending on the number of shooters. This makes it very difficult to run 
competitive shooting events or to efficiently sight in new weapons at this location.  
Delays at the range also change how women participate in shooting events. 




Figure 17: A militia father helps his son position 
ear plugs prior to going to the shooting range to 
watch others shoot. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
participate in other training activities, would regularly target shoot with a variety of 
firearms. In part, this allowed them to compare the grips and kickbacks of different 
firearms as the male members tried to talk their wives and girlfriends into getting their 
own guns29. Children occasionally participated in target shooting activities under close 
supervision, most often at the yearly Field Day event. If they became bored, they could 
safely go back on their own to the nearby picnic table or tents with other adults.  
Now, women tend not to make the trip to the range, and instead stay at the 
campground. When they do go to the range, the rarely shoot, but instead spend their time 
managing children who have difficulty maintaining interest and patience during the 
lengthy safety checks. The public nature of the range and its distance from camping and 
other facilities means that children must wait 
nearby and have no other options for 
entertainment as they wait their turn to 
shoot. Although militia men capably 
supervise children when women do not 
participate in shooting events, men rarely 
attend the range without leaving time for 
their own target practice.  
The separation between the range 
and other facilities necessitated a shift in 
the focus of militia training toward non-
                                                 
29 As I previously mentioned, most women who officially join the militia use weapons and other equipment 
belonging to their partners. Many of the men obviously used their wives' potential interest in joining the 




Figure 18: A member from the west part of the state 
demonstrates the bow he just made by shaping a small 
sapling with a knife. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
shooting activities such that there is now a greater focus on camping and survivalist 
skills. In the last few years, members have learned different techniques for making a fire, 
such as how to create a homemade burner with an empty tuna can, cardboard, and 
improvised igniter, how to plan a route over varied terrain, and how make different kinds 
of animal traps. These techniques often require advance planning and collecting materials 
at home prior to training, and they allow members who complete them to show off their 
skills at the next gathering.  
Women do not typically participate in the activities that require such homework, 
but they are substantially more engaged in projects that can be completed on- site during 
training, including those where members learn how to make and use tools from the 
environment. For example, members learned how to carve bows and arrows out of 
saplings from a local man who is an 
expert in primitive weapons. This 
was a tedious and impractical task 
ostensibly meant to be used in a 
worst-case survival scenario, but 
was more genuinely just for fun. All 
three women present at this training 
eagerly participated in the task and 
received compliments about the 
quality of their work. Tasks like 
bow making require physical effort, 




strength, and can be done around the camp site near the facilities and any playing 
children.   
 
FLUID MASCULINITY 
Despite militia men's desire to make the group inclusive of their whole families, it seems 
likely it will remain a strongly male-dominated space. Militia men genuinely want their 
partners and children to be more involved in their activities, but are not always aware of 
the factors—personal, ideological, and environmental—that may inhibit women's and 
children's participation. Even with full awareness, it is unlikely that militia men would be 
able to completely change the culture of the group, which is largely predicated on the 
military experiences of those members who have been in the armed forces; no militia 
women I have encountered have been in the military. Women in SMVM are more 
integrated into overall militia activity since the move to public land, but are less involved 
in shooting practice, which male members consider central to their identity, and women 
in other units continue to have a low level of involvement. It will be interesting to see 
whether militia children who enjoy training with their fathers today continue their 
involvement as adults, especially given the lessened level of commitment they witness 
from their mothers.  
More generally, the militia superficially reflects a familiar story of traditional 
masculinity. It would appear to be yet another organization in a long lineage that includes 
the Boy Scouts and Promise Keepers that seeks to reaffirm a white, heterosexual 
masculinity with a focus on physical and mental toughness and traditional gender roles. It 




are less common than they were in an earlier era they idealize (e.g., Putnam 2000), and 
where men subscribe to masculine ideals "because they want to be positively evaluated 
by other men" (Kimmel 2009:47).  
The militia nonetheless has two important differences from its predecessors. First, 
it is not exclusively a men's organization. Women and children are welcome, even 
encouraged, to attend the vast majority of militia units' events, though few regularly do 
so. Second, the militia provides a safe space for those men who want to innovate—to test 
or expand what it means to be a man in modernity. Militia men believe they have enough 
in common with each other to express their feelings in surprising ways without fear of 
ridicule or reprisal, and they may not have this kind of bond with many male coworkers 
or family members. It is difficult to estimate what proportion of members these 
innovating men comprise. However, men who are not innovators observe and accept men 
who are innovators during trainings and other militia functions across the state, as 
evidence by their continued participation in these events.  
This fluidity and acceptance of masculine experimentation challenges notions that 
hegemonic masculinity is always strictly enforced, particularly in all-male groups, and 
that deviations from an hegemonic ideal are sharply sanctioned by other group members. 
Sociologist Sharon Bird, for example argues that all-male groups promote  
"clear distinctions between hegemonic masculinities and nonhegemonic 
masculinities" and "... contribute to the maintenance of hegemonic 
masculinity norms by supporting meanings associated with identities that 
fit hegemonic ideals while suppressing meanings associated with 
nonhegemonic masculinity identities" (1996:121). 
 
In contrast to this expectation, militia men encourage each other to violate the hegemonic 




in childrearing and other stereotypically feminine behaviors, and sometimes question 
strict expectations of heterosexual male sexuality. 
There is also evidence that militia men who innovate or experiment with their 
masculinity challenge traditional gender relationships at home as well as in the field, and 
may be genuinely challenging the hegemonic masculinity presumed to pervade their 
lives. Lloyd, for instance, publicly expresses his affection and respect for his wife at 
militia events, and she, in turn, proudly talks about how much he helps her with cooking 
and cleaning at home. All innovators in the field serve as models to other militia men 
who are not. As men see each other challenging hegemony, they may eventually become 
more comfortable doing so themselves. Several members, for example, have become 
more involved in child care as a result of their militia participation. Before joining the 
organization, some men report that they rarely spent time with their children on 
weekends; now, they see militia activities as a family recreational space and bring both 
male and female children with them to the events.  
This is not to say that militia men should be considered activists for the rights of 
women and other groups; few of them seem to have a full understanding of structural 
barriers to full equality for women and other groups. Members like Kyle, who blamed 
women's sexual behavior for all the world's problems, undoubtedly resist change in 
traditional gender roles and hegemony. Nonetheless, the militia is not merely a backlash 
against the women's movement, as seemed to be the case with Ferber's (1999) study. 
Their acceptance of female members, of transgendered Barbara, and their emotive, 
feminized expressions of masculinity alongside some members' increasing involvement 




This case also shows us that masculinity as a construct may be more contentious 
and fluid in contemporary American, even among nostalgic, male-dominated groups, 
than we typically acknowledge. Sociologist R.W. Connell (2005) rightly notes that 
masculinity is a collective practice and that what constitutes hegemonic masculinity 
changes over time and space. There is not one agreed upon version of masculinity even 
within the limited context of the Michigan militia, a group of men who see themselves as 
having the same relatively narrow set of interests and motivations. Many are, instead, 
willingly engaging in Connell's version of masculinity politics and are actively and 
consciously negotiating what constitutes masculinity for them. Connell questions the 
utility in attempting to identify a "true" or "real" masculinity in a context of changing and 
competing masculinities; however, I think it is important to remember that both the 
hegemonic and fluid versions of masculinity that militia men evince are "real" for their 
lived experiences. Men know hegemonic tropes of emotional strength and protectionism, 
but find them constraining and use the militia as a space to fight against this constraint by 
experimenting "softer" (Heath 2003) forms of masculine expression. 
This case shows how some lower-middle class, white, American men are 
grappling with concepts and social issues they are often accused of ignoring or 
exacerbating. This case also shows how masculinity and masculine expression cannot be 
fully studied through interview methods alone; members' verbal accounts of masculinity 
and the masculinity they enacted at trainings were often at odds with each other. Only 
careful observation can reveal such nuance. Chapter Four analyzes members' responses to 




populations—to further examine whether militia members are consistently adhere to 






Race and Racism in the Militia:  
Members' Responses to Michigan's African American and Muslim Populations 
 
 
"Yeah! It's not surprising [that there are some racist militia members]. 
We're a cross-section of society. So that cross section is going to be 
represented in our group." 
   - 35 year old George 
 
 
This chapter analyzes how "super citizens" in a predominately white, male group think 
about race and do or do not act racially. I focus on militia members' responses to 
Michigan's African American and Muslim populations, which are the two racialized 
groups that are most salient to them. I first analyze the militia's group-level orientation 
toward these issues and argue that Michigan militia units are not racist at the group level. 
By this I mean that the militia as a group does not have racism as either a goal or a 
guiding principle because members reject any form of identity-based exclusion as 
antithetical to their stated mission of upholding Constitutional principles of equality and 
freedom. I analyze two racialized interactions to clarify this point: a meeting where the 
militia's only consistent non-white member was clearly put forth at a large public meeting 
as a token of racial acceptance, and a meeting where local NAACP members planned to 
protest a militia gathering but instead became involved in the meeting.  
Despite the egalitarian group-level outlook, members may not always recognize 
or ideally respond to individually-evinced racism at their gatherings. Additionally, there 




that strongly racist individuals have the potential to harm the group's egalitarian 
viewpoint over time. I analyze an incident where a new militia member consciously 
tested how much tolerance the group had for his increasingly racist expressions in an 
apparent attempt to see how much racism he could show before being sanctioned. This 
case demonstrates the point at which coded language (Mendelberg 2001) becomes 
recognizable and objectionable as racism to militia members. I suggest that most 
members who do exhibit racism are best understood as symbolic racists, but that non-
racist militia members may mistake racist statements for a shared investment in 
nationalism. I show that nationalistic sentiment also undergirds a more common disdain 
for illegal immigrants among militia members.  
I then analyze an issue that arose in early 2011 that initially posed a challenge to 
my categorization of the Michigan militia as a non-racist group. On several occasions, 
members coordinated involvement in several anti-Muslim events in the state, despite 
having a respected militia leader who is Muslim. It became clear that many members 
were viewing Muslims as a racial, not just religious, outgroup. I show that militia 
members' anti-Muslim sentiment is not a form of symbolic racism, but rather a form of 
cultural threat to their national ideal, combined with a real fear of physical harm of future 
terror attacks.  
 
THEORIES OF RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION 
"Jim Crow" or Old Fashioned Racism 
"Jim Crow" racism is perhaps the version of racism that most people think of when 




inherent and immutable biological differences across races, such that whites are 
intellectually and morally superior to other races. Historian George Fredrickson says the 
concept became firmly embedded in U.S. discourse in the 1830s in an effort to continue 
justifying black slavery even as greater numbers of white men were granted the right to 
vote (2002). Old fashioned racism started falling out of favor in the U.S. in the decades 
prior to the start of the Civil Rights Movement as various biological theories were 
discredited (e.g., Countryman 2006; Schuman et al. 1997). It was replaced with more 
subtle, but still deleterious forms of racism. 
 
Symbolic Racism 
As defined by political scientists Donald Kinder and David Sears (1981), symbolic 
racism is "a blend of antiblack affect and the kind of traditional American moral values 
embodied in the Protestant [Work] Ethic." Symbolic racism has at its core a general racial 
resentment or negative emotionality toward nonwhites, and is often framed as a 
"cultural," rather than inherent difference between racial groups30.  
 I suggest that symbolic racism is the theory of racism that is most applicable to 
understanding militia members' exclusionary responses to African Americans. The 
understanding that militia members (and many U.S. whites more generally) have of what 
it means to be a good American or a good citizen also heavily relies on the Work Ethic's 
valuation of individualism, hard work, and having only what one earns; these themes are 
embedded in the mythic tales about the country's founding. Symbolic racists believe that 
                                                 
30 Symbolic racism differs from" laissez faire racism," which typically assumes Whites are consciously 
acting to protect a privileged position (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997); it also differs, from group threat or 
realistic group conflict theories (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Sears 1981), and from theories of 
individual self-interest (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996), all of which similarly 




African Americans do not subscribe to these American ideals (Brown et al. 2003) and 
may therefore see African Americans as un-American. For example, they believe that 
African Americans do not value hard work, that they could succeed if they only tried 
harder, and that discrimination is no longer a stumbling block in economic advancement 
(Henry and Sears 2002; Kluegel and Smith 1983).  
 
Racialization and Cultural Threat: A Combined Perspective 
Little of the public discourse around Muslims seems to implicate perceived cultural 
deficiency regarding work ethic, and political scientists John Sides and Kimberly Gross 
(forthcoming) found that Americans understand Muslims as violent and untrustworthy 
but not as lazy or unintelligent. Instead, I suggest that a combination of racialization and 
group threat theories explains militia members' continuing skepticism of and hostility 
toward Muslim Americans.  
 
Racialization 
Racialization occurs when racial meaning is attributed to a group that previously 
possessed no such attribution (Blalock 1973; Omi and Winant 1994). It is an 
essentializing process; as John Hartigan says, racialization is a process that "reduces 
individuality to the point that only racialness matters" (1999:13). All other aspects of 
individual identity become lost from the perspective of the person or group making the 
racialized classification. Racialization means that phenotypical differences are reified 
across groups that are perceived to be distinct, and skin color or the shape of the nose, for 




Racialization may also incorporate cultural factors in addition to traditional, 
physical markers of race and ethnicity. Importantly, these perceived cultural differences 
are still understood to be embodied. Cultural racialization often happens via religion, such 
that religion is understood as a marker of race, and vice versa. Race scholar Khyati Joshi, 
for instance, notes that the racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism has "rendered 
[all three religions] theologically, morally, and socially illegitimate" in a U.S. context 
(2006:212) because most Americans are unable to differentiate them and reject all three. 
Junaid Rana (2011), a professor of Asian American Studies, discusses the State's 
involvement in the racialization of Muslims, which occurs, in part, to promote the War on 
Terror and to uphold clear ingroup/outgroup boundaries during the time of national crisis 
following the 2001 terror attacks31. Sociologist Sherene Razack (2008) goes a step further 
and theorizes that once Islam is racialized, terrorism also becomes racialized, such that 
Arabs are not only perceived as Muslims, but they are also uniformly perceived as likely 
terrorists. The reverse is also true; for many Americans, the term "terrorist" harkens a 
mental image of a traditionally dressed Muslim (ibid).  
More explicitly, many Americans believe that women wearing veils or burkas, or 
men wearing turbans or long beards must be Muslims, though similar clothing may mark 
people of several faiths (Joshi 2006; Shaheen 2000; Joseph et al. 2008). This confusion 
has been at the root of several incidents where followers of Sikhism were targeted for 
violence because their attackers believed they were Muslims (e.g., Romney 2011). 
Studies have also shown that many Americans believe Muslim Americans are somehow 
                                                 
31 Naber (2007) discusses the history of Arab immigrants in the U.S. and argues that the racialization of 
Muslims happened long before the 9/11 attacks, but that the attacks changed the tenor and acceptability of 




culturally deficient and less committed to the nation than they should be (e.g., Condon 
2011; Sides and Gross 2010).  
 
Group Threat 
I suggest that integrating racialization with a version of group threat theory emphasizing 
nationalism allows for a more complete specification of what precisely it is that some 
people believe is "wrong" with Islam. Traditional group threat theories sometimes 
implicate cultural themes including nationalism, but most typically reference political 
threats due to the outgroup's population size, or economic threats due to outgroup 
members' increasing presence in jobs traditionally dominated by whites (e.g., Blalock 
1973; Olzak 1994). When considering Muslim Americans, there is little realistic political 
threat because Arab Americans32 comprise less than 1% of the overall U.S. population 
(Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005).  
There is also little evidence that economic conflict plays a role in anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the U.S. Although Arab Americans have a higher mean household income 
than Americans as a whole ($56,331 versus $51,369), they also are more likely to have 
more education (45% with at least a bachelor's degree compared to 28%), and to be in 
managerial, professional, technical, sales or administrative jobs (73% compared to 59%) 
(Quick Facts"; data compiled from Census 2000 EEO Data tool). These factors together 
mean that most Americans are unlikely to view Arabs as direct competition or threats to 
their economic interests. 
 
                                                 
32 Similar data are not available for self-identified Muslims; using Arab Americans is a reasonable proxy 





A Combined Approach: Nationalistic Threat 
Militia members engage in racialization of Muslims Americans, such that they 
understand Muslims to have certain shared (and typically, essential) physical and cultural 
traits, but their disdain goes beyond race. I argue below that members discriminate 
against and exclude Muslims—not only from the militia but also from their construction 
of full U.S. citizenship—because they believe Islam ubiquitously contrasts American 
values of equality and individual liberty. Notably, this fear is not the same as a 
generalized sense of cultural incompatibility; instead, these are the values that militia 
members see as central principles of the nation, the very values upon which the country 
was founded, and the values that they, as self-described super citizens have vowed to 
uphold.  
Sociologist Nadine Naber (2008) took a similar approach to this as she 
convincingly argued that an interaction of cultural and nation-based racisms33 account for 
Muslim Americans' experiences of discrimination after the 9/11 terror attacks. My work 
expands on Naber's in two respects. First, Naber's insights were built from Muslim 
Americans' accounts of their experiences of exclusion, while this analysis is based on 
non-Muslims who are justifying their own acts of exclusion. This angle provides 
additional information about how such action may be undertaken with limited social 
sanction and plays into actors' broader nationalistic schemas.  
Second, my data show how discussions of "racism" as it is often construed may 
be an unnecessarily limiting framework. Sociologist Robert Miles (1993) suggests that 
racism and nationalism are simultaneously distinct and overlapping. In this context, a 
                                                 
33 Cultural racism excludes groups based on cultural, rather than biological factors, while nation-based 




focus on racism alone may miss an important part of how Muslim Americans are 
excluded from full citizenship. That is, some non-Muslims may reject Muslims solely for 
racist reasons, but others may reject them for purely nationalistic reasons, and yet others 
may reject them out of a combination of racism and nationalism. Framing the totality of 
this exclusion as racism may distract from how individuals with different motives for 
exclusion use and respond to the same rhetoric and participate in the same discriminatory 
behavior. I suggest that the term "legitimate discrimination" (e.g., Scambler and Hopkins 
1986) better captures how people who exclude Muslims from citizenship similarly justify 
their exclusion as being in their or the nation's best interest, regardless of their underlying 
motives for doing so.  
 
THE MILITIA'S ANTI-RACIST ORIENTATION 
The front page of www.michiganmilitia.com states: 
"A well-armed citizenry is the best form of Homeland Security and can 
better deter crime, invasion, terrorism, and tyranny. Everyone is welcome, 
regardless of race, creed, color, religion or political affiliation, provided 
you do not wish to bring harm to our country or people. If you are a 
United States citizen (or have declared your intent to become such), who 
is capable of bearing arms, or supports the right to do so, then YOU ARE 
the MILITIA!" 
 
When I first read these words just prior to attending my first militia event, I could not 
help but wonder how true they were. Did their author genuinely mean that people from a 
variety of backgrounds would be welcome, or was the intent merely to minimize overt 
claims of racism and exclusion against the group?  
Over time, I witnessed interactions in the field that indicated the message was 




different militia leaders tell first-time meeting attendees that they had no patience for 
racism or any "Nazi crap" on at least half a dozen occasions (usually directed toward 
white men with numerous visible tattoos), including times when they did not know I was 
observing. I also saw many members regularly act welcomingly toward black couples 
who were in earshot of public militia events and seemed to be listening to the 
proceedings, inviting them (usually unsuccessfully) to join the discussion. Members 
almost never approached white onlookers in this manner, and it became clear from my 
discussion with leaders that the militia both wanted to ensure the black couples did not 
feel uncomfortable or threatened by the militia's presence, and also wanted to increase the 
racial diversity of the group in an effort to combat accusations of racism. Some members 
genuinely want to increase the diversity of the militia because they believe people of all 
backgrounds should be prepared, while others are guided more by concerns of social 
perceptions; they believe they might face less public criticism if they are seen as racially 
inclusive in media reports, for example.  
Many male militia members were involved in interracial relationships, often with 
Asian women they had met while stationed abroad during military service, but these 
women almost never attended militia functions. Some members proudly and 
spontaneously described their own mixed racial heritages during our interviews when 
they sensed that I was interested in the racial dynamics of the group. Several 
interviewees, to my surprise, even responded similarly to 30 year old Mark, who has 
some college education, when I asked why he thought more people of color were not 
involved in the militia:  
"I know plenty of black folks that would like to go shoot guns and stuff 




it's an awareness thing. I think if anything they're more aware than most 
white people. Because they've been through it. I mean they've already 
been manipulated and exploited more so than most white people have. It's 
just, I think it's a proximity issue. You can't train at Six Mile [in the 
middle of Detroit]." 
 
Mark says he understands that non-white Americans have a different relationship with the 
government and the country's history than he does. He says he thinks non-whites may 
have a greater awareness of the need for something like a militia to protect citizens' rights 
because of a history of race-based mistreatment in the U.S., but are unable to participate 
in training.   
Marks' reference to the unavailability of militia training sites in large cities 
alludes to ongoing socioeconomic disadvantages of people of color relative to white 
Americans. That is, many white militia members live in or just outside of Michigan's 
larger cities. They are nonetheless able to travel to militia events in more rural areas, but 
Mark thinks a higher proportion of people of color are unable to do so. Mark believes that 
if more people of color would participate in regular militia activity if such opportunities 
were more readily available. Mark's perspective is informed by his living in Detroit for 
many years and talking with his black neighbors. Whether his assumptions are correct, it 
is clear that Mark thinks about race in his community and about at least some of the 




Kevin, an African American man in his thirties, is the only person of color who regularly 




Figure 19: Militia members try to demonstrate their open-mindedness in a variety of ways. At a recent 
Field Day, they provided Kosher and vegan meal options. Photos from 
http://s657.photobucket.com/profile/SMVM  
2010, I asked him how he felt about being asked to sit with militia leadership at a large 
meeting just after the 2008 Presidential Election. The meeting was open to the public and 
had drawn a larger crowd than usual. At the start of the meeting, one of the leaders loudly 
asked Kevin, who works in information technology, to help them set up the computer to 
show the crowd some of their YouTube videos. The leader in question was quite familiar 
with computers and had been responsible for creating and uploading the video. It seemed 
obvious to me that the leader's real motive was to make sure that the new people 
attending their first militia function could see their token black member. 
At the time, Kevin came across as happy enough to take this role, but, afterward, 
his participation in militia events became much less consistent. He elaborated on the 
experience during our interview several months later: 
"I was okay with it [being shown off] but it was still a little…daunting. 
[…T]hey put me up front as a way of saying, you know, 'This is our stance 
on the whole [race] thing.' […] So I thought that was a good statement but 
at the same time, too, I was just like, 'Wow.' So. And then I started going 
back—like I have been going back sporadically now. And, you know, for 
the most part it's pretty cool. But I'm actually thinking about going next 





Kevin did not take his son to the next militia meeting; rather, he stopped participating in 
the militia altogether. I do not know for certain whether my questioning Kevin about the 
militia's using him to promote an egalitarian group image influenced his decision to end 
his militia participation, but it is difficult to imagine the timing of his disengagement was 
purely coincidental. Kevin's statement and the rest of his interview demonstrate that he 
believes that militia members really do strive to be racially inclusive, but do not always 
know how to be racially sensitive. At least in retrospect, Kevin was uncomfortable being 
shown off as a token non-white militia member and presumably did not want to be 
pushed into that role again. 
 
NAACP 
Another unique yet instructive encounter occurred when the militia gathered for a joint 
post-election meeting in November 2010. Militia members from four different units 
across the state were confronted by six members of the local NAACP who mistakenly 
believed34 that the militia was gathering with some kind of racial agenda, and they 
planned to protest the meeting. The militia meeting had been underway for five or ten 
minutes when one attendee noticed that a woman was standing outside the restaurant, 
taking pictures through a large plate glass window at the side of the meeting room. 
Leaders paused and exchanged glances with one another, and normally well-spoken 
Lloyd uncharacteristically had to stop speaking, collect his thoughts and regain his 
                                                 
34 One NAACP representative told me that a local pastor had notified them that 300 armed people had 
recently been in a nearby Detroit neighborhood somehow causing anxiety. I wondered whether local Neo-
Nazis or the Open Carry movement had been mistaken for the militia in this scenario, but could find no 




composure before warmly saying, 'Tell her to come in! Welcome! Why not?' and 
motioned for her to come inside.  
Only when she entered the room did the woman's "NAACP" baseball cap become 
visible. Behind her, five men who had previously remained out of sight also entered, 
some of them wearing jackets with the NAACP emblem. The feel of the room became 
rather tense as neither militia members nor NAACP members seemed to know the other 
group's motives for being there, and militia members cautiously watched as the woman 
pulled out a laptop and began taking notes. Lloyd continued speaking for a few minutes 
about the militia's mission and an upcoming training. He jokingly noted that, 'This is the 
wrong place if you were interested in the secret Nazi moon base. My van just does not get 
the kind of gas mileage it would take to drive to a secret Nazi moon base, so you should 
just forget it.' Comments like this were not unusual for Lloyd, and this one in particular 
was intended to subtly convey the non-racist intent of the militia without directly 
referencing white racism toward African Americans. With the new visitors, however, the 
comment only added to the awkwardness in the room.  
One of the male NAACP members eventually asked a question regarding sources 
of information for concealed carry permits for handguns. Militia members struggled to 
put together a coherent answer, with at least five eager members inadvertently talking 
over each other and providing different information. I had never before seen such a 
muddled response to a straightforward firearms question that many of the members take 
great pride in being able to answer. I had to assume they were made nervous by the 
NAACP presence and were trying too hard to appear knowledgeable and cooperative. 




and clarified that he already had a permit and just wanted to know the best source for 
keeping up with changes in the laws that would affect his rights and responsibilities. This 
clarification very visibly made several of the militia members relax and act less warily 
toward the man, whom they could now view as a fellow gun owner, rather than as 
someone who was potentially hostile to gun ownership or who needed to be persuaded of 
their utility. A sole militia member then quickly provided a succinct and clear response to 
his question. 
This interaction apparently made a couple of the other NAACP members 
comfortable enough to also begin asking questions including, "What exactly are you 
preparing for?" "Why are you armed?" and "Do you see yourselves as law abiding 
citizens?" Militia members from all four units took turns providing calm, clear responses 
to every question. Some discussed their military service, as did one NAACP member—a 
WWII veteran who received a, "Thank you, sir!" and a standing ovation from militia 
members when he announced his service record. After this, everyone seemed more at 
ease and militia leaders soon returned to their planned talking agenda for the night.  
 Once the meeting was over, I asked Jamal, the NAACP member sitting closest to 
me, if the meeting had been what he expected. He laughed and vehemently shook his 
head, saying, 'These guys aren't at all what I expected, in a good way!' Jamal mentioned 
that he was heavily involved in his community and it seemed like the militia was, too. He 
said, 'It sounds like they have some good ideas. I feel like there needs to be more 
conversation across different groups with the same interests.' At that point, he exchanged 





'I'm really interested in reaching out to the youth. You know, I live in the 
suburbs, but I work regularly with the youth in the city. I try to help get 
them on the right track. In part, I try to get them on the right track so they 
won't come to my house and I'll be in a position to defend myself! You 
know? I'm a gun owner, and I'll gladly defend myself if I need to, but I 
really don't wanna be responsible for perpetuating a cycle of violence and 
death of young black men.' 
 
George and other militia members could strongly identify with Jamal's interest in his 
community and with his gun ownership, even if they could not quite empathize with 
particular needs of the black community that Jamal referenced. Along with the other man 
who had acknowledged his concealed carry permit earlier in the meeting, this interaction 
helped militia members see NAACP members' interests and concerns as parallel to their 
own and helped reaffirm their anti-racist self-image. To my knowledge, no long-term 
interactions between militia and NAACP members happened after this night, though 
George reported at least one positive follow up phone call with Jamal. 
Militia members' overall response to race, as shown in the above scenarios, 
reflects a more insightful perspective than I had anticipated prior to starting my fieldwork 
with this group of white men who idealize a national identity set in an era of exclusion. 
These interactions demonstrate members' attempts to reenact a super-citizen vision of 
themselves and of an egalitarian America. Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva investigated 
contemporary forms of racism in the U.S. and found that many of his white respondents 
said or implied that they, "don't like to think about" race (2001:145) as a way to avoid 
confronting ongoing racial problems. Militia men, in contrast, do think about race and 
how their group is perceived in the context of members' whiteness. Perhaps members' 
racial insights are, in part, a product of their proximity to racial problems in Michigan 




inclusion in line with their national vision, or even the past criticisms the militia has faced 
about being racially exclusive. 
Militia members' introspection does not, however, mean that they have full 
empathetic understanding or knowledge of continuing discrimination, and their 
awareness of institutional racism may be particularly limited. Members' principled focus 
on individualism and individual achievement almost certainly contributes to a certain 
degree of blindness regarding how institutional practices and social structures are infused 
with discriminatory practices. In spring 2010, militia member Billy had a lengthy phone 
call with a man who identified himself as a Black Panther member who was doing a 
newsletter story on the militia. Billy told me that he had a very enjoyable conversation 
with the man, and he was particularly excited to tell me that the man had taught him a 
new way of thinking about Affirmative Action. The man explained that Billy could think 
about economic achievement as a foot race, and that African Americans had a 400-year 
difference in the starting line, due to slavery. Billy exclaimed, 'I never thought about it 
that way before! It makes a lot of sense!' as he told me the story. This interaction 
exemplifies how militia men may not think about how historical contexts may influence 
people differently without some outside impetus. 
It is also the case that members do not always recognize more overt forms of 
racism, including from other members, despite their attempts at racial introspection. In 
the rest of this chapter, I focus on interactions where racism goes largely unrecognized by 
a majority of militia members. These interactions are instructive for understanding how 
and against whom racism continues within this group of lower and lower-middle class, 




RACISTS IN THE MILITIA 
Edmond, a utilities worker in his early 40s who is married with young-adult children, 
joined the militia in early 2010 and was by far the most racist member I encountered. His 
feelings became evident when he intentionally tested other members' tolerance for racism 
at the first camping event he attended. As Edmond, four other male members, and I sat 
around the campfire on a cool May night, Edmond remarked that 'the natives' were out 
that evening as he complained about the loudly croaking frogs in the distance. The men 
made small talk about new weapons and other gadgets for a few minutes before one 
started talking about the deteriorating state of Detroit after having recently driven through 
the city for the first time in several years. Edmond, who lives near the city, assented and 
noted that he enjoyed going to the 'ghetto' and acting as an election monitor—someone 
tasked with observing a particular polling location and watching for signs of fraud or 
other problems. It became clear that Edmond envisioned all of black Detroit as the 
'ghetto' as he continued. He explained that he had monitored a poll location for the 2008 
Presidential Election 'during Obama's run,' and found it funny when a woman approached 
him after seeing his "Republican" badge, supposedly saying, 'I thought we got rid of all 
of you four years ago!' He said, 'But by the middle of the day, they were all glad to have 
the Republicans there because they couldn't keep track of what they were supposed to 
keep track of on their own.' 
Edmond's story implies several things. First, that the 'ghetto' of Detroit needs 
particular assistance in avoiding voter fraud and other problems; Edmond did not live in 
that area and specifically chose to be an election monitor there. Edmond perceived 




his own neighborhood. Second, Edmond's reference to Obama indicated that he believed 
the 2008 election was even more likely to provoke problematic behavior from Detroit's 
black voters who, he assumed, might have particular incentive to rig the election in black 
Presidential candidate, Barack Obama's favor. Third, when Edmond reported the woman 
said she thought they had gotten rid of "all of you," his inflections indicated that he 
thought she meant not only Republicans, but also Whites (or perhaps white men) more 
broadly. Edmond interpreted the woman as also having an us-versus-them racialized 
mentality and as not wanting "them" in her neighborhood. Fourth, Edmond indicates that 
if he as a white, male, Republican had not been present, the black, female, Democrat poll 
administrator and her assistants would have been incapable of completing their jobs 
because of incompetence.  
The other militia members listened to Edmond's story in silence, with several 
exchanging uncomfortable glances, but neither affirming nor challenging Edmond's 
implications. It seemed to me as though some of the members were trying to discern 
whether Edmond's statements might be racist, but were uncertain and did not want to risk 
accusing him without being able to more concretely identify a problematic statement. A 
slight pause ensued, to which Edmond added, 'They just have no clue what's going on. 
All over the country. Those people vote based on skin color and nothing else.' 
More uncomfortable glances followed, and one member tried to shift the topic of 
conversation slightly by saying he thought people often voted for the wrong reason, or 
without adequately understanding the candidate they were supporting; this was a general 
statement that did not apply to any particular racial group, and is a common 




rant as he then turned to discussing the high crime rates in Detroit, eventually exclaiming, 
'The natives are out of control!' "Natives" often refers to a group of supposedly primitive, 
uncivilized people, which should be offensive enough in this context, but Edmond had 
just used the term a few minutes prior to refer to annoying animals at the campsite, 
making the connotation even worse.  
One member raised his eyebrows and loudly cleared his throat at this comment, 
another jumped up to unnecessarily stoke the still-roaring campfire, but no one yet said 
anything to challenge Edmond's statements. At this point, I was unsure whether the other 
militia members still retained uncertainty about Edmond's racism, or whether they just 
felt uncomfortable confronting him about it. I knew that I was struggling to remain silent, 
but—just like Edmond—wanted to see exactly what kind of comment would be 
necessary to evoke a reprimand, and to identify the point at which racism became 
undeniable for other members.  
 I did not have to wait long. Another member tried, again, to shift the subject and 
discuss Michigan's failing economy, saying that the auto industry in particular had left 
Detroit in 'a terrible state.' Another mused aloud if anything could ever be done to repair 
the city's economy. Edmond, still riled up from this rant, glibly responded, 'I wonder if 
you can grow cotton this far north?'—a clear reference to the legacy of slavery from the 
southern states. Most other members loudly and simultaneously exclaimed "Woah!" at 
this comment, unable to deny the racism in Edmond's statements any longer. Several 
members angrily talked over each other for a few moments, and the only response I could 
clearly make out was, 'That was not cool.' Those who did not speak sat in slack-jawed 




unphased by his last offensive comment. Edmond's reference to the slavery-based 
economy was finally overt enough to make the other members recognize his racism for 
what it was. 
None took the opportunity, however, to confront Edmond. He did not receive a 
version of the almost innoculatory anti-racist statements that first-time meeting attendees 
often heard. Instead, members quickly put out the campfire and went to their respective 
tents, in near silence. Edmond looked a bit uncomfortable after being admonished, but 
did not apologize or try to soften his previous statements. The next morning, no one 
spoke of the incident and militia training proceeded, though Edmond was much less 
assertive and vocal than he had been the night before.  
 Edmond undeniably possesses at least some degree of "Jim Crow" or "old 
fashioned" racism, which claims there is a biologically-rooted, inherent racial hierarchy. 
Most militia members who evinced racism did not reference biological notions, but were 
more like 45 year old delivery driver Aaron who told me in our interview:  
"I'm racist to a point. Um, but not outright, I mean you know it's—how do 
I explain it. I've got Mexican friends, very good Mexican friends that I—
buddies of mine. I got black buddies. It's the, I guess when you see a 
group of 'em dressed up or somethin' and they're hippin' and hoppin' at a 
corner, you know, and whatever you wanna call it. It's just that—I don't 
know, I guess it's just because I don't know them. The place that I work at 
in Detroit, they have a whole bunch working at that factory, and the thing 
that frustrates us at work is they don't care about their job. And they just 
do it any way to get it out of the warehouse, and then we hafta to put up 
with what crap work they've done, which angers us."  
 
Aaron's acknowledgement of his racism is unusual, but other members referenced similar 
themes. Like Aaron, they do not recognize these characterizations—congregated black 
youth as othered and possibly dangerous and his black coworkers as lazy, incapable 




Americans. What Aaron's quote and Edmond's early statements have in common is a 
vague sense of a racial "other" whose values are incompatible with their own. 
 
Illegal Immigrants 
Some militia members exhibit similar culture-based attitudes toward illegal immigrants. 
These militia members recognize the U.S. as a "nation of immigrants," but insist that 
people who are dedicated to the nation's values should now immigrate legally. People 
who enter the country illegally, in these members' opinions, demonstrate that they cannot 
play by the rules and be law abiding citizens who support freedom and equality for 
everyone. As retiree Walter explains: 
"Immigration, I have no trouble with it as long as it's legal. You know, just 
the fact that—'illegal,' illegal immigration, okay, that means you broke a 
law. That means you shouldn't be here."  
 
A selection from 52 year old Daryl's interview elaborates on this theme: 
"I think that if you're goin' to come into America, I think it should be done 
legally and properly and that if you're coming in, the reason why you want 
to come in here is because you believe in what the U.S. stood for, and 
you've read the history enough to know that that's what you wanna be. But 
to come in here just to start hollerin' and try to change the United States, I 
don't believe that's fair. I mean that's—I don't think it should be that way. I 
have no problem with any race, color, you know, comin' in here. There's 
no problem with that." 
 
John, in his late 40s, made the point even more strongly in an email he wrote to me after I 
asked for more information about his family's immigration: 
"…and I [also] have current family members who I am assisting to 
immigrate to this country. Do you realize the hoops my family and myself 
have had to jump through to come to this country? Many. […] I do not 
fear Mexican immigration, I do not fear the 'browning of America' as 
some say, I have contributed to it. But open border immigration is a free 
ride. No hoops to jump through and no reason to adapt to a new culture or 




This adds to divisions and ultimately conflict. All immigrants have to earn 
citizenship! Or it has no value." 
 
John references E Pluribus Unum, which is stamped on U.S. currency, to reflect 
his belief that immigrants should want to adapt to American culture. In his opinion, going 
through legal immigration and its requirements means that a person wants to conform to 
American ideals and values, while illegal immigration means they do not. Just as many 
other militia members who disdain illegal immigration, John does not see it as a race-
based issue; John's wife is a non-white immigrant, and John has expressed great 
frustration over his granddaughter dealing with bullying in school over her "brown" skin 
because, as he says, 'Who cares what color you are? That has nothing to do with what 
kind of person you are.' In other words, members maintain that their sentiments about 
illegal immigration do not apply only to Mexican immigrants, but to immigrants from 
any country. They believe in an ideal type of a civic nation (Brubaker 1992), whereby 
citizenship is earned through being born in the nation, or through following legal 
procedures to signify citizenship and support of national values. 
It is no coincidence that scholars have found that whites who identify as just 
"American" tend to score higher on symbolic racism measures than do whites who 
identify with ethnic groups like "Italian-American." People who identify as just 
"American" are likely more invested in the national mythos, undergirded by the Work 
Ethic (Bafumi and Herron 2009; Coverdill 1997). Some militia members for example, 
talk about how they do not understand the need for "hyphenated identities," and that 
everyone should want to be "just plain American." They believe that loyalty to some 




means they might be intentionally maintaining "cultural differences" that are somehow 
problematic or set them apart from "real" Americans.  
  
THE MILITIA'S EXCLUSION OF MUSLIM AMERICANS 
Theories of symbolic racism or broad cultural differences fall short of explaining why 
many militia members, including Daryl and John, make no effort to accept and welcome 
Muslim Americans35. Early in my fieldwork, 35 year old George, a truck driver, told me 
that several members left SMVM and joined another group when he wanted to bring a 
close Muslim friend to trainings and SMVM leadership supported his decision. One of 
the objectors, Kyle, told me:  
"Last April, the SMVM was contacted by some Muslims, and they wanted 
to train. And they [SMVM] said, 'well we can't discriminate [based on] 
their religion and their race.' And we basically said, 'the hell we can't.'  
[…] Ok, you let these guys in, they come out and train with us, they come 
to all our meetings, they do everything. They're there for a year or two, 
next thing you know, they disappear. They're not around. You can't find 
them. Their email address doesn't work, there's no contact. But, one of 
their carcasses just turns up in the Sears tower that just got bombed, with 
an SMVM membership card. […] What do you think is gonna happen? 
They are gonna round up every member, anybody that ever inquired in 
conversation or email [about the militia], they're gonna come through 
these and hunt everybody up, [saying] 'You trained a terrorist.'" 
 
Kyle believes Muslims would only want to train with the militia to learn skills to harm 
American citizens, and believes it is perfectly appropriate to exclude Muslims from the 
group. He does not see this as contradicting the militia's egalitarian, super-citizen vision 
because he believes that Muslims do not comply with the militia mission statement of 
allowing the participation of people who do not want to "bring harm to our country or 
                                                 
35 As explained above, militia members tend to reject all "hyphenated identities" in accordance with their 
assimilationist, anti-illegal immigrant selections above. Members tend to view Muslims as not being 





people." A quote from Trevor, a retiree in his 60s, further exemplifies how many militia 
members understand the term "Muslim Americans" to be oxymoron: 
"And [the Constitution] is for all people. All people of all races, all creeds 
and all religions. But one thing you gots to understand: the Muslim 
religion and our Constitution and our way of life cannot co-exist. They 
can't do it." 
 
Trevor believes that Islam is incompatible with American values and implies that its 
practitioners are in a category of their own, excluded from other belief systems, other 
races, and even other human beings. Trevor buys into the racialization of terrorism and 
believes that all Muslims are terrorists who want to harm U.S. citizens, a trait that 
dehumanizes them, in Trevor's view. 
Militia members like the men quoted above feel that Muslims threaten the 
physical safety of the nation and its citizens, in addition to threatening the nation's 
cultural values. Other authors have shown that many Americans similarly believe Muslim 
Americans are less committed to the nation and its principles than they should be 
(Braiker 2007; Condon 2011; Sides and Gross 2010). They assume that there is 
something wrong with Islam or Islamic culture that promotes violence and makes 
Muslims fundamentally opposed to American values, and this may in turn play into 
assumptions that Muslims have the potential to be uniformly terroristic (Murphy 2002; 
Perry 2003; Razack 2008; Joseph et al. 2008). The case of the militia helps identify what 
precisely it is that is "wrong" with Muslims for some people. 
 
Fear Management 
It is sometimes overlooked that white, gun owning men are expressing real fear with 




Oliviero 2011) or to disguise racism or other underlying motives. Part of the reason that 
militia men feel such a strong need to prepare for unknown disasters is because they are 
afraid of what might happen; for some of them, owning guns and other equipment is itself 
a way to manage this fear as much as it is a real preparation for danger. For example, 
whenever legislation is considered that might restrict access to firearms or ammunition 
(such as discussions of banning online ammunition sales in the wake of the summer 2012 
shooting at an Aurora, Colorado theater), many militia members stock up on the exact 
model of firearm or type of ammunition that is being considered for restriction. This 
action is a symbolic act of defiance and protest against the proposed legislation, and a 
symbolic reassertion of members' threatened national identity (Hobsbawm and Ranger 
1983), but it is also a concrete way to manage fear of losing access to certain weapons, a 
loss which represents restricted gun rights more broadly.  
Fear management is also the reason that my interviewees had an average of 4.6 
guns per person in their household—a much higher number than is realistically needed to 
effectively defend, for example, against a home invasion. This attitude can be seen as 
Kurt, in his late 50s, discussed his distrust of both major political parties just prior to the 
2008 Presidential Election, before adding: 
"But I am more in fear of the Left trying to take away my rights [than I am 
of the Right]. They are more or less trying to censor people they don't like 
Rush Limbaugh and they try to take him off the air […]. I said, "Well, that 
doesn't sound like you want to protect the First Amendment, does it?"  But 
I tell 'em, it's like, "But if you don't want to protect the Second 
Amendment, I see why you wouldn't want to protect the First or probably 
any of the other ones."   
 
Kurt is referencing a popular notion among militia members that Second Amendment gun 




privately held arms prevent government agents from infringing on other fundamental 
rights. Kurt believes that people on the political left who oppose the Second Amendment 
also devalue the right to free speech and possibly other rights. Kurt's ownership of 
firearms is a way to both defy this un-American attitude as he sees it, and to manage the 
fear of what might happen if such liberals were to gain increased political power.  
Members' fear of Muslims is also rooted in a feeling that core American 
principles are being threatened, which is a feeling initiated by the terror attacks of 9/11. 
George, who invited Muslim friends to training, called the attacks "the biggest disaster 
this country has ever seen," while Adam said:  
"I, as a citizen, do not feel our nation is safe, and weaknesses are being 
opened up for our enemies to exploit. If there are any failures here, I feel 
they will cost us many American lives." 
 
Daryl, now in his early 50s told me he tried to sign up with military recruiters shortly 
after the terror attacks but was told he was "too old." Other members, like Bert, a father 
of three teenagers, try to be vigilant against future attacks as they remember being 
traumatized from 9/11:  
"I recall where I was and who I was with, pretty much most details around 
those hours leading up to and after the planes crashed. We were all in 
shock - this couldn't be real - it must be an accident—is this a bad dream!  
[…] It was only months ago, another terrorist came close to blowing up a 
plane as it approached Detroit. […] I've researched what experts are 
predicting, there are still many terrorists attempting to attack Americans 
and cause catastrophic damage to us. I would recommend we map out 
where the nuclear power plants are located and try to have maps ready on 
hand so it would be quicker to plan a route to get family away from the 
radiation and/or violence that could occur. Had those planes on 9/11 
crashed into nuclear reactor towers, it would have been WAY worse for us 






In other words, the terror attacks of 2001 presented a real and symbolic threat to 
members' senses of safety and identity. No other groups had previously perpetrated an act 
that impacted white Americans in quite this way.  
Militia members also fear change that could happen to the country's government 
and legal system as a result of terrorism. Militia members despise increasing restrictions 
on private citizens through legislation like the Patriot Act because these changes 
undermine what American culture represents to these self-described super citizens. 
Members like 27 year old Hugo, who works in customer service, describe this act as 
allowing the police to have entirely too much power: 
 "Now with the Patriot Act, with the other rules and regulations they have, 
[there's] no warrant, no knocking, the door gets busted down and they 
seize everything." 
 
This Act exemplifies the increase in governmental power over individual lives that militia 
members despise and sometimes fear. 
 
Involvement in Anti-Muslim Events 
Militia members' verbal disdain for Muslims and their purported effect on American 
society was evident early in my fieldwork, but their disdain only shifted to action in 
spring 2011 when they became involved in two anti-Muslim events. Oddly, the same 
leaders who supported George's desire to bring a Muslim friend to training became some 
of the biggest proponents of involvement in these events. Understanding the militia's 
involvement in these events is useful for delving further into how they understand 






The first anti-Muslim event that members became involved in occurred in April 2011, 
when Koran burning Florida pastor Terry Jones made a trip to Dearborn, Michigan to 
rant about Sharia law36 and Islam's supposedly negative effect on the Constitution and 
freedom of speech. The city briefly denied Jones' right to protest by ordering a hearing to 
determine the likelihood that his presence might incite violence, jailed him over his 
refusal to pay a "peace bond" to cover the cost of protest security, and charged him a 
symbolic $1 bond to be freed from jail (Langton 2011).  
Militia members often stated that they believe First Amendment rights to be the 
most important rights that Americans have. Because if any other rights are infringed, they 
say, 'We can complain about it, but if they take away the right to complain, to fight, we're 
in real trouble.' Dearborn's treatment of Jones certainly played into members' decision to 
be involved in this particular protest, as Elias' note on the forum indicates: 
"A 1st Amendment precedent is being set here, that is the side we should 
all be on. Ignoring such things over the years, no matter how small, is why 
our Constitution keeps slipping away. If a local government decides my 
"Freedom of Speech" is beneath them, they order me to post a "PEACE 
BOND" of let's say $200,000 before I can speak, sorry but that is 
censorship by fine." 
 
Although none said so explicitly, some members seemed to believe that the city of 
Dearborn was attempting to protect its Muslim residents from Jones' message at the 
expense of his fundamental right to free speech—a clear betrayal of American values 
members claim to support above all else. 
                                                 
36 Sharia law is a version of traditional Islamic Law that includes harsh sanctions for adultery and other 
behavior that has largely been decriminalized in the U.S. Its opponents claim to fear that courts will begin 




Figure 20: Some militia members hold signs that read, "I will not 
submit!" in both English and Arabic as they listen to Terry Jones 
speaking from the podium. Another man, to Jones' right, holds a sign 
reading, "Ban Sharia law in the U.S.". Photo from 
http://s657.photobucket.com/profile/SMVM  
Members were divided on their opinion of Jones himself. One person called him 
an "ass," while another noted, "In militia terms, pastor Jones is a few rounds short of a 
full mag," but both still wanted to support his freedom of speech. A few members 
expressed concern about sending the 'wrong message' by supporting Jones, and some said 
they were uncomfortable attending what might prove to be a violent event. To this 
Rodney, a student in his 20s, responded: 
"He [Jones] is not the first man or woman to step into the powder keg to 
make his point! I think about what it would had been like to be a black 
man in the 1960's when Dr. Martin Luther King was holding meetings and 
pleading his rights, for the things he believed in."  
 
Likening Jones to the Civil Rights leader indicates that Rodney believes Islamic doctrine 
and values to be oppressive, and the fight against its perceived spread is just as noble and 
necessary as the fight for equal rights.  
Given their divided sentiment, it is unsurprising that only eight militia members 
from two different units 
attended Jones' rally, 
although several more 
expressed frustration that 
they were unable to miss 
work to do so. Those 
who did attend the event 
did not wear their usual 
camouflage, deciding to 




Figure 21: Police and SWAT team members line Jones' 
side of the rally. Photo from 
http://s657.photobucket.com/profile/SMVM 
identified as members of the 
militia37. Based on their self-reports 
as well as pictures and videos they 
took of the event and posted to an 
online photo-sharing account, 
militia members stood as a group 
on Terry Jones' side38 of the street 
along with around two dozen or so 
Jones supporters. Two members in 
attendance held signs, pointed toward counter-protestors, that read "I will not submit" in 
both English and Arabic. This message, which apparently originated from a blog post by 
conservative commentator Michelle Malkin on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, is 
intended to defy perceived attempts to repress anti-Muslim dialogue, as well as to defy 
oppressive Islamic doctrines, particularly those related to notions of holy wars against 
non-believers (Malkin 2006). Jones supporters were separated from a loud-counter 
protest crowd, which must have numbered in the hundreds, by two sets of temporary 
barriers on either side of a four-lane road, police officers, and, when the counter-
protestors tried to rush the barriers, a line of SWAT officers.  
 
                                                 
37 A police officer noticed the attendee's radios and other communication equipment and asked who they 
were. When they told her they were with the militia, she reportedly responded, "Oh, you're the good guys," 
and radioed other police officers in the area so they would not "hassle" the militia members. No member 
speculated that she may have had other motives for alerting other officers, such as making sure militia 
members were being watched for signs of trouble making. 
38 One video of the event includes a text overlay that says militia members were on both sides of the protest 
in an effort to bolster their claim of being present to support everyone's right to free speech. They do have a 
few photos taken from the counter-protest side of the street; however, given the crowd placement and other 





Importantly, some militia members who participated (including George who 
brought Muslim friends to militia training) did genuinely feel they were merely 
demonstrating on behalf of the First Amendment. However, at this point, Jones' freedom 
of speech was no longer threatened—he was speaking with a microphone from behind a 
podium on the steps of City Hall. Well-intentioned members were really protesting that 
Jones' freedom of speech had been impeded at all. 
A more problematic motivation for protest soon surfaced for at least three of the 
members who participated in the event. The most telling response came at the next militia 
meeting when Edmond—the same member who offensively spoke about "natives" and 
cotton during his first camping excursion—told me that a local media crew could not air 
the second part of his interview about his presence at the protest when they asked what he 
thought of Jones' message. He had responded that he thought Jones would just stir up 
trouble "because we already know they [Muslims] are animals." Edmond meant that he 
believes Muslim Americans would respond violently in response to Jones' speech 
because they are "animals" who have inferior cultural standards regarding tolerance for 
violence and free expression. 
Militia members did not attend Jones' rallies when he made two later trips to 
Michigan. There was some debate over this on the forums, as a few members wanted to 
go and support Jones' message. Leadership indicated that people were of course free to 
attend on their own but that the militia as a group wanted no part of it because there were 
no threats to anyone's freedom of speech during Jones' return visits. At the same time, 




show how they view that culture as uniform, more primitive, and socially problematic. 
Vincent, a proudly atheist leader, said for example:  
"Any social structure that tolerates rape and fails to punish rapists39 is not 
acceptable to me. Period. Any structure which denies the basic dignity and 
self-ownership of human beings is wrong. Period. Any idea, concept, 
teaching, or thought that requires violence or threats thereof to spread is 
not just wrong, it is weak. Weak, weak, weak. That's why it needs force, 
because it cannot stand on its own." 
 
Spoken concerns like this about Muslims threatening America or its culture are 
reflected through some members' discussion of Jones and participation in his first rally. 
These members viewed Jones' hampered ability to speak out against Muslims as a threat 
to First Amendment rights even after he was provided with a space to speak at City Hall. 
Other members, like Edmond, were clearly participating to support Jones' anti-Muslim 
message, rather than his right to speak. These competing motivations for participation in 
the protest allowed members like Edmond to engage in exclusionary action without 
sanction.  
Edmond's anti-Muslim bias was essentially hidden behind a dialogue of First 
Amendment support until he revealed his true feelings to a reporter on site. After he and 
other members participated in the rally, he became more vocal about his anti-Muslim 
attitudes and expressed frustration when militia leadership declined to involved the group 
in Jones' future Michigan events. Perhaps as a result of a lack of responsiveness to Jones' 
                                                 
39 Several other members mentioned objecting to Islam because of its treatment of women. More than 
"white men seeking to save brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1999:303), critical race theorist and 
philosopher Alia Al-Saji (2010) has suggested that Muslim women serve as a "negative mirror" that allows 
white men to view their own culture as more positive and egalitarian in contrast to Islamic culture (and in 
contrast to how it truly is). This is a compelling claim that needs further investigation, but nonetheless has 
some relevance to understanding militia men who express anti-Muslim sentiment. Many of them, like 
Edmond, also oppose abortion rights and health care policies that would ensure easy access to birth control. 
These restrictive beliefs nonetheless seem more egalitarian, to them, than their understanding of how 




Figure 22: A reporter interviews a small crowd of counter protestors supporting Lowe's Hardware near 
Dearborn. The counter protestors hold an American flag and have signs and apparel that reads "infidel" 
in both English and Arabic. Photo from http://s657.photobucket.com/profile/SMVM 
future visits, Edmond again appealed to the notion of a threatened First Amendment 
when trying to spark militia involvement in another protest opportunity. 
 
All American Muslim Protest 
The next protest event happened in December 2011, when home improvement store 
Lowe's pulled advertising from the short-lived television show All American Muslim. The 
show followed several Muslim families in Michigan as it highlighted the Muslim 
community as well as the challenges some family members faced in their jobs or other 
venues as a result of their religion. Lowe's Allen Park, Michigan location (the store 
nearest where the show was filmed) found itself hosting around 100 protestors—many of 





couple militia members, including Edmond, attended this event as counter-protestors, but 
several more expressed regret that they could not. 
Edmond claimed that people did not understand that Lowe's had the right to spend 
money as they chose, and said he wanted to show support for Lowe's free-market 
decision. Counter-protestors, however, can be heard in video taken at the event 
repeatedly saying "God Bless America," "'Kill the infidel right where you find him,' [it's] 
right out of the Koran," and obnoxiously singing "We Wish You a Merry Christmas." 
These comments do not reflect a concern about protecting a corporation's rights to speech 
or spending. If anything, Edmond and others involved seemed not to recognize that 
people protesting Lowe's also had the free speech rights to express their opinion. What 
the counter-protestors' comments demonstrate a belief that Islam is fundamentally 
opposed to both Christian40 and American values. Counter-protesters were supporting 
and enacting Lowe's lack of support for the local Muslim American population.  
Just as with his efforts to involve other militia members in Jones' subsequent 
Michigan events, Edmond failed to produce a militia strong showing when supporting 
Lowe's. Militia leaders nonetheless allowed him to post photos and videos of his protest 
activities on their forum and photo sharing sites, and other members expressed support of 
Edmond's actions. Billy, in his 30s, for example, remarked:  
"We need to keep doing little things like this [protest]. Some may worry 
about negative backlash, but... as long as we make sure to stick to a 
constitutionally sound position on whatever we do, we should weather any 
storms." 
 
                                                 
40 Unsurprisingly, militia members who attended this protest identify as Christian. It may also be that many 
people understand the nation to be founded on Christian principles, even if they are not Christians 
themselves. Islamic traditions may seem foreign to this heritage. A similar situation is seen in France, 




Figure 23: A used shooting target depicting a 
man in a turban and battleground clothing. 
Photo courtesy of www.michiganmilitia.com. 
Faux Muslim Terrorist Training  
It became clear that Edmond's persistent influence was having a behavioral impact on 
other members who had previously only verbalized anti-Muslim discomfort when anti-
Muslim activities began to enter militia trainings. SMVM conducted a training in April 
2012 where the motivating scenario involved evading an imaginary terrorist group named 
Farouk-Al-Salit. A careful reader will notice that this is a play on the name of a Willy 
Wonka movie character that can serve as a tongue-in-cheek denial that the name has a 
Muslim connotation 
In my time in the field, no other unit used a named figure as a fictive enemy in 
their training sessions. On the contrary, units usually are careful to completely avoid 
referencing real people in their training scenarios, with the exception of using Osama Bin 
Laden shooting targets; he is a person they assume everyone would recognize as an 
undisputable enemy. Notably, he was also recognizably Muslim in these pictures, with a 
long beard and turban. These targets 
occasionally had small packs of strawberry 
jelly or ketchup taped to their backs, so that 
good shots would result in a large blob of red 
staining the surrounding paper—simulating 
blood and allowing members to symbolically 
kill Bin Laden and prevent future harm to the 
country's safety. Members also used pictures 
of anonymous, but clearly Muslim, male 




(see Figure 23), and who thus visually represented what members assumed most Muslims 
to be—ready to engage in warfare with Americans; I never saw any other group of real 
human used as pictures for targets. The introduction of the new training scenario 
indicates that Muslim-sounding names are increasingly acceptable as outgroup identifiers 
to militia members. Combined with their participation in and support of anti-Muslim 
demonstrations, this means that militia members are increasingly marking Muslims as 
problematic others, an act that reinforces lingering fear and perceived cultural difference. 
 
RESPONSE TO SALIENT MUSLIM INDIVIDUALS 
Members' marking of Muslims as othered is complexified by two men who were salient 
to militia members during my fieldwork. One man was a Muslim militia leader, and the 
other was the newly elected President of the United States, whom many people on the 
political right believe to be a Muslim despite his own profession of Christianity. 
Analyzing members' very different responses to both men helps more clearly delineate 
the threat members believe Muslims pose to American culture and security. 
 
Muslim Militia Member 
Militia member Chad is white, grew up in a Christian military family, and lived in nearly 
a dozen states before he moved to Michigan a decade ago with several extended family 
members. Chad converted to Islam after joining the Navy and encountering people who 
believed in the Muslim faith, although, curiously, Chad was stationed not in the Middle 
East, but in Mississippi. Regarding his decision to convert to Islam, Chad notes: 
"I didn't like how the Lutheran religion—the churches anyway that we 




everything's fine on Sunday but come Monday morning, they're a whole 
new person." 
 
 Chad believed there was less hypocrisy among the Muslims he knew than among 
the Christians he grew up with. It was important to him to be in a community of faith that 
enacted the principles and behavioral standards they advocated behind the pulpit. All the 
same, Chad explains that he is not strongly religious:  
"I don't follow it [Islam] religiously per se. Most Christians don't either, 
you know, they don't go to church all the time. They don't follow all of the 
rules that you're supposed to, you know, and stuff like this. I don't. [With] 
Islam, you're supposed to pray five times a day. I don't. Do I have a prayer 
rug?  Yes. Have I used it?  Not in the last six years [laughs]. You know?  I 
don't do that. I haven't been to a mosque since I have converted and when 
I lived in North Carolina. I have not been to a single one since I've lived 
here. So I mean in 10-11 years now I haven't been to a single mosque." 
 
Chad nonetheless adheres to the relatively strict dietary standards laid out in the Koran; 
he doesn't eat pork despite, he laughingly notes, his rich Italian heritage, and only rarely 
drinks alcohol after abstaining from it altogether for many years. In his view, he takes his 
faith as seriously as "most Christians."  
 At the time of our interview, Chad had been involved with the militia for three 
years after starting his own militia unit along with his Christian brother. The brothers 
started their own unit after feeling the government was "overstepping their bounds" and 
realizing that there was not already a local unit with whom they could train. Chad and his 
brother followed SMVM model for training guidelines and required gear, which they 
found on www.michiganmilitia.com, soon made contact with SMVM and other units in 
the state, and began attending other groups' trainings as well as continuing to structure 




  Militia members who did not already know that Chad is a converted Muslim 
became aware of Chad's religion in spring 2010, when he discussed both his faith and his 
militia activity on several news reports. Reporters spoke with Chad after learning he 
called the FBI rather than harboring members of the nearby Hutaree militia who were 
trying to avoid arrest following law enforcement raids of that unit. Other militia units 
continue to welcome Chad and other members of his unit (who are all Christian or non-
religious) to shared training events and other functions, and Chad is included on 
messages that pertain to leadership concerns or disaster planning.  
Chad attended the Terry Jones protest in Dearborn, and must have done so at least 
in part to demonstrate that his loyalty rested with national values including freedom of 
speech that the militia supports, more so than with his religion. His participation did not 
stop another militia leader from only partially joking about whether other members in 
attendance at that event 'asked to see the contents of his backpack,' to make sure there 
were no explosives in it to injure Jones and his supporters. Chad recognizes that his 
acceptance by at least some militia members is tenuous as he talks about members who 
left SMVM because they allowed Muslims (including Chad, in his view) at their 
trainings: 
"Okay, I am a Muslim, I have an AK-47, but I'm white so that helps a little 
bit, you know? If I was Arabic, they would have just totally stereotyped 
the hell—the crap out of it." 
 
 Importantly, Chad remarks that his skin tone only helps him "a little bit," 
meaning that he is aware that his whiteness does not fully absolve some members' 
suspicions of his loyalties. Keith, for instance, called Chad a 'fashionable Muslim' and 




Chad would be "too serious" if he talked extensively about his beliefs, wore turbans or 
other religious clothing, or interrupted trainings to participate in daily prayers. Another 
man even emailed me to ask my "professional" opinion on Chad's dedication to the nation 
after he first learned of Chad's Muslim faith. Thus, skin tone alone does not nullify 
concerns about Chad's commitment to the nation for members who do not know him 
well. Assumptions they hold about violence and exclusion being fundamental attributes 
of Islamic faith outweigh the possibility of accepting Chad based on his skin color and 
militia participation alone.   
At the same time, other members indicate that race alone is not enough to reject 
someone as a Muslim. Thirty-six year old Curtis, for example, advocates acceptance as 
long as people are in some way demonstrating their commitment to the nation. Curtis 
became a little frustrated and animated as he tried to convey that Americanness matters 
more than race or other factors:  
"I mean an American's an American no matter what color you are: black, 
white, Arab, Mexican, whatever. I mean if you're an American, you're an 
American. You know, you've got Arabs fighting for the U.S. [in the 
Middle East], too, you know, you got Mexicans and whatever. You know, 
as long as you're an American, you're an American!" 
 
Members who know Chad well follow this logic and believe that Chad 
demonstrates his commitment to their shared national values in several ways: his militia 
participation, which is reinforced by his Christian family members' militia involvement, 
his prior military experience, and a large "We the People" tattoo on his back. Further, 
Chad's militia unit has participated in multiple community events, including search and 
rescue efforts, that have garnered positive media attention for the militia, and Chad 




Figure 24: Chad's tattoo, which references the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the notion 
that the American people are collectively more powerful and more important than the government. 
Photo courtesy of Claire Schneider. 
unlawful behavior. These factors allow members who know Chad to view him as a fellow 




In contrast, militia members remain skeptical of the national loyalty of President Barack 
Obama, assumed by many as 17% of Americans to be a Muslim ("One in Six" 2012). 
Atheist Vincent, a government employee, said he believed Islam denies "basic dignity 
and self-ownership of humans," and that it is inherently terroristic and antithetical to the 
American way of life such that all of its adherents are incapable of understanding and 
adopting American values—that they are incapable of being American. Grady, a man 
who only attended meetings, not trainings, announced just prior to the 2008 election that 
he believed that Obama had connections to terrorists like those involved in the 9/11 




the highest office.' Another member added that he would be able to get a higher security 
clearance than Obama because of Obama's supposed ties to the Middle East. When I 
asked 23 year old Stewart, who worked in construction before joining the military, about 
his opinion on Obama's administration during our interview, he haltingly responded, 
"Clearly he had some kind of Muslim or Arabic background. So that was a concern. For 
our nation's security." 
 Presumed support for Islam is not, of course, the only factor that plays into 
members' distrust of the President41. Other factors include Obama's political affiliation 
and legislative history. Obama is a Democrat, whom most members see as straying more 
from an idealized interpretation of the Constitution than Republicans (despite members' 
overall dislike of both major parties) because Democrats tend to be more in favor of 
larger government, more government spending, and greater gun rights restrictions than do 
Republicans. Further, Obama was a Senator from Chicago prior to entering the 
Presidential race, Chicago has some of the toughest gun laws in the country, and Obama 
has made clear his preferences for greater gun restrictions, which militia members see as 
a threat to the Second Amendment and other rights. 
I have found that accusations in popular discourse that conservative actors' 
references to Obama as a socialist are really coded language for racism are overstated as 
applies to militia members. Members genuinely fear socialism will undermine the 
American Dream and citizens' sense of hard work and self-determination. References to 
                                                 
41 Notably, two interviewees reported voting for President Obama prior to joining the militia. Both said 
they regretted their decision to do so and said that they felt they had not done enough research into his 
politics before voting. Neither of these interviewees felt comfortable revealing this information to other 
militia members, and one re-confirmed the confidentiality of his interview content before telling me. Both 
members now consider themselves to be more politically conservative than they were before joining the 
militia, seemingly indicating that militia membership has increased their conservatism, though the 




socialism are replete in militia writing from the 1990s during President Bill Clinton's 
tenure. An article titled "Socialism in Amerika" by Joseph Gallup in a September 1996 
issue of a militia newsletter reads, for example: 
"The recent FDA/Clinton venture that enables our government to regulate 
and essentially control the tobacco industry is one more example of a 
government that is actively seeking such a Socialist state. […] While 
many politicians are calling for a smaller government they appear to be 
moving us into a society where virtually every aspect of our lives as some 
kind of government controls or regulations. […] We must take advantage 
of the freedoms we currently possess and become involved in the political 
process and hold our so called representatives accountable for their 
actions. We must do it now while we still have the liberties which allow us 
to express our opinions, our influence without fear of retribution. Wake up 
American, for Socialism is waging its war against us and we are on our 
way to becoming its latest casualty."  
 
Most members' references to Obama as a socialist thus cannot always be attributed to 
only his race. His status as a Democrat alone is important for at least some members' 
perception of him and his administration. 
It is nonetheless true that Obama was also the most salient non-white in a power 
during my fieldwork due to his status and frequent present on TV and in political 
commentary. For members like Edmond, Obama's race may have alone caused doubt 
regarding Obama's commitment to national identity and values as members see them. 
However, Edmond's strong racism is by and large an exception in the militia. So-called 
"birthers"—people who believe Obama is not even an American citizen and deny the 
veracity of his Hawaiian birth certificate—are surprisingly rare within the militia, with 
only half a dozen of all the members I have contact with embracing this perspective.  
President Obama's assumed Muslim status is not the sole driving factor behind 
militia members' concerns that he does not represent their idealized nationalistic interests. 




are enough to cause doubt about his loyalty to the nation. However, what remains clear is 
that members' concerns about Obama's commitment to the nation and its security drive 
much of their resistance to him.  
 
EQUALITY AND EXCLUSION VIA NATIONALISM 
Militia members who exhibit symbolic racism toward African Americans or illegal 
immigrants have two common threads with members who feel culturally and physically 
threatened by Muslims. First, they all believe in certain stereotypes about the groups they 
do not fully accept. Symbolic racists may believe that all African Americans fail to live 
up to the Protestant Work Ethic or that illegal immigrants have no desire to work hard 
and live up to other cultural standards. Members who feel threatened by Muslims believe 
that they may support further terrorism and violence like that perpetrated on 9/11, and 
that they want to enact Sharia or other law that undermines the freedom and equality of 
some citizens. 
 The second commonality that militia members who exhibit symbolic racism and 
fear of Muslims have is a belief in the national mythos laid out in Chapter Three: a 
country founded on hard work and individual determination where the American Dream 
still holds true. Symbolic racists genuinely believe hard work is required to be a good 
American and that some groups just do not want to work as hard as others. Members who 
feel threatened by Muslims genuinely believe that Muslims want to subvert the country's 
values and that Muslims' supposed support of women's subjugation, for example, is 




All militia members I encountered invest strongly in this same super-citizen 
version of national identity, including those members from whom I witnessed no 
evidence of racism or anti-Muslim sentiment. Members like George (quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter) recognize there are racists in the militia. Militia members' 
shared investment in nationalism means, however, that non-racist members often do not 
identify or address racism and stereotyping from other members because they charitably 
interpret those members as merely referencing their shared national ideal instead of 
having a deeper, racist meaning. This was seen when Edmond was allowed to make 
increasingly racist statements until he reached a point where his claims could no longer 
be dismissed as only referencing an individual (rather than a whole racial group) or as 
referencing the Work Ethic ideal. When Edmond's statements finally became too overtly 
racist to be ignored, members became incredibly uncomfortable, nearly silently went to 
their respective tents, and did not address the situation the following day. Edmond was 
allowed to remain in the group and had increasing influence regarding the anti-Muslim 
protest activities in which several militia units at least considered participating. 
 Members' inability to identify racism extends to other areas of social life. When 
black teenager Trayvon Martin was gunned down in February 2012 by an apparently 
overly-zealous neighborhood watch captain, for example, many members could not 
understand how the shooter's and media commentators' references to "hoodies" and 
"thugs" could be informed by racial stereotypes. Instead, several members posted 
inflammatory news articles or pictures on Facebook that insinuated news coverage was 




It seems that militia members can cope with racists in the abstract. They do not 
like the idea of racism because it violates their understanding of Constitutionally-
advocated equality. They reject explicit, biologically-rooted racism on its face because it 
is easily recognizable as racism. To militia members, racists are neo-Nazis with visible 
tattoos or other people whose racism is overt and undeniable.  
What members do not always know how to recognize (or address) are more subtle 
forms of racism like coded references to culture and notions of deservingness. Indeed, it 
may be the case that militia members have a subtle incentive to not recognize this form of 
racism when they witness it. I do not think this is best explained from either a conflict 
theory or white male privilege perspective. Overt, continuing prejudice and 
discrimination seriously threaten the mythos of nationalism and Americanness in which 
members are heavily invested. Stories like Trayvon Martin's or Edmond's 
characterization of Detroit and its black citizens threaten members' worldview of a just, 
equal America, and they may look for any possible reason to reject an explanation of 
racism as a result. Members may even be less willing to recognize this kind of racism in 
other militia members than they would in a stranger because they want to believe that 
other members, even those new to the group, are as devoted to equality and inclusion as 
they are.  
 I want to emphasize that members' inability to identify racism is certainly not 
unique, but rather is emblematic of a problem in American society more generally 
regarding recognition of continuing racial problems. The widespread public skepticism of 
Trayvon Martin and his family exemplifies this problem. Increased education is needed 




examples of Muslims acting in accordance with national values, rather than being 
terrorists, as they are often portrayed in fictional stories, are also needed to combat the 
racialized image of all Muslims as terrorists. 
The case of the militia additionally suggests that we should expand the boundaries 
of what constitutes group threat to more explicitly encompass nationalism. The 9/11 
attacks represented a new kind of threat: a group threat combined with a concrete act of 
mass violence that uniquely made Americans insecure about their safety and identity. 
Although discrimination is generally considered un-American, discrimination against 
people who supposedly want to harm the nation is not only legitimate and acceptable in 
this frame, it is seen as necessary to uphold the identity and security of the nation, as well 
as the safety of its "true" citizens. This protectionist framing has the possibility to 
resonate with other politically conservative groups who also profess a certain 
nationalistic vision, including those who may be excluding Muslim Americans solely on 
the basis of race or religion, rather than perceived national threats, or those who exclude 
based on a combination of factors (Miles 1993). That is, nationalistic framing of anti-
Muslim sentiment may have the potential to mobilize a variety of groups with differing 
underlying motives for discrimination.  
Militia members believe that individual liberty and national identity were 
threatened as a result of increased the security and monitoring of citizens that was 
implement in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and some still feel uncertain about their own 
physical safety from future terror attacks. Militia members and other Americans' ongoing 
resistance to accepting their Muslim neighbors may, in other words, reflect a continuing 




time about how the attacks would not undermine American culture and identity, but they 
did apparently undermine the historicized sense of invincibility possessed by some 
American whites, including militia members.  
 A few militia members like George are relatively open and express no objection 
to Muslim Americans so long as they exhibit an acceptable level of loyalty to the militia's 
super-citizen understanding of the nation. Other members like Edmond believe all 
Muslims are "animals" and potential killers whom he prefers not to have in his country. 
The majority of members fall somewhere in between these extremes, but tend more 
toward hostility and suspicion than even partial acceptance. Returning to Miles' (1993) 
construction of nationalism and racism as simultaneously distinct and overlapping, 
George and Edmond most represent the pure nationalism-racism poles of the spectrum, 
respectively, while the majority of members in between likely have anti-Muslim 
sentiment because of a combination of nationalism and racism. My claim is not that 
nationalism and racism operate independently; as philosopher Étienne Balibar (1991) 
argued, the constructions of race and nation are both similar acts of exclusion and are not 
easily separated into distinct entities. Instead, my aim here was to more clearly delineate 
how nationalism functions as a tool for exclusion in contemporary U.S. society.  
An integration of group-threat and racialization process helps explain why militia 
members did not shift from anti-Muslim rhetoric to anti-Muslim protest involvement and 
training activities until recently. Racialization of Muslims was undoubtedly an ongoing 
process that was revealed early in my fieldwork in various anti-Muslim comments, but 
group-threat only became salient later, before resulting in action in spring 2011. Late 




being built near Ground Zero (Jia et al. 2011), and Osama Bin Laden's death in spring 
2011 returned media dialogue to the 9/11 attacks and the War on Terror. The withdrawal 
of U.S. troops from Iraq (begun in August 2010 and completed in December 2011) was 
another contentious issue during this time. Further, media attention has also kept anti-
Sharia state legislation in the public during this time frame, including Michigan (Raftery 
2012). These events, collectively, helped inflame militia members' relatively dormant 
anti-Muslim passions and reignite perceived nationalistic group threat, with the Jones and 
Lowes protests in 2011 providing timely outlets for these anxieties.  
This framework combining group threat with racialization also fits with other 
scholar's findings regarding nationalism and discrimination. Psychologists Kumar 
Yogeeswaran and Nilanjana Dasgupt (2010) found that their white participants' feelings 
of nationalistic sentiment, was intensified when judging other ethnic groups' ability to 
work in national security jobs—in other words, when they understood national security to 
be potentially threatened by another group. More specifically, Debra Oswald (2005) 
found that the greater association her respondents had with national identity, the greater 
their anti-Arab sentiment. Lile Jia et al. (2011) argue that nationalism played a strong role 
in opposition to building a mosque at Ground Zero, while Sides and Gross (forthcoming) 
found that people who viewed Muslims as violent and untrustworthy were more likely to 
support the War on Terror. These authors' findings all confirm that a feeling of threat 
against national identity may play a strong role in anti-Muslim sentiment and violence in 
a variety of contexts. Qualitatively examining the militia's response to their Muslim 
neighbors helps elucidate that threats to security and individual liberty specifically 




Other work (e.g., Naber 2008; Nagel 2003) suggests that white men like militia 
members are more likely than other groups to believe in a strong nationalistic vision. If 
this is true, we would expect to see other studies confirming that white men in particular 
exhibit anti-Muslim animus when their nationalistic vision is threatened. Indeed, 
psychologist Hakim Zainiddinov (2012) recently found that white men are significantly 
more likely than other groups to exhibit anti-Muslim sentiment. The case of the militia 
reminds us how the mythic story of America's founding is one of white men 
individualistically taming a rugged frontier and fending off Native Americans and 
various European interests to form a strong, unique nation. In this story's lineage, men are 
supposed to be competent protectors not only of their families, but also of their country. 
Militia men and others who internalize this story as a personal duty may more personally 
feel threats to the nation and its security than do women, or men of color who do not have 
this same heritage.  
Finally, I want to return to Edmond and his influence on the militia. Over time, I 
observed how he had a slow, yet consistent influence on the group. His attitudes toward 
African Americans did not seem to transfer to other members, likely because anti-black 
racism is more recognizable to them, but I do wonder how involved the militia may have 
been in anti-Muslim activities if it were not for his presence. Edmond often wore t-shirts 
or baseball caps with "Infidel" written in both English and Arabic on them, and 
eventually helped procure similar clothing for other members. Edmond's son was fighting 
overseas during much of my fieldwork, and he often told stories about his son's 
experiences in the war. Many of these stories revolved around his son having trouble with 




Edmond's stories consistently received sympathetic nods from members in 
earshot, particularly those with military experience. Further, the Terry Jones protest was 
the first protest in which militia members became involved despite the frequent 
discussion of instances where free speech or property rights were being threatened, such 
as when an elderly Michigan woman painted her porch in a color that her neighbors 
found objectionable and reported it as violating township procedures. However, 
members' talk on these issues never resulted in action, while they did become involved in 
the first Jones protest, at Edmond's urging.  
It seems that Edmond's presence and frequent anti-Muslim discussions had an 
influence on the militia's involvement in protests and other anti-Militia events. As legal 
scholar Cass Sunstein (2009) notes, members of a group that have the same general 
belief—in this case, a version of Americanness—become more extreme in that belief 
over time. In other words, an individual's extreme ideology may go unrecognized, and 
over time, make the group more extreme on this dimension. As a result, the militia may 
face the possibility of becoming more racist over time if it does not adequately recognize 
and address individually racist members like Edmond.  
In the next chapter of this manuscript, I analyze a different influence on militia 
activity: authoritative attempts to control the movement. Law enforcement is the primary 
source of authority that attempts to define the militia movement, though the media and 
researchers may also take this role. I observed law enforcement characterize militia 
members in four different ways in my fieldwork: as confidants, suspects, criminals, and 




a lens of ideal Americanness, and respond to what they understand to be illegitimate 






"Don't Tread on Me":  
Defiance and Compliance as Supporting American Values 
 
 
"You know, I had briefly considered being a law enforcement officer, but 
as a Libertarian, I'm not willing to trade my Constitutional beliefs for a 
paycheck. And I don't agree with a lot of the laws that they are sworn to 
enforce."       
- 30 year old Mark 
 
 
Mark is one of the relatively few militia members who does not have military experience 
and who did not express a desire to serve his country in a more formal manner during our 
interview. He is more skeptical than some members about the role of law enforcement in 
our society, and worries that too many of them will "brainlessly" follow orders that 
violate the Constitution and infringe upon individual rights in the event of a major 
emergency or government crackdown on Second Amendment rights specifically. Mark 
pointed to examples like police illegally confiscating private firearms in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina (Kunzelman 2008), which, in Mark's view, left law abiding citizens 
unable to protect themselves and their families at the worst possible moment, during 
widespread societal break down. 
Militia members are not overtly opposed to authority, nor are they anarchists; 
even Mark does not fear law enforcement, except in circumstances where he believes 
they are acting illegally. Members want a well-defined social structure headed by a strong 




uniform, however, and is strongly shaped by their understanding of Americanism, as 
Mark's example shows. Militia members generally believe citizens should be able to rely 
on authority in times of need, but should otherwise be left alone to pursue their interests 
without undue surveillance, interference, or persecution. They also believe that 
government must be constantly monitored and critiqued to ensure that it operates within 
the boundaries of the Constitution and this idealized understanding of the role of 
authority. 
To better understand the militia's relationship to authority, this chapter analyzes 
Michigan members' responses to several efforts to monitor or control the militia 
movement that occurred during my fieldwork. These interventions occurred in a context 
of increased national security that resulted from the terror attacks of 2001. Understanding 
how "super citizens" who ideally embody American principles interpret the legitimacy of 
authorities who represent the U.S. yields a window into how lower-middle class, white, 
American men interpret government constraints. 
I analyze the militia's relationship to authority through theories of crime and 
social deviance. I argue that Lawrence Sherman's Defiance Theory (1993) is especially 
useful for understanding members' response to perceived government control because it 
explains why authorities' attempts to suppress militia activity may sometimes increase it. 
Members defy authority when they believe its agents to be acting illegitimately, but 
comply when they believe authority to be legitimate. Moving beyond Sherman's theory, I 
argue that militia members define legitimacy in nationalistic terms, and understand acts 






UNDERSTANDING THE MILITIA'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENTION:  
FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENTS TO SOCIAL DEVIANCE 
 
Social Movements Perspectives 
Social movement scholars have mixed perspectives regarding the impact of government 
intervention on the behavior of social movement groups. Some authors argue that state 
repression leads to a suppressive effect on social movements. Jules Boykoff (2006), a 
scholar in politics and government for example, argues that there are twelve distinct 
techniques of suppression that state actors have successfully used to squelch a variety of 
movements in the U.S. Other scholars suggest that repression may not halt movement 
activity, but can shift movement actors' violent behavior into non-violent protest 
(Lichbach 1987), thus making the movement much easier to manage or ignore.  
Another set of social movement scholars argues the opposite perspective, that 
repressive efforts uniformly increase mobilization or even radicalize moderate movement 
actors into action. Sociologists Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl (1990) suggest that 
radicalization often happens after the State applies repressive efforts that are perceived as 
"unjustified," but how movements determine whether State action is justified is not 
always clear. Political scientists James Walsh and James Piazza (2010) aim for greater 
specificity as they argue that a State will face greater terrorist action when it infringes on 
"physical integrity rights," which are those related to preventing government torture or 
political imprisonment. Sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui (2004) has argued that attention to 
the global context is important for understanding activity of ethnic movements striving 
for civil rights because they can use successes in other nations as models or political 
leverage for human rights actions in their home States. It may also be the case that 




own nations, but also on how compatriot movements or issues of importance to them are 
handled on the world stage. That is, although global issues can empower social 
movements to achieve positive human rights outcomes because of the models and 
leverage they provide (Tsutsui and Shin 2008), global issues may also incite backlash 
politics and radicalization if a movement wants to oppose or discourage similar actions in 
their own nation. 
A third set of researchers suggests that the relationship between repression and 
movement behavior depends on a complex interplay of individual and societal level 
factors. Sociologist Rudd Koopmans (1997), for instance, differentiates between two 
different kinds of government repression in his study of the extreme right in Germany: 
situational and institutional. He finds that when law enforcement officers (LEOs) act to 
contain a protest through force, the protest activity tends to escalate, meaning that 
situational repression tends to enhance mobilization. In contrast, when institutional 
constraints such as bans of certain groups or activities, or legal actions including trials 
take place, movement action is suppressed. It might thus be argued that Koopmans' 
groups of interest perceived a certain legitimacy or at least authority in legislative action, 
but not in forcible police action. 
How determinations of "legitimacy" or "authority" happen within a movement are 
left relatively unanswered in the social movements literature. Particularly given the 
contradictory findings in that literature, I suggest it is useful to turn to criminological 
theories of behavior. These theories typically address social deviance of individuals as 





Theories of Crime and Deviance 
Militia participation is a non-normative form of political activity in the U.S. in the sense 
that it is rare and involves unusual, embodied enactment of belief, and people who are not 
involved in militias might be prone to reject it as a legitimate form political expression. 
Militia participation may thus be considered a socially deviant behavior or expression of 
threatened ideals. It is understandable in a post-9/11 State with increased security that law 
enforcement would at least want to monitor militia activity in light of other acts of 
violence allegedly committed by militia members in the past (e.g., Williams 2011). 
Theories drawn from the criminology literature help explain why efforts to monitor and 
control militia members may nonetheless backfire in some circumstances.  
 
Control Theory 
Traditional criminological Social Control Theories argue that efforts to control criminal 
or deviant behavior through threats of punishment (e.g., incarceration or other sanctions) 
should typically reduce the likelihood of the behavior (Matza 1969; Reckless 1973). This 
would seem to be the principle under which law enforcement agencies have generally 
interacted with militia units and other similar groups. The 1992 conflict at Ruby Ridge, 
Idaho and the stand-off a year later in Waco, Texas, for example, clearly show law 
enforcement actors who took an aggressive, controlling, and punitive stance over an 
initially small conflict that then ballooned into national headlines and multiple civilian 
deaths. More recent events where various militia units have been infiltrated and observed 
by undercover officers (e.g., Karoub and Householder 2010) show a slightly different 








In contrast to the social control approach, traditional Labeling Theories suggest that once 
a person is labeled as a social deviant by society or one of its agents, that person may 
internalize that deviant identity and thus participate in more, or amplified, deviant 
behaviors (Lemert 1951; Paternoster and Iovanni 1989). Labeling theory would suggest 
that the more law enforcement agents act in a controlling way toward militia members—
through increased firearms legislation, perhaps—the more deviant behaviors we would 
expect from members. That is, the more law enforcement treats militia members like 
deviants or criminals, the more likely militia members may be to participate in future 
problematic activities. This is not to say that law enforcement should not take action if 
they suspect militia members of criminal activity. Rather, the labeling scenario becomes 
problematic in instances where militia members are acting lawfully but nonetheless 
perceive law enforcement agents as treating them criminally.  
Situations where militia members responded negatively to such perceived labeling 
were surprisingly common in the 1990s, and often occurred during what should have 
been routine traffic stops. On these occasions, reactionary individuals within the militia 
movement understood the traffic stop as a labeling act because they believed they were in 
accordance with the law, or denied the authority of the law to set regulations regarding 
                                                 
42 It is worth noting that this law enforcement tactic is certainly not limited to the militia movement or even 
groups on the political right. The FBI is known to have infiltrated various segments of the Civil Rights 
Movement through the program known as COINTELPRO (Earl 2003), and is suspected to have similarly 




license plates or safety belt usage, for example. Reactionary individuals interpreted the 
interaction with law enforcement as confrontational, and, in some cases, resisted arrest, 
assaulted the officer, or fled the scene and led officers to caches of illegal weapons or 
explosives that might have been used in a dangerous standoff scenario (Pitcavage 1997). 
 
Defiance Theory 
Criminologist Lawrence Sherman's (1993) Defiance Theory bridges this gap between the 
approaches of control and labeling theories and provides an explanation of both 
compliance with and rebellion against authority. Sherman suggested that defiance occurs 
following four necessary conditions: 
1. The offender defines a criminal sanction as unfair under one of two independently 
sufficient conditions:  
 
a. The sanctioning agent behaves with disrespect for the offender, or for the 
group to which the offender belongs, regardless of how fair the sanction is 
on substantive grounds. 
 
b. The sanction is substantively arbitrary, discriminatory, excessive, 
undeserved, or otherwise objectively unjust. 
 
2. The offender is poorly bonded to or alienated from the sanctioning agent or the 
community the agent represents. 
 
3. The offender defines the sanction as stigmatizing and rejecting a person, not a 
lawbreaking act. 
 
4. The offender denies or refuses to acknowledge the shame the sanction has 





Figure 25. A "Don't Tread on Me" Gadsden flag blows in the wind 
at a November 2009 training as militia members prepare for their 
next activity. Photo by Amy Cooter. 
In other words, when an 
individual who does not 
feel integrated into a 
society believes they have 
been unfairly sanctioned by 
that society, they 
understand the sanction as a 
rejection of them as a 
person, rather than a 
rejection of some particular 
act they committed. Instead 
of experiencing shame and 
changing their subsequent 
behavior to match societal standards, the person denies they have experienced shame as a 
result of sanctioning and then acts in defiance of the societal standard instead. 
 Sherman correctly observes that the idea of defiance is embedded in the American 
mythos. The American Revolution is the story of colonists defying a burdensome 
monarch. The "Don't Tread on Me" Gadsden flag was a Revolutionary-era symbol of 
defiance and has experienced renewed interest in recent years for the same purpose, 
including among militia members.  
Similar sentiments are still seen in high school sports teams (particularly in the 
South) that still use "rebel" mascots and Confederate flags to represent individuality and 




The ideas are reminiscent of the "culture of honor" (Nisbett and Cohen 1996) that dictates 
how a certain segment of American men understand their masculinity, national identity, 
and personal integrity to be interrelated. More broadly, ideas of individualism and 
defying authority are synonymous with constructions of Americans as entrepreneurs and 
self-sustaining world-leaders, however mythological those constructions may be. 
 
THE MILITIA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Since the 9/11 terror attacks, law enforcement in the United States has changed. Police 
are more militarized, with local police agencies having increasingly more (and more 
deadly) equipment previously reserved for military or rare SWAT units (Kraska and 
Kappeler 1997; Moomaw 2010). At the national level, the FBI tripled the number of 
intelligence analysts (FBI 2011), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
formed to assist different intelligence agencies in sharing information, and these agencies 
have vastly increased the monitoring of various private communications (Brasch 2005). 
The Patriot Act was similarly implemented following the attacks with the overt goal of 
expanding law enforcement power in the War on Terror. Both DHS and the Patriot Act 
have faced criticism in the intervening years for various encroachments on individual 
citizens' liberties because the Act has been used to commit widespread wiretapping of 
citizens' telephone conversations, to monitor individuals' internet activity, and even to 
request library patrons' records (Graves 2010; Lichtblau 2008; Ryan 2008). 
 Despite ongoing public conversations about problems with the Act, there is 
evidence that Americans' tolerance of government intrusion in their personal lives in the 




example, indicates that 42% of Americans believed the Patriot Act was "necessary" for 
security in 2011, which is an increase from 33% in 2004. The same study revealed that 
slightly fewer Americans saw the Act as a threat to civil liberties in 2011 than in 2004 
(34% vs. 39%).  
Militia members understand national security and individual liberty to be 
intimately connected, and perhaps believe this more strongly than most Americans. 
Without unfailing protection of individual liberty, they believe the national character of 
the U.S. would be changed such that concerns about physical security would be pointless. 
When authoritative agents push the boundaries of individual liberty with attempts to 
monitor or control the militia movement, militia members' response is shaped by the 
perceived legitimacy of those actions. They evaluate legitimacy by the degree to which 
authoritative actions conform to their vision of Americanism.  
During my fieldwork, I observed that LEOs variously treated militia members 
(and others) in four distinct ways: as confidants, suspects, criminals, and terrorists, each 
of which I analyze below. Each subsequent category holds a greater degree of suspicion, 
hostility, criminality, and perceived threat than the previous category. Confidants are 
people with whom information may be shared; suspects are people who cannot be trusted, 
but who have not yet been tied to a crime; criminals are people who have committed an 








Treating Militia Members Like Confidants 
Militia members have a hyper-awareness of LEOs' interest in their activities. After some 
casual chatting at the very first militia meeting I attended in March 2008, 47 year old 
Adam told me, 'I don't care that the FBI watches us. I don't.' I had not asked him a 
question about law enforcement or any related topic, and took his statement as revealing 
an assumption that I might be an undercover officer, in which case he wanted to make it 
clear to me that he was unperturbed by my presence. Vincent, a government employee 
who was listening in, agreed and said that several months back he had trouble getting one 
of his children, Clay, to regularly do his homework. He jokingly posted a reference to 
"Agent Clay: Operation Homework " on the front page of www.michiganmilitia.com as 
he dealt with this parenting issue. Vincent said it still made him laugh to fantasize about 
LEOs reading that line and trying to discern whether the message meant something secret 
or sinister. 
 SMVM leaders occasionally left other messages to LEOs through the website, 
such as, "Nothing down here, Jim!"—an FBI agent with whom some leaders frequently 
spoke—to demonstrate they knew they were being monitored. Vincent said that Jim had 
indicated he appreciated how much information SMVM listed on the website and wished 
all groups were so easy to monitor. Vincent believed that Jim was not opposed to the 
militia, but was just trying to do his job. In return, Vincent said that Jim notified different 
militia units about concerns the FBI had that might be of interest to them. Jim had 
reportedly told Vincent just recently that the FBI expected to 'See a large rise in racist 




 Regardless of Jim's real feelings for the militia, or motives for communicating 
with leaders, what is important is how militia members perceived these interactions. 
Members clearly saw themselves as cooperating with law enforcement and were 
understanding of, if bemused by, LEOs' desire to monitor their activities. They joked 
about being watched even while appreciating information that Jim gave them. They 
believed themselves to be partners, to some extent, with law enforcement efforts to 
maintain civilian safety. 
  Notably, one of the few publicly available articles on militias that was written by 
law enforcement officers, rather than academic researchers, encourages officers to engage 
in open and respectful conversations with militias who are not overtly criminal or 
dangerous. FBI agents James Duffy and Alan Brantley somewhat irritably ask,  
"How can law enforcement agencies determine which groups represent 
more of a threat than others? How can agency commanders assess the 
specific beliefs and philosophies of the groups they may encounter in their 
own jurisdictions? In many cases, all they need to do is ask" (1997:2). 
 
Duffy and Brantley suggest that officers engage in respectful, mutually agreed upon, in-
person, "proactive contacts" with militias so that both militia members and LEOs can 
discuss issues of concern. They suggest this allows LEOs to have a more accurate 
representation of militia members who have not been agitated by hostile interaction and 
to set up relationships for the future exchange of information should a problem arise. 
This tactic worked with Michigan militia members who cooperated with LEOs in 
other circumstances after feeling like Jim and other officers had openly communicated 
with them. One member claims he drove on his own time to the Detroit FBI field office 
to go through pictures of members in various units around the state so agents might know 




business card and showed it to me during my interview with him. Other members 
routinely contacted law enforcement officials in their areas if new visitors at meetings 
raised suspicions. I was present at one meeting where leaders had received a 12 page 
letter from an obviously disturbed individual who requested that the militia help defend 
her from Tom Cruise and other Hollywood figures that she believed were somehow 
planning to harm her. I witnessed leaders use Google to find the sheriff's station nearest 
the letter sender's return address and prepare an envelope to send the sheriff a copy of the 
letter, 'Just so he knows what's going on in his neighborhood.' 
 This relatively positive relationship with LEOs also carried over to in-person 
interactions, particularly when undercover officers attended public meetings. When the 
undercover officers were particularly poor at being undercover, leaders openly said things 
like:  
'And to law enforcement present tonight, welcome! Thank you for your 
service. We're glad to have you. Come talk to us after the meeting, we 
have some materials 'specially for you.' 
 
Statements like this were not paranoia, nor mere speculation. When it was eventually 
revealed that an FBI informant who was in part responsible for initiating the arrests of 
some militia members in another unit first did undercover work within SMVM, leaders 
identified him on their forum more than a year before his name was released to the 
public43. 
                                                 
43 After some time, I too became able to identify likely undercover officers at militia events. They were 
usually two middle-aged, white men whom no one remembered seeing previously and who did not return to 
future events. In contrast to members' work clothes or casual tee-shirts, they wore plain, dark tee-shirts, 
khakis or dark slacks, waist-length jackets even when the weather was not cool enough to merit one 
(presumably to cover a sidearm tucked at the small of their back, or carried in an over-the shoulder holster), 
and  radios exposed at their belts. They typically arrived 20 minutes after the function's published start time 
and thereby avoided small-talk interactions with members. They never ordered any food or drink if the 




Despite the welcoming message leaders gave them, I never saw a suspected 
undercover officer stay to speak with militia members after the meetings. Instead, they 
routinely left quite early, well before the end of the meeting, as if to avoid one-on-one 
interactions. Militia leaders were never surprised by this, but sometimes expressed 
disappointment at not having the opportunity to try convincing the officers of the 
common goals about protecting the community and nation they believed they shared with 
law enforcement. In these specific circumstances, members were not coopting or 
replacing law enforcement authority as sociologist Jennifer Carlson (2012) argued her 
gun owning male participants were, but were instead attempting to compliment and 
strengthen officers' authority. 
Militia members actively sought out opportunities to interact and share 
information with LEOs when they were operating under what they perceived to be a 
mutually cooperative framework. Militia members understood law enforcement 
interactions to be legitimate in these scenarios in that LEOs treated militia members 
respectfully and as sources of information, rather than as a source of suspicion. In this 
context, militia members had little against which to rebel. They neither felt they were 
being controlled, nor felt they were being labeled by the government, and thus continued 
to act cooperatively.  
 
Treating Members Like Suspects 
A slightly greater degree of suspicion from law enforcement was evident in two internet-
related events. Neither event was overtly directed at militia members, but members 
                                                                                                                                                 
both. They sat where they could observe the entire room, and made frequent eye contact with each other, 




Figure 26. Left: the original AttackWatch.com. 
Right: the site as it appeared following post-ridicule 
modifications.
believed all American citizens were being treated like suspects who must be watched for 
possible criminal action in both incidents. They responded to both incidents as "super 
citizens" who were concerned about everyone's right to free speech, and understood 
themselves to be acting on behalf of people who were perhaps less informed about 
possible government encroachment than they are. 
First, in the fall of 2011, President Obama's administration started a website 
called AttackWatch.com, where people could "report" attacks or "smears" about Obama 
and his administration. The website was intended to be a source of information for the 
administration, so they could engage in fact checking and better fight public 
misinformation regarding various proposed policies (see Figure 26). However, the site 
was widely ridiculed by conservative commentators. The campaign soon changed the 
image of the site to be less mysterious, and changed its content to be a place where 
people could sign up to receive more information about the administration. 
 The second event occurred in early 2012, when DHS released a list of more than 
two hundred words whose usage they monitored on the internet. If used, especially in 




(Department of Homeland Security 2011). The words covered several categories and 
included things ranging from "militia," "nationalist," and "terrorism," to "cloud," "ice," 
and "vaccine." 
  Militia members had a strong negative response to both the Attack Watch website 
and the list of keywords. Some members described the website a "Stazi-style snitch link," 
and understood it as a "socialist" attempt to control the populous as well as free speech. 
Their acts of speaking out against the site and Obama's perceived intent behind it were in 
direct contrast to what they believed the site was intended to accomplish. Members 
similarly understood the broad list of DHS keywords to be an ineffective attempt to 
control free speech, and many of them immediately wrote a dozen or more words from 
the list on their Facebook pages or unit websites. "Militia" was, of course, always their 
first entry. Members believed they and other Americans were being treated like people 
who might engage in criminal behavior if only given the opportunity, and who must 
accordingly be closely monitored. 
Militia members engaged in more of the behavior that government officials were 
monitoring and apparently trying to discourage, rather than less. If the government really 
was trying to control or constrain this type of behavior, the effort failed, as would Control 
Theory's applicability to this scenario. Militia members were not directly labeled or 
targeted by these government actions, so Labeling Theory similarly fails to explain their 
behavior. Defiance Theory, however, allows us to understand how members directly defy 
perceived efforts to control free speech by engaging in the very behavior they believed 
the government was trying to control. In accordance with their understanding of 




scenarios because they believed it to be an infringement on the fundamental right of free 
speech. Members understood themselves to be acting in the spirit of the Founding Fathers 
and following Thomas Jefferson's famous instruction, "If a law is unjust, a man is not 
only right to disobey it, he is obligated to do so." 
 
Treating Militia Members Like Criminals  
The next framework for LEOs' interactions with militias was the most common one 
during my fieldwork. Instead of people who might become criminals, militia members 
were sometimes treated as though they had already broken a law or participated in 
dangerous behavior. I first observed militia members being treated like criminals as the 
2008 Presidential Election approached. Much was at stake during this election for 
political conservatives. Republican George Bush was ending his second term in office, 
and there was general disapproval among the American public regarding his performance 
on many issues, especially the war in the Middle East. President Bush's final approval 
rating was 22%, according to a CBS News poll (2009a). This was the lowest ever for a 
President, and many people seemed to expect a Democrat with very different policy 
views to be elected as a result of this general dissatisfaction.  
 This expectation made political conservatives rather anxious, and militia members 
were no exception. At the first meeting I attended in March 2008, SMVM discussed plans 
for a "Post-Election Public Readiness Meeting" for November 5th, the day following the 
Presidential Election. This was to be a special meeting, the first of its kind, according to 
leaders. It was held instead of their usual monthly meeting, though both types of meeting 




things that threaten your right to bear arms, and as a result of that, your right to live and 
exist as a free American.'  
In mid-October 2008, leaders began to heavily advertise the event to other militia 
units, to friends and family, and to interested people visiting their websites. One leader 
managed to post an advertisement in some low-circulation, local newspapers. Leaders 
reserved a meeting hall in a more central location than their usual space, and made sure 
they had enough room to accommodate up to 100 people. Their main flier read: 
 "On November 4th a decision will be made on the future of this nation. 
Are we still a Republic? A socialist welfare State? Or a militarized police 
State? How stands the Republic? How stands this State? What are you 
prepared for on November 5th?"  
 
Representatives from several different law enforcement agencies visited militia 
members around the state, nearly simultaneously, a few days before the election. Thirty-
six year old Edward, a member from the western part of the state claimed that officers 
from three different agencies collectively pulled him over on the interstate to have a 
conversation with him. He understood this interaction as follows. 
"Yeah, they wanted to see if we were planning anything and if we were 
pissed off if Obama got elected and stuff. You know, it's not that. 
Obviously, I think a lot of people are pissed off, but I don't think it's like, 
you know, those yahoos down South plannin' on killin' Obama. Yeah. Ok. 
That's gonna happen [rolls eyes]. I think people are still in fear that that's 
what we wanna do, [that] we're anti-government, like we wanna 
assassinate people." 
 
Edward is referring to the highly publicized arrest, just days prior to the 2008 election, of 
two young men with neo-Nazi affiliations who apparently made a plan to assassinate 
Barack Obama and kill other African Americans (Associated Press 2008). Law 
enforcement was undoubtedly on high alert after this and other similar threats, and 




perhaps wanted to intimidate any members who were particularly upset by Obama's 
expected election victory into either revealing their feelings or suppressing any violent 
urges, in accordance with control theory's predictions.  
 Some members reported having been visited by LEOs at work. Vincent, for 
example, joked that he had a 'Nice, 45 minute, paid break' as FBI agents took a hostile 
tone with him. Agents reportedly said, 'We know you're involved in the militia,' to which 
Vincent said he laughed and replied, 'You'd better know that! I'm all over the 
[michiganmilitia.com] website, and I have a militia sign hung up in the elevator [that we 
just rode in]!' Vincent thus reports having used humor to downplay the potential 
aggressiveness in the interaction and try to maintain power in the conversation.  
Thirty-nine year old Cliff similarly tried to maintain control of the interaction that 
a different law enforcement agency initiated with him. They called him, saying they had 
been unable to find him at his home. Cliff said he replied, 'That's the way I like it!' before 
giving the caller a specific time and place outside his home they could meet if they were 
still interested in speaking with him. In other words, Cliff did not appreciate LEOs 
showing up at his home unannounced and was glad their efforts to find him had been 
temporarily frustrated. Rather than mutually establishing an alternate meet-up location, 
Cliff gave a single time and place as the only option for an in-person conversation, which 
was again intended to maintain a degree of control in the interaction.  
Several days later at the post-election meeting, one of the members who believed 
he had a cooperative relationship with the FBI before these interactions was still visibly 
irritated and told me that he had called his primary FBI contact and angrily asked why 




agents did not trust them as much as they had previously believed when LEOs were 
treating them like confidants. Despite past openness and cooperation with law 
enforcement, it is clear that these members felt that law enforcement had mishandled pre-
election concerns and trespassed on personal boundaries that were important to militia 
members. They did not appreciate being treated like criminals, rather than as responsible 
citizens who would willingly cooperate with law enforcement. They responded with 
hostility as a result of this perceived betrayal. 
Militia members retained this resentment for the next Presidential Election in 
201244. Members again planned a large, public, post-election meeting and widely 
advertised it. Members did not experience direct efforts at government intervention 
during this election cycle, but some were very clearly still upset regarding LEOs' 
interactions with them prior to the 2008 election. Elias, the member who served as the 
primary organizer of the event, told me he was still 'Annoyed at how [law enforcement] 
handled the last election,' as he sarcastically said that LEOs, 'Had done so well to 
discover information we publicly posted all over the internet.'  
In 2012, Elias christened the post-election meeting "MilitiApocalypse" and 
designed a flyer with that read, "311 MiLiTiApocalypse: The Day America Will Change 
Forever". Smaller text notes that "311" refers to November 7, 2012, which is the day of 
the meeting, as well as the 311th day of the year. Instead of listing the meeting location on 
the flyer or website as is typical, the flyer includes instructions to contact the group or 
watch the website for more details. 
 
                                                 
44 Several units similarly hosed a 2010 midterm election meeting, but this one had fewer first-time 
attendees, and topics of conversation revolved around militia training and activities, rather than political 




Figure 27. "MiLiTiApocalypse" flyer for the 2012 post-election meeting. From michiganmilitia.com. 
Elias gleefully noted that the yellow-orange picture he chose for the background 
was ambiguous,  
'Is it a sunrise? Is it a sunset? Is it an atomic bomb going off? Who knows? 
And what about "311?" It sounds like it should mean something, right? 
Like 911 or 411?'  
 
Elias was sure that at least one FBI agent would be assigned the task of deciphering the 
message to discern the meeting's "real" purpose, and said he wished he could know how 
long it would take them to realize what the "311" meant, despite being printed on the 
page. Other SMVM leaders were at first resistant to the plan of using such a potentially 
scary-looking flyer, but Elias' articulation of his annoyance with LEOs' previous 
interactions with the group quickly won them over. In this case, the flyer and its 




resources because of the perceived disrespect they had given members in the days prior to 
the previous Presidential Election.  
Members of another group took a somewhat more direct approach to defying law 
enforcement categorizations of militia members as criminals. In June 2012, LEOs 
detained and questioned members of a Michigan militia unit that had just experienced 
renewed interest after a period of relative inactivity. The group's leader, who goes by the 
codename Blackjack, was detained as he was getting off a flight, while other members 
were simultaneously approached at home or at work. Blackjack wrote an account of his 
interaction with law enforcement that was widely posted to militia forums and a few 
blogs of sympathetic groups around the country.  
Blackjack said the FBI "Wanted to know if I wanted to talk about my group." The 
forced nature of the conversation belied this casual inquiry, as the interaction took place 
in a secluded area of the airport with several armed officers. According to his account, 
Blackjack spoke briefly with those officials and merely attested to his commitment to the 
militia, but later expressed frustration with how LEOs had approached the situation: 
"All that said, for those federals reading this, should you decide to arrest 
us or 'NDAA45' us, for the charge of loving our Constitution and country, 
have the decency to leave the neighborhoods we live in alone. Leave our 
wives, children and other family members alone. Approach us calmly, 
reasonably, and without dynamic raid teams. They are unnecessary. Doing 
so might just help you start to rebuild the older, more honorable title of 
'peace officer' and heal the scars the last 40 years of 'law enforcement' 
have wrought among us ('us' meaning the citizenry). All dynamic raids do 
is provide a testosterone 'buzz' for those 'tactical types' [in law 
enforcement] that see all of us, and I mean every single one of us, as 'the 
enemy.'" 
 
                                                 
45 This refers to the National Defense Authorization Act which allows for individuals to be indefinitely 




Other militia members similarly expressed frustration that LEOs had again 
simultaneously detained members of Blackjack's group in a way that felt hostile, that 
communicated suspicion of the group, and that felt almost like a military operation. They 
did not object to LEOs' desire to speak with this group's members, merely the manner in 
which they had approached members as suspects rather than law abiding citizens. The 
forced nature of this interaction made Blackjack and others believe that law enforcement 
was likely to be hostile to them in the future, to the extent of arresting them merely for 
their militia participation. 
In each of the above three scenarios where LEOs treated militia members like 
criminals, members responded defiantly. The government's efforts to exert authority and 
control on the movement failed as members engaged in more militia activity. Members 
certainly believed they had been labeled "criminal," in accordance with Labeling Theory, 
but rejected the label, rather than internalizing it, because of the legality of their behavior 
and the perceived illegitimacy of law enforcement actions.  
In accordance with Defiance Theory, members instead acted in ways that 
reinforced their militia identities. Members confronted by LEOs prior to the 2008 
election used sarcastic humor and constrained meeting opportunities to maintain control 
in interactions with law enforcement, while insisting on the value of their militia 
participation. Members who were still frustrated about their treatment during that election 
planned a meeting to look intentionally dangerous and scary, with the overt goal of 
creating a hassle and spitefully wasting law enforcement resources—a clear enactment of 
the "Don't Tread on Me" version of patriotic defiance. Blackjack took a more direct 




educate LEOs on how to better interact with militia units in the future. Blackjack's taking 
the role of instructor defies the position of authority that law enforcement established in 
their interaction with him, while reinforcing the validity of his militia participation.  
 
Treating Militia Members (and Veterans) Like Terrorists 
The most hostile framework LEOs applied to militia members during my time in the field 
was that of militias as terrorists. This framework is more hostile than assuming militia 
members are mere criminals because it implies that they are involved in especially 
violent and dangerous behavior intended to harm the country and its citizens, rather than 
vaguely criminal activity that may or may not be targeting private individuals instead of 
government agents or institutions. Predictably (through the lens of Defiance Theory), 
militia members responded very poorly to this categorization.   
 The "terrorist" categorization was made evident in a ten-page report on "rightwing 
extremism" from DHS in April 2009. The report's introduction says it is intended for law 
enforcement, "So they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist 
attacks" (Department of Homeland Security 2009:2), and is marked "For official use 
only." It was leaked to the media, however, and soon found its way across the internet. 
The report compared the contemporary socio-political climate to that of the 1990s, and 
suggested that increases in so-called extremist activity during both time frames could be 
attributed to an economic decline alongside increasing global competition and proposed 
firearms legislation. 
 Although the report differentiated between groups that are primarily "hate-




groups" in its early pages, there is slippage throughout the document between these 
categories. In most places, militias seem to be categorized as anti-government groups, but 
some passages specifically reference only "violent," "extreme," or "radical" militia 
groups, while other passages seem to refer to all militia groups without differentiating 
among them.  
There was one primary predictive claim in the report that militias understood to 
apply to them: 
"The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of 
military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their 
communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or 
lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks. [… Returning 
veterans] possess combat skills and experience that are attractive to 
rightwing extremists. [DHS] is concerned that rightwing extremists will 
attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to boost their 
violent capabilities" (ibid.:2, 3-4). 
  
The implications of this claim are rather vague: returning veterans may join rightwing 
groups, some of which have the potential to be violent. Several Republican 
Congresspersons called for an official withdrawal of the report, or even for Homeland 
Security secretary Janet Napolitano's resignation or dismissal (Fox News 2009). They 
noted that a DHS report on leftwing extremism released three months prior included 
information on specific groups and specific threats, while the rightwing acknowledged 
that DHS, "Has no specific information that domestic rightwing terrorists are currently 
planning acts of violence" (DHS 2003:3) 
 This claims about veterans in the report deeply offended many militia members 
and returning veterans alike. Pete Hegseth, chairman of the organization called Vets for 




"If anything, veterans have an allegiance to this country greater than the 
average citizen. Veterans have learned where their allegiances lie and are 
less prone to extremism. Something's wrong with the editing process, or 
[DHS officials] just don't understand veterans. The report demonstrates a 
true lack of understanding of who veterans are" (Fox News 2009). 
 
Militia members, many of whom have military experience themselves, and all of whom 
honor combat veterans as national heroes, described the report as calling veterans 
'suspected terrorists.' Militia members prioritize serving their country, uphold a 
traditional view of national identity that lauds service and honor, and see themselves as 
super citizens who work more diligently than most Americans to uphold the country's 
values and security. Members found it incredibly offensive to be labeled as the very 
problem they see themselves as fighting, and respond accordingly. As Emmet, a recent 
returning veteran in his twenties who joined the militia after the report's release, told me 
at his second training in June 2009,  
'I mean, here I am, I honorably served my country. I risked my life in the 
sand over there! I come back home and those fuckers call me a terrorist? I 
was fighting terrorism. It was "The War on Terror!" You bet I'm pissed!' 
 
Emmet and other veterans returning from the War on Terror, as well as veterans 
from earlier skirmishes, sought out the Michigan militia46 after feeling betrayed by the 
DHS report. They most often took very active roles and used their military knowledge to 
dramatically expand the number of available activities during trainings. Trainings were 
no longer dominated by target practice alone; members engaged much more in varied 
activities like navigating advanced compass courses across different terrains, self-defense 
training, and technical lessons on different firearms.  
                                                 
46 Militias in other states with whom I and Michigan leaders had contacts reported their own increases in 




The presence of more veterans also meant that militia membership and attendance 
experienced substantial growth in the immediate aftermath of the DHS report. Figure 28 
shows non-media adult attendance at SMVM events (both meetings and trainings) I 
attended from March 2008 to March 201047. Units around the state experienced a very 
similar pattern; SMVM's attendance is generally larger and more consistent than other 
units', and thus is the best to explore graphically. The vertical lines on the graph (at 
March 2009 and March 2010) separate the 12 month periods surrounding the DHS 
report's release.   
The first SMVM event following the report in April 2009 shows an immediate, 
large jump in attendance relative to all other events in the preceding 12 months. 
Attendance at events in the 12 months following the report was elevated relative to the 
preceding time frame, with all events having more attendance than all but three (21%) of 
the preceding year's events48. The November 2009 training had an especially high 
attendance because this was the event immediately following the death of the WWII 
veteran on whose property many militia units trained; more units than usual attended to 
participate in his memorial service.  
Observing this increase in participation during 2009, Vincent, who has been an 
active member since the militia's inception in the early 90s remarked, "Man, this is what 
                                                 
47 I do not include myself in the attendance counts. The graph does not include attendance at special 
election meetings SMVM hosted in November 2008 and November 2010 on this graph. While these two 
meetings were similar to each other, they are both anomalous relative to all other SMVM gatherings during 
my fieldwork. Attendance at both these events was abnormally large because of the greater publicity 
SMVM leaders raised for this events, and because several other militia units participated in each event to 
express their solidarity. Neither election meeting resulted in a single new member for SMVM or other units 
in attendance. 
48 It is also worth noting that no substantial bump in attendance happened following either the November 
















the militia should have looked like 15 years ago!" Vincent's remark is particularly 
compelling since militia membership in the 1990s is estimated to have been between 
10,000 and 20,000 people in Michigan alone (Churchill 2009). Vincent has witnessed the 
fluctuations in militia attendance since 1994, and for him to be impressed by this surge is 
striking. Vincent believed that interest and participation in the militia finally matched his 
vision of what it should have been at its inception. He later joked on the forum that 
another member should change the name of one of their information brochures to, "How 
to Recruit National Guardsmen," thus referring to the notion that militia participation had 
increased as a direct result of the DHS report. He continued:  
"Oh, wait Jan Napolitano has already done that for us....The tighter they 
[government officials] squeeze, the more patriots will slip through their 
fingers." 
 
In Vincent's view, the more the government treats veterans and other people who are 
loyal to an originalist understanding of the nation like terrorists, the more likely those 
people are to seek out groups like the militia with the intention of undermining the 
government's efforts. Attendance increases after the DHS report indicate that there is at 
least some truth to this claim. 
 The authors of the 2009 DHS report explicitly referred to a control theory 
approach when explaining the decrease in militia prevalence in the late 1990s. 
"Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in 
Oklahoma City, the militia movement declined in total membership and in 
the number of organized groups because many members distanced 
themselves from the movement as a result of the intense scrutiny militias 
received after the bombing. Militia membership continued to decline after 
the turn of the millennium as a result of law enforcement disruptions of 
multiple terrorist plots linked to violent rightwing extremists, new 
legislation banning paramilitary training, and militia frustration that the 





DHS credits law enforcement attention and new legislation with undermining the militia 
movement by essentially scaring off its membership through threats of legal action.  
 The control approach fails to explain why militias might grow stronger as a result 
of law enforcement interactions, such as the DHS report itself. Additionally, despite 
attributing some of the decrease in militia activity in the 1990s to firearms legislation, the 
report also warns that such legislation now may result in backlash. It says: 
"The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of 
military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their 
communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or 
lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks" (ibid.:2). 
 
Control theory cannot account for these contradictory expectations resulting from 
firearms legislation. 
 Labeling Theory helps explain the resentment that members like Bruce felt after 
the report. Bruce said: 
"So when it comes out that the Department of Homeland Security lumps 
us as 'terrorists' or 'prone to [being] terrorists' because of being veterans, 
combat veterans, or police, or anything else, let me just say this: my oath 
stands just as well today as it did when I was 17 in 1962 and took it [while 
in the military] to protect and defend the Constitution."  
 
Bruce did not say that annoyance at being called a potential terrorist redoubled his 
interest in the militia, but did say that he planned to continue his militia activity until he 
was physically unable to do so. Labeling Theory does not, however, adequately address 
the new militia sympathizers and participants who developed an interest in the group only 
after the DHS report.  
 It is again most useful to understand militia members and returning veterans with 
shared ideological perspectives as acting in defiance of the DHS report. They understood 




militia and its goals. Instead of internalizing a label or being afraid of government 
monitoring, new members joined the group to spite the report and its authors. Members' 
understanding of what it means to be a good citizen again shaped their interpretation of 
authoritative action and shaped their behavioral response. 
 
When Militia Members Really Are Criminals: The Hutaree Arrests 
Militia members took defiant action in response to being treated like suspects, criminals, 
and terrorists when there was no evidence they were engaged in illegal or dangerous 
behavior. In contrast, members supported law enforcement intervention when members 
of the Hutaree militia in southern Michigan were arrested in March 2010. In this case, 
members judged there to be sufficient evidence to justify the arrests. 
"Hutaree" is a word that members of that militia made up to mean "Christian 
Warriors;" unlike other units in the state, this one had explicit religious overtones. 
Members understood their unit leader to also be their spiritual leader, and all of them 
attended the same church. The Hutaree should be considered a millenarian group in 
historian Robert Churchill's (2009) typology, relative to other Michigan groups' being 
more solidly located on the constitutionalist end of the spectrum. Members from several 
other militia units told me early in my fieldwork that they found the Hutaree's emphasis 
on a particular understanding of religion off-putting.  
They additionally warned me that the Hutaree could be dangerous, as different 
groups had independently witnessed members practicing unsafe firearms practices. For 
example, Hutaree members who attended SMVM trainings reportedly needed to be 




loaded as they carelessly swung their empty rifles' barrels in trajectories that crossed 
other people's bodies. One Hutaree member did this to such an extent that a Vietnam 
veteran at the training told the man he was only allowed to participate in training 
exercises with a stick, rather than a rifle, as he took the rifle from the man's hands. This 
story has been told to much ridicule and laughter (e.g., "What caliber was the stick?!") 
during various militia gatherings at least half a dozen times during my fieldwork, 
including several times before the Hutaree arrests occurred. 
Militia members from at least two different units, including SMVM, contacted the 
FBI over their concerns about the Hutaree (Baldas 2012; Higgins 2010). The FBI placed 
an informant and, later, an undercover officer within the ranks of the Hutaree. It is 
unclear what the undercover officer witnessed in March 2010 to trigger the arrests. 
Militia rumor has it that the Hutaree leader showed the agent an assembled bomb in the 
woods near their training area, but this was never confirmed in media reports of the trial.  
Nine Hutaree members were charged with a variety of offenses including plotting 
to use "weapons of mass destruction" and "seditious conspiracy"—a very serious charge 
of planning to overthrow the government. The State alleged that Hutaree members were 
planning to murder a police officer, then murder and injure other officers, perhaps with 
an improvised explosive device, at the first officer's funeral. The defendants' lawyers 
argued that Hutaree members discussed violent action, but said that it was protected 
speech under the First Amendment. They further insisted that there was no evidence 
members were really planning to harm anyone.  
On March 26, 2012, exactly two years after the Hutaree members were arrested, 




had failed to support the State's charges, and that there was not enough evidence to 
demonstrate Hutaree members had a specific plan for harm. Two defendants who pled 
guilty to weapons charges and one defendant who pled guilty at the beginning of the 
proceedings were sentenced to time served.  
Upon first glance at Figure 28, it might be tempting to conclude that the Hutaree 
arrests had a suppressant effect on militia activity. However, I argue that this is not the 
case. The April 2010 SMVM event immediately following the arrests had only slightly 
lower attendance than the previous month, with more attendees than were present at all 
but three (17%) of the events during the time frame of the DHS report's release. Further, 
the two events with low attendance following the arrests were both trainings that 
occurred under unusual circumstances. The first, in May 2010, became the first and only 
training that SMVM made entirely private: they explicitly disallowed the media and did 
not publicly post the training location. Only members on the private forum were made 
aware that this training was taking place on private property three hours north of their 
usual location. The driving distance also created difficulties for some members who 
wanted to attend, but were unable to make the trip on relatively short notice.  
The second unusual training in October 2010 also occurred at a different location. 
This time, SMVM leaders were unable to book the campground at their usual state park 
due to a large gathering of Boy Scouts who reserved the entire area. Leaders instead 
reserved a camping area at a different state park, which was again a farther distance to 
travel for many members. Additionally, this particular training was intended to be the 
start of the Junior Militia Corps, which is designed to more fully integrate members' 




in which children could be involved. This may not have been something that members 
without children wanted to travel the additional distance to do.  
The relevant characteristic of the graph is that attendance following the arrests is 
still elevated compared to the time frame prior to the DHS report. Thus, it would seem 
that the Hutaree arrests had no impact on militia attendance. Although the arrests could 
be understood as a form of government crackdown on the militia as a whole—a form of 
government control—members were not intimidated into decreasing their activity as 
Control Theory would predict. The arrests specifically targeted a group from whom other 
units in the state separated themselves, long before the arrests occurred. Members who 
were not breaking the law did not generalize the government's response onto their own 
militia activity, nor did they internalize a "criminal" label because of the behavior of 
another group.  
In the case of the Hutaree, supporting law enforcement action amounted to 
supporting the militia's vision of American identity. The authorities' actions were justified 
and in accordance with militia members' understanding of law enforcement powers to 
protect citizens and prevent harm. Militias also want law enforcement to prevent rogue 
militias from engaging in dangerous activity to avoid a further disparaging of the public 
image of militias that would happen following a successful violent event. Members thus 
had no reason to act defiantly because they endorsed this effort. Just as was the case 
when law enforcement treated militia members like confidants, members could interpret 
the actions of law enforcement as conforming to their understanding of how authority 





PATRIOTISM, DEFIANCE AND COMPLIANCE 
Militia members' understanding of nationalism premised on individual liberty and their 
understanding of militia participation as a duty of citizenship certainly make ideas of a 
righteous, patriotic defiance resonate with them. In terms of the rest of Sherman's (1993) 
typology of defiance, members do not always feel alienated from society as a whole, but 
do feel alienated from the government (as the sanctioning agent), and from LEOs as 
official extensions of the government. Members believe certain government interventions 
with them to be a form of sanction because the interactions indicate that the government 
either assumes militia members are criminal or at least socially deviant, or that the 
government uses such interactions to label the militia as deviant in the public eye.  
 Members reject sanctions for both of Sherman's suggested reasons. In some 
circumstances, members believe government interactions to be completely unwarranted, 
as they did with the DHS report. In other circumstances, members understand the 
government's interest in interacting with the militia movement, but feel disrespected by 
the process, as they did when LEOs behaved hostilely toward them prior to the 2008 
Presidential Election. As 36 year old Dale said when Blackjack and his group were 
detained and questioned in the summer of 2012: 
"[LEOs] should leave us alone because we aren't doing shit! If they have 
cause for alarm, in the sense that there are illegal things being done, by all 
means, do what you have to do. We shouldn't have to be subject to 
questioning at the behest of the federal government. We're private citizens 
exercising our 1st and 2nd Amendment rights by being in the militia, it's not 
subject to the blessings and permissions of the FBI or any other 
bureaucracy. Let's not forget that." 
 
Dale aruges that if there is evidence of illegal behavior within the movement or a specific 




wants to be left alone to enact his rights. Dale and other members see hostile interactions 
as an effort to mark the militia as a whole as socially problematic, rather than as an effort 
to explore a particular suspected act. 
 When militia members are sanctioned via hostile interactions or reports that label 
them suspects, criminals, terrorists without evidence, members do not experience shame; 
they instead become angry and uncooperative. Members defiantly reinvest in their militia 
member identity as they invoke both the legality of their actions and their loyalty to the 
nation. Members participate in additional militia activities, and become less open with 
law enforcement. In some circumstances, members, like Elias, intentionally make the 
group's activities look more threatening than they are with the goal of wasting LEOs' 
time, thus possibly distracting from real threats within the movement or elsewhere. In 
other circumstances, people who sympathize with militia ideology join the movement in 
droves out of frustration. The more hostile law enforcements' categorization of militias is, 
the more defiant their reaction. 
 In contrast, in scenarios where members perceived government interventions to be 
justified, as was the case with the Hutaree arrests, members do not become defiant. They 
do not understand the legitimate arrest of a particular group as an assault on the militia 
movement as a whole because they believe that any person or group who desires to act 
violently defies the core principles related to individual freedom that the militia is 
supposed to uphold and protect. This is why the Hutaree arrests had no overall impact on 
militia participation.  
 Social movement theories of repression do not capture these behavioral outcomes. 




authoritative actions. Their pattern of response is exactly the opposite of what Koopman's 
observed regarding situational (police) repression's increasing movement activity, but 
institutional (legal) repression's lessening activity. When LEOs directly interacted with 
militia members in a hostile manner just prior to the 2008 elections, members were 
annoyed, but their activity did not escalate. In contrast, when legalistic efforts were 
applied in an attempt to control the movement with a 2009 Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) report, the militia grew dramatically in size. After the 2010 arrests of 
Hutaree militia members—another legal intervention with potentially hostile overtones—
there was no effect on militia size. 
Defiance Theory, through a lens of ideal nationalism explains these trends and 
also helps explain why militia members respond negatively to exaggerated media and 
other reports of their activities. Journalists or researchers may, alongside law enforcement 
actors, take Sherman's (1993) role of "sanctioning agents" who represent a community 
that is hostile to the movement when they negatively report on militia activities. Members 
become frustrated when they feel that reporters or others inaccurately represent their 
activities, as was the case following an inflammatory report of an international film crew 
who was very friendly and relaxed while on site at a training. Similarly, SMVM's training 
where media representatives were explicitly banned was intended to give members a 
break from being interviewed so they could better focus on desired training activities, and 
also helped members avoid negative coverage linked to their group in the immediate 
aftermath of the news of the arrests. Other units continued the trend of disallowing media 
for varying periods of time. The negative coverage, which did not clearly differentiate 




Figure 29: The "Thank You" card to the SPLC. Photo 
by Amy Cooter. 
more closed to outsiders and more 
difficult to monitor as members once 
again embraced their militia identities 
and acted in defiance of the media 
reports.  
Perhaps even more strikingly, 
members from several different units 
sent Mark Potok, director of the 
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), 
a "Thank You" card in March 2010 following the SPLC's release of the newest list of 
active militias. The yearly list is intended to undermine militia activity by drawing 
attention to it; alongside ongoing militia reports on their "Hatewatch" list, the SPLC 
strongly implies that militias are uniformly involved in dangerous and socially 
problematic behavior. Michigan militia members reject that public knowledge of their 
activities is a shame-inducing act, however, because they insist on its legality and, in their 
view, necessity, for maintaining a free America. They acted defiantly once again by 
sending the card.  
The outside of the card read "You really shouldn't have,…," while the inside read 
"but I'm so glad you did." Members added a handwritten note that read, "Thank you 
SPLC for the wonderful list of militias to network with. We hereby declare you militia 
recruiter of the year." It was signed by more than two dozen members by the end of the 




as an opportunity to reframe what was intended to be a shame-inducing act into 
something positive for the group that contradicted the SPLC's intent.  
In the scenarios with the media and with the SPLC, militia members were 
frustrated by public portrayals of their group as criminal and dangerous, and once again 
reinforced their militia identities as they defied attempts to control their behavior and 
their image. Members banned outsiders for varying lengths of time, depending on the 
unit, in response to the media reports, and thus became more difficult to access and 
monitor, as the reports suggested was necessary. In response to the newest SPLC list, 
members thanked its authors for a useful tool to help grow the movement, and thus 
directly defied the list's intent to undermine the movement.  
What Sherman's Theory of Defiance does not capture is how members interpret 
the legitimacy of authorities' actions through the lens of Americanness. Militia members' 
express their commitment to the nation through acts of both defiance and compliance. 
Their response depends on the degree to which authorities' actions conform to members' 
vision of authorities serving the needs of the people and upholding the law. 
When authorities treat militia members like confidants or when they engage in 
investigations that are justified based on evidence of dangerous behavior, members are 
compliant and support those actions. When authorities treat members like suspects, 
criminals, or terrorists with no concrete evidence of problematic behavior, members are 
likely to become defiant, with their degree of defiance increasing as the hostility of the 
label increases. That is, when members were treated like suspects with no direct 
confrontation, they post more material online in defiance of a perceived attempt to 




Figure 30. A sign reading 
"NO FEDS Allowed" is 
nailed to a tree at the 
entrance to an event, hosted 
by friends, intended to 
assist Hutaree members 
cover their legal expenses. 
Photo by Amy Cooter.  
criminals, they created hassles to waste law enforcement resources. When members were 
treated like terrorists, their reaction was most extreme; in the wake of the DHS report, 
members not only became uncooperative, but doubled the size of the militia in Michigan. 
In the context of increased attention to legitimacy as defined by commitment to 
national identity, Defiance Theory would predict that we would see greater militia 
activity during times when the political environment is hostile to such groups. Although 
most militia members dislike both major political parties, Democrats tend to be further 
from their ideal Libertarian standard than are Republicans, particularly on the issue gun 
control. Militias experienced substantial growth during the last two Democratic 
administrations of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and were relatively quiet during the 
intervening Republican administration of George W. Bush. The rise of administrations is 
intimately tied with a variety of national and global socioeconomic and political changes, 
so it is overly simplistic to attribute militia activity to having a Democrat in the 
Presidential seat alone. However, those administrations represent a collective of policies 
and political attitudes that are hostile to political 
conservatism. 
We might also expect to see an increase in militia 
activity when public discussions concern specific proposed 
restrictions to gun rights or firearms availability. 
Conversations like this happen periodically, particularly 
following mass shooting incidents, of which there have been 
several in the last few years. I did not witness membership 




fieldwork, but that could be because such discourse is typically short-lived and without 
any real political backing.  
Existing members do discuss such news coverage amongst themselves and renew 
promises to fight firearms legislation through protests, contacting their representatives, 
and purchasing more firearms. In the event that such legislation becomes likely (during 
President Obama's second term49, for example), I would not, however, be surprised to see 
protests alongside a growth in membership. Militia members do not oppose firearms 
restrictions for the mentally ill or felons, but believe that new legislation typically only 
impacts law-abiding citizens, rather than criminals who obtain and possess weapons 
illegally. Members worry they would be unable to protect themselves and their families if 
legislative efforts left firearms only in the hands of criminals.  
 Militia members understand their militia participation as a concrete way to learn 
how to protect themselves, their families, and their communities in the event of a disaster. 
They understand themselves to be super citizen patriots who should be working alongside 
LEOs to protect the nation and individual freedoms as laid out in the Constitution. They 
greatly resent any implication that they instead work to undermine the safety of the 
country or its citizens. Members enjoy feeling like trusted informants and are more likely 
to cooperate with LEOs when they are approached in this manner. Members become 
hostile, uncooperative, and even disruptive when they are treated like suspects without 
cause, as Defiance Theory with a lens of Americanness predicts. Sometimes members 
                                                 
49 I have not been attending militia functions since the shooting incidents in Aurora, Colorado or Newtown, 
Connecticut. A militia leader from the west part of Michigan reports, however, that recent conversations 
about gun control in the wake of these tragedies, including President Obama's executive orders, has brought 




like Trevor, in his late 60s, anticipate unwarranted law enforcement harassment based on 
previous control-based interventions the government has directed at the movement: 
"And do not send an innocent cop, male or female, to come and try to 
confinscate [sic.] my gun. If you want to confinscate it, I'm puttin' you on 
notice, Obama, you come to my door and you try to do it!  Because that's 
the day you and I will meet our maker." 
 
Seemingly cooperative interactions can, in contrast, dispel these tensions, as 
Blackjack noted following his detention at the airport. Militia members welcome contacts 
from LEOs that are cooperative, or at least respectful, and that do not immediately treat 
militias like criminal organizations. Members want to believe that the government and its 
agents act justly, legally, and in accordance with their nationalistic value of freedom and 
equality. They believe that respectful interactions with law enforcement can rebuild trust 
that has been destroyed in past interactions, and are hopeful that LEOs have learned 
lessons from this past, which left civilians dead and law enforcement agencies 
reprimanded by Congressional panels.  
In a post-9/11 world, many Americans might find that compliance with authority 
and with all law enforcement actions—no matter how intrusive—are necessary for a 
secure nation (Pew Research Center 2011). For militia members, however, defiance of 
law enforcement action that is seemingly unwarranted or hostile is necessary to maintain 
a national character that is worth fighting for and that conforms to the mythologized 
history of the country. Militia members understand hostile interactions not just as a threat 
to individual members or the militia as a whole, but also to the essence of the rights 
included with U.S. citizenship. In this context, it is members' perceived duty to be defiant 
of what they understand to be improper law enforcement actions, and members will 










In the first part of this manuscript, I explained how militia members understand 
themselves to be super citizens who are part of a patriotic organization that they believe 
helps preserve the nation's identity and original values. I discussed the origins of the 
militia movement, including the formative events of Ruby Ridge, Waco, the Brady Bill 
and the Oklahoma City Bombing, and I discussed how the movement of today differs 
from the militia of the 1990s in terms of membership, ideology, and communication 
strategies. Contemporary militias in Michigan have few overlaps with other 
contemporary nostalgic groups active in the state, including white supremacist groups, 
Minutemen or even the relatively mainstream Tea Party. I argue this is because of 
ideological differences militia members have with these groups, and because of 
constraints on members' free time when ideological similarities do exist.  
I suggested that a combination of state-level and individual factors, including a 
depressed state economy, high levels of crime and government corruption, and 
charismatic leaders, contribute to the militia's continued strong presence in Michigan. I 
also suggest that historian Robert Churchill's (2009) militia typology, which differentiates 
between militias based primarily on their ideology, is analytically useful for 
understanding militias in Michigan. Most Michigan militias are Constitutional militias, 




ensure that the government acts within its legally defined authority. The Hutaree militia, 
arrested in 2010, provides an example of millenarian militias, which are more secretive 
and more invested in traditional conspiracy theories of a New World Order, and in 
apocalyptical, religious ideology. 
In Chapter Three, I found that militia men explain their reasons for joining the 
militia in terms of a traditional, hegemonic masculinity. That is, men say they join 
because of a sense of duty to the country or to their families, because of a desire to 
enhance their personal preparedness, because of a need for comradery, or because of a 
desire for political expression. These four stated reasons directly reference notions of a 
strong, independent man who values being able to defend oneself, one's family, and one's 
country from a variety of threats, and who wants to spend time with other men who share 
those interests.  
Men's verbalized reasons for militia participation echo past organizations, like the 
Boy Scouts, that have emphasized the role of "manly strength" (MacLeod 1982:30) or 
other stereotypical male traits as being necessary for preserving our social structure. This 
attitude relies on and references a mythic past of the U.S. as being founded by solely by 
the efforts of white men who engaged in hard physical labor, and wars fought with 
morality as much as muscle to conquer the land (Cronon 2003; Garner 2007). 
Traditionally masculine themes from these stories extend through major events in the 
country's history, including the Industrial Revolution, the Great Wars, backlashes to the 
Civil Rights and Women's Movements, and recent military conflicts in the Middle East. 
I found, however, that the masculinity militia men enact with each other at 




as men engage in the theater of gearing up for militia training and thus symbolically 
embody the national story they want to invoke, they allow and even encourage deviations 
from the traditional gender roles on which this image relies. Men accept other men who 
love the color pink, who talk openly about their emotions, including their fondness of 
each other, while in front of other members, their families, and non-militia strangers at 
public functions. They even accepted a male-to-female transsexual who transitioned after 
becoming a militia member until she decided to leave the group for reasons she said were 
unrelated to the militia.  
Past research has argued that masculinity is a fluid construct that varies across 
time and context, but says there is nonetheless a hegemonic version of masculinity in any 
given society toward which men are socially pressured to aspire (Connell 2005; Nagel 
2004). This pressure is generally assumed to be greatest in all-male groups (Bird 1996), 
and the degree to which men may successfully match the hegemonic model is influenced 
by their race and class (Gutmann 1996). I argue that the case of the militia shows that at 
least some white men have a greater conscious awareness of the pressures and constraints 
of hegemonic masculinity than much of the literature would suggest.  
Militia men actively grapple with what it means to be a man in modern society, 
even as they honor an archetypical, protective, independent, mythical man of yesteryear. 
Rather than stubbornly clinging to this narrow construction of manhood in their own 
lives, militia men  welcome the challenge, enjoy the process, and sometimes take these 
masculinity lessons back home with them as they assist with childcare or other 
traditionally female tasks after seeing other members do the same. In contrast to some 




live up to a hegemonic version of masculinity (Bird 1996), the militia welcomes and even 
encourages men who innovate toward a more fluid and open masculinity.  
Although some authors resist the notion of describing a "true" or "real" 
masculinity because of its variance across time and context (Connell 2005), I suggest that 
it is important to remember that, both the innovating, flexible masculinity, and the more 
traditional, protective masculinity are real for the lived experiences of the men in 
question. They are simultaneously trying to honor the past they revere, as well as the 
social expectations for manhood with which they were raised, and trying to adapt to a 
changing society that allows for "softer" (Heath 2003) masculine expression.  
Militia men's expanded masculinity does not, however, mean that militia men 
understand why their children and especially their wives or girlfriends typically have only 
a limited interest in militia participation. Militia members' children describe the militia as 
"important," but are unsure of their own role in it as they grow older. Most see militia 
activities as fun weekend diversions, but do not have their own gear to full participation 
and usually become bored before the end of the event.  
Women seldom become militia members, and rarely seem as concerned about the 
political climate as their male partners. They say they support their partners' involvement 
in the militia as both a political and leisure activity. I suggest that women's full 
participation is limited by a general lack of strong political feeling, harsh outside 
conditions, particularly during the winter, and a sense of intimidation about the all-male 
space and the physical expectations for participation. 
Despite their relative passivity within the movement, militia men would prefer 




findings in other studies of male-dominated groups, which expect women to play up their 
femininity in order to be accepted (Kimmel 2009; Mitchell 2002; Shapira 2011). Militia 
men most accept women who "get dirty" and fully participate in training exercises. 
Rather than being "mascot" members (Adams 1999) because they are different from the 
group, I suggest that these women are heralded because they mirror the men's behavior 
and evinced level of commitment when they fully participate in militia activities. This 
difference between the militia and some other male-dominated groups may be a product 
of militia members' belief that it is the duty of every citizen, regardless of sex, to be 
attentive to and able to protect both national identity and security 
 In Chapter Four, I turned to analysis of how these men with "super citizen" self-
concepts understand race and act racially. I found that militia units in Michigan do not 
have racial agendas at the group level. Most members genuinely try to be accepting of 
other racial and ethnic group and showed a surprising degree of awareness of how their 
group's overwhelming whiteness influences public perceptions of the militia. They try to 
mitigate this image by attempting to recruit more non-white members and by making sure 
newcomers saw how they valued non-white attendees. Members were not always racially 
sensitive in this process, however. They did not, for example, understand that Kevin, the 
most consistent non-white member, would be uncomfortable being made into a token 
example of racial inclusiveness for new attendees. 
Outright "Jim Crow" or "old fashioned" racists are rare in the militia, and 
Edmond, who referred to African American Detroiters as "natives" and who suggested a 
return to a slave-based economy as a way to save the city, was the only militia member I 




symbolic racist thinking, such that they believe some groups have cultural (rather than 
biological) barriers to financial and other success (Kinder & Sears 1981). A few members 
commented on African Americans whose work ethic they questioned, but symbolic 
racism was most evident when members discussed illegal immigration. Members argued 
that people who are not respectful or dedicated enough to enter the country legally must 
have cultural deficiencies, such as a proclivity toward laziness or criminal activity, that 
make them undesirable citizens.  
 Symbolic racism does not explain why militia members tend to largely exclude 
Muslim Americans, in defiance of their message of overall acceptance and 
egalitarianism. That is, there is no indication that militia members believe Muslim 
Americans are not hard workers (Sides and Gross forthcoming), which is the usual 
marker of symbolic racist thinking. Previous authors have instead suggested that white 
Americans reject Muslims through a process of racialization, whereby they believe all 
Arabs to be Muslims, and all Muslims to be terrorists (Joshi 2006; Razack 2008).  
I argue that using racialization alone to understand anti-Muslim sentiment may 
overstate the role of biological race and give insufficient attention to how at least some 
Americans are genuinely fearful of Islam and its adherents (Sides and Gross 
forthcoming). I suggest that theories of group threat, where people believe their ethnic or 
racial group is being threatened by another group are useful here; however, I argue that 
greater attention to nationalism as a source of threat is needed, compared to a past 
emphasis on economic threat (Olazk 1994). I suggest the term "nationalistic threat" to 
reflect a combination of racialized beliefs about Muslim Americans alongside feelings of 




terrorists (a form of racialization) and are genuinely fearful of further terror attacks or 
socio-political changes that result from terror (a form of group threat with an emphasis on 
nationalism).  
Militia members' overall rejection of Muslim Americans is complicated by militia 
leader, Chad, a white man who converted to Islam after time in the military. Other 
members evaluate Chad through a lens of Americanness to determine their level of 
acceptance toward him. Members who know Chad well value his military and militia 
participation and know that his Christian family members are also involved in the militia; 
these factors mean they can accept Chad as genuinely committed to their shared national 
values. Members who do not know these facts about Chad worry that his religion might 
mean he is not truly committed to the country and its security.  
Some members similarly worry that President Obama's rumored status as Muslim 
is a threat to national security. They believe he may have loyalties to the Middle East 
instead of to American principles. Other members may be wary of Obama's race, but I 
argue that neither race nor supposed religion wholly explains militia member's distrust of 
the President because similar distrust and "anti-Socialist" language is common in the 
militia's literature of the 1990s when the last Democrat, Bill Clinton, held the Presidency.  
I argue that members' responses to Michigan's African American and Muslim 
populations—members' two most salient racialized outgroups—show how their 
understanding of Americanness simultaneously incentivizes them to be accepting of other 
groups while limiting their enacted acceptance of some groups who do not conform to 
their vision of the nation. Members may similarly charitably interpret racist and 




nationalism, rather than of racism because they want to believe that all militia members 
share their vision of egalitarianism and inclusion. In this way, strongly racist individuals 
might have a long-term detrimental impact on the militia's intended egalitarian outlook. 
In Chapter Five, I analyzed how militia members who see themselves as dutiful, 
patriotic monitors of government behavior respond to authority, particularly authority 
represented by law enforcement interactions with the militia. The social movement 
literature has sharply conflicting predictions regarding the effect of authoritative 
repression on movement behavior, with relatively little guidance about movement 
characteristics that might result in compliant versus defiant behavior. Some scholars 
suggest that government control will suppress social movements (Boykoff 2006), or 
reduce violent action to protest behavior (Lichbach 1987). Others argue that government 
efforts at movement repression will instead increase (Opp and Roehl 1990) or radicalize 
(Walsh and Piazza 2010) movement actors.  
I suggest that it is thus useful to consider theories of crime and social deviance 
when analyzing how militia groups are likely to respond to attempts at authoritative 
control. Militia involvement is a form of deviant political expression, and theories of 
crime and deviance are particularly relevant to explaining law enforcement efforts to 
control militia behavior they perceive to be deviant. Theories of social control and 
labeling do not adequately capture how militia member sometimes comply with and 
sometimes defy authoritative action. Control theories suggest that authoritative control of 
behavior through monitoring or legal action should result in lower levels of the behavior 
in question (Matza 1969; Reckless 1973). Labeling theories, in contrast, suggest that once 




criminal or deviant acts than they might have without being labeled (Lemert 1951; 
Paternoster and Iovanni 1989). 
I instead suggest that Defiance Theory (Sherman 1993) better captures this mixed 
response. Sherman's theory says that an individual who is suspected of deviant behavior 
may understand authoritative action as illegitimate if authorities act disrespectfully, 
arbitrarily, or unjustly toward that person. When militia members accept authoritative 
action as legitimate, they act in compliance with that action. When they understand 
authoritative action to be illegitimate, they instead defy authority. I expand on Sherman's 
framework and argue that militia members evaluate the legitimacy of authoritative action 
through the lens of their idealized Americanness and national identity. Authorities who 
act in accordance with the Constitution and the legal structure are met with respect and 
compliance, while those who betray militia members' expectations of legal or just 
government action are met with defiance. 
This mixed outcome was evident in how militia members responded to four 
different law enforcement characterizations of the militia during my fieldwork as 
confidants, suspects, criminals, or terrorists. Each subsequent category entailed a higher 
degree of suspicion and deviation from ideal Americanness on the part of law 
enforcement, and a higher degree of defiance from militia members. Members who were 
treated like confidants willingly shared information with law enforcement. Members also 
complied with and supported law enforcement actions when there was evidence of 
problematic behavior within the Hutaree militia group.  
In contrast, members who were treated like suspects without any evidence of 




with no evidence engaged in defiant in-person behavior that was designed to annoy law 
enforcement officers and waste their time and resources. Members, along with their 
sympathizers, who were treated like terrorists with no supporting evidence effectively 
doubled the size of the militia movement in defiance of a perceived government effort to 
label and limit the movement. I also found that media and research representatives could 
take authoritative roles—as actors publicly defining the militia movement—with similar 
results. 
Americanness is thus the common thread across members' attitudes on 
masculinity, race, and government control. It is also the element that helps militia men 
make sense of and navigate their gendered, raced, and classed identity categories. 
Members are highly invested in a mythologized version of national identity that upholds 
notions of equality and individual liberty even as it references the historical time frame of 
the American frontier and the Revolutionary War, where white men had a monopoly of 
socio-political power.  
Militia men embody this contradiction. They are nostalgic for simpler times when 
the Constitution might be literally enacted, rather than interpreted and applied beyond its 
original meaning to fit evolving societal and technological advancements; yet, they 
genuinely strive to be accepting of other groups so long as they believe those groups are 
dedicated to upholding national security and identity. This case affirms previous scholars 
who have argued that the nation and its character are symbols that are defined, contested, 
and reaffirmed through daily enactments, images, and storytelling (Billig 1995; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Zubrzycki 2011). In this context, it is an interesting, if 




people from many walks of life, but simultaneously becomes the mechanism by which 
people (like Muslim Americans) are excluded from members' construction of citizenship 
and national belonging.  
 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
The case of the militia can also inform our understanding of some questions related to 
social movements and politics in the U.S. that I do not explicitly engage with in the 
empirical chapters. Below, I address several areas where my findings about the militia 
challenge or expand conventional thinking about politics in the U.S. I suggest that this 
case should be the starting point for further dialogue about the motivations and trajectory 
of nostalgic movements in this county, and about how we should categorize nostalgic 
groups and their actors within the political landscape. 
 
The Power-Devaluation Model 
Sociologist Rory McVeigh (2009) recently proposed a theory known as the power-
devaluation model to explain why relatively advantaged people, like white men in the 
U.S., become involved in social movements. This model is updated version of the status-
threat explanation for so-called right-wing mobilizations. McVeigh suggests that a 
feeling that one's group is losing social power to another group is essential, but that 
mobilization only occurs after some event creates a "shift" in their "interpretive 
processes" (ibid. 39). He additionally notes that social power should be construed as a 
combination of three facets—economic, political, and status-based power—in contrast to 




The model is still new, and the case of the militia serves as a qualitative test of its 
parameters, which have predominately been thus far applied quantitatively to the second 
wave of the Ku Klux Klan. While militia members often struggle financially, their status 
as white men does mean they are relatively privileged relative to other demographic 
groups in Michigan. The reasons that men say the join the militia reference an underlying 
sense of threat to traditional American masculinity, and many joined following some 
event—the death of a loved one, a move to an isolated area, or the publication of a report 
that called their patriotism into question—that brought attention to their vulnerability.  
For militia members, Rory McVeigh's "interpretive process" entails an assessment 
of whether the government is acting in accordance with their idealized national identity. 
If the government is not, the event becomes a cognitive tipping point that leads to 
mobilization. This suggests that future applications of the model should be attentive to 
the dynamics between social movement actors, their values, and State behavior (rather 
than to more individual-level processes alone) to elaborate on the members' interpretive 
process and how it leads to mobilization.  
Historically, militia activity has increased following events that were national in 
scope, highly publicized, and unique (meaning not merely cyclical with political 
administrations): government raids on private citizens (Ruby Ridge and Waco), 
threatened economic collapse (Y2K), and attacks on national values (9/11 and the 2009 
DHS report). This pattern suggests that "shifts" in movement actors' interpretive 
processes are likely to occur only after threats to their particular movement's geographical 
level of reference. For the militia, the nation, rather than the state or local community, is 




government. Other movements may have different units of analysis, based on their 
interests. Environmental movements might, for example, be more likely to focus on local 
issues and to mobilize following a local threat, while human rights organizations might 
be more likely to mobilize following an issue understood to be operating at a global scale 
(Tsutsui 2004), such as recent discussions about women's rights in India. 
 
Nostalgic Groups and Self-Interest 
The case of the militia can contribute to another aspect of the social movements 
literature: the question of why people vote against their economic self-interest. It has long 
been a mystery as to why people who would benefit from increased welfare accessibility 
or from certain tax structures, nonetheless vote for a political party that opposes those 
policies. The case of the militia helps explain that, at least for some voters, a desire to 
support a certain understanding of national identity may be of greater importance than 
personal benefit. That is, supporting policies or political parties that nostalgic group 
members believe to uphold notions of individual effort and achievement (rather than 
government "handouts") may be a symbolic vote for a perceived greater good that is 
more important to them than possible personal gain.  
Political scientist David Sears and his colleagues (1980) have previously argued 
that short-term self-interests (during the tenure of a particular political candidate) may be 
outweighed by ideological issues, and the case of the militia confirms that long-term self-
interest may be at risk for these voters, too. Militias understand their commitment to 
Americanness to be life-long, and the trajectory that many members have taken from the 




support this claim. Militia members are unlikely, in my estimation, to ever vote for a 
candidate whose ideological viewpoints contrast their own, even if the candidate's 
economic platform would benefit them. Militia members are not quite so-called "value 
voters" who vote exclusively on a very narrow set of social issues, but they may refuse to 
vote for a candidate regardless of his or her other policies if they understand that 
candidate to be undermining their vision for America and its values. Votes have great 
symbolic power and militia members use them to endorse and try to maintain a certain 
national story and identity. Members of other nostalgic groups may take a similar tack.  
 
A Linear Political Spectrum? 
A thorough understanding of the militia's complex ideology also necessitates a 
reassessment of the traditionally linear political model of American politics, which may 
be construed with Communism at the furthest left point and Fascism at the furthest right, 
with subsequent divisions fading rather smoothly into the next (Eatwell 1989). Groups 
charted to the conservative end of the spectrum are often associated with "preservatism" 
(Lipset and Raab 1978:19)—a backward-looking idealization of the past—and 
understood to have continuing resistance to granting rights and power to groups that have 
traditionally not held them (e.g., Mudde 2007). 
Militia members are certainly nostalgic for a past they perceive to have been 
simpler. They desire limited government authority, and want to preserve access to 
firearms, both of which are typically associated with the conservative end of the linear 
spectrum. I nonetheless saw no evidence that militia members were opposed to ensuring 




perceived to be opposed to national security. Most members openly welcome interested 
women and non-whites into their units, rather than trying to preserve a male-dominated 
space or power structure.  
Most members support abortion rights and gay rights, in accordance with their 
Libertarian ideology. For example, 36 year old Edward, a construction worker, expressed 
his view on abortion by saying, "I don't think as a man, personally I could tell a woman, 
or vote for a man who would pass legislation to tell a woman, what she can and cannot do 
with her body." As an example regarding gay rights, I observed that some militia leaders 
became visibly angry when a Michigan-based, gay-rights reporter told them a story of 
having been excluded from covering a nearby Tea Party event because of his sexuality. 
One militia leader huffed, 'That's not very Libertarian! And we're supposed to be the bad 
guys!' 
Members certainly do not have a full empathetic understanding of ongoing 
racism, sexism, homophobia, or other social problems, but their open perspective on a 
variety of issues fails to match an image of a consciously exclusionary or preservatist 
group. "Right wing" becomes a misnomer for the militia, given their mix of political 
standpoints and general lack of overlap with other contemporary nostalgic groups, which 
is why I have avoided the term in this manuscript. The label of "conservative" may also 
be questionable, given members' acceptance of rights that tend to be opposed even by 
many mainstream Republicans.  
It is not my goal to advocate an alternate political model that better captures 
militia activity, but rather to suggest that researchers reevaluate previously proposed 




contemporary political action in the U.S. Other models have been suggested, for instance, 
using a horseshoe shape to illustrate that extremists of both the right and the left may 
have more in common with each other than with some components of their respective 
halves of the traditional linear spectrum (George and Wilcox 1996). Other authors have 
attempted to take into account different ideological components such as valuation of 
economic and personal freedom or opposition to government intervention, by imposing 
those axes over the traditional linear model (Christie 1970). Additional work, especially 
comparing ideological standpoints of groups formerly described as right-wing, to those 
formerly described as left-wing, is needed to achieve a more accurate and complete 
model of the contemporary U.S. political landscape. 
 
"Anti-Government" Groups? 
Finally, the case of the militia helps clarify a term that has loosely been used to help 
explain things ranging from the U.S.'s lack of full participation in international markets 
(Tolchin 1996), to labor movement activism in Korea (Suh 2001), to anti-U.S. 
mobilization in Bolivia (Cott 2003). Within the U.S. alone, the term "anti-government 
group" has been applied to militias (SPLC 2011), mentally-ill, lone shooters (Montopoli 
2011), Tea Partiers (Fetner 2012), and eco-terrorists (ADL n.d.) alike. However, none of 
these studies or reports offer any attempt to define "anti-government." Political scientists 
Cheryl King and Camilla Stivers build on Evan Berman's (1997) earlier typology of 
citizen discontent to say that, 
"...[W]hen citizens voice anti-government feelings what they mean is one 
or more of three things: Government has too much power and does not use 




wastes taxpayers' money; government is remote and disconnected from 
ordinary life" (1998:12). 
 
In this otherwise excellent exploration of the conditions under which people may 
experience anti-government sentiment, the authors never define what they mean by "anti-
government." A more colloquial understanding seems to be that "anti-government" actors 
have a uniform disdain for the party in power. 
 The findings in this manuscript complicate this assumption. Michigan militia 
members are opposed to big government, but supported law enforcement investigations 
into the Hutaree militia, which verbalized a desire to harm police officers, as Chapter 
Five discusses. Most members are not overly angry with the government, though they do 
believe both major political parties deviate from what the Constitution allows. Members 
are not even particularly hostile toward President Obama, whom they believe wants to 
increase government size and decrease gun rights. In November 2009, a CNN reporter 
asked one militia leader—a federal employee—about the President, and the leader 
responded, "That's my boss. I'm not gonna let anybody mess with my boss. […] He 
should come out and have some barbeque with us [at a militia training]." The leader was 
publicly recognizing Obama's legitimacy as President while expressing subtle frustration 
that the government did not really understand the aims of his movement.  
 Militias have certainly gained traction under the last two Democratic presidencies 
(Bill Clinton and Barack Obama) compared to the last two Republic presidencies (George 
Bush Sr. and Jr.). Militia members feel more at odds with Democrats' stances on illegal 
immigration, foreign aid, social welfare, and gun control, compared to Republicans' 
relatively conservative perspectives on those same issues. However, in the same way that 




disdain for only Democratic administrations and acceptance of Republican 
administrations. As I mentioned, militia members tend to support abortion and gay rights, 
and correspondingly tend to disapprove of Republican efforts to restrict these rights. 
"Anti-government" is, in the case of the militia, better defined as opposition to 
political policies, rather than political parties, or a broad feeling of disconnect from 
average citizens (King and Stivers 1998), that threatens one's understanding of national 
identity, or that threatens values and definitions understood to comprise Americanism as 
defined by individualism, personal responsibility. This is an important clarification. If 
researchers label a group "anti-government" without analyzing which particular policies 
or political constructs the group opposes, the term has little analytical purchase and does 
not advance our understanding of our political landscape. Similarly, politicians cannot 
win seats or effect policy by trying to please all constituencies; but, especially in times of 
war, economic turbulence, or other social disturbance, it is nonetheless important to avoid 
fundamentally alienating any large voting bloc if there is any aspiration for meaningful 
and harmonious social progress. 
 
CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
In concluding, I now return more explicitly to the two over-arching, interrelated questions 
of this manuscript. First, how are different identities (e.g., male, white, lower-middle 
class, American) combined and navigated in the context of a society whose dominant 
public dialogue is evolving to be increasingly inclusive of traditionally oppressed groups? 
Second, how does social movement participation, in this case, participation in the militia, 




 For the men in this study, Americanness becomes the medium through which they 
navigate their masculinity, whiteness, and class position. Militia men honor a time where 
white men had exclusive social power, but they look to the guiding principles of ideal 
Americanness—equality and liberty—to guide their interactions with others. Militia men 
understand that masculinity and whiteness are changing in U.S. society, such that men 
can be more expressive and emotive without social sanctions, for example, and such that 
Whites are expected to lose their status as the racial majority in a few short years.  
 Militia men are not fearful of these changes. They are not just stubbornly clinging 
to the past, nor are they consciously looking to return to a time that was more favorable 
toward white men. Instead, they make an effort to evolve alongside a changing society. 
They embrace the possibility of a less constrictive masculinity even as they still try to be 
the primary protectors of their families. They assess how their experiences differ from 
those of their African American neighbors, and consider how the public perceives the 
militia in the context of its whiteness, even though they are not aware of the full range of 
privileges that both their masculinity and whiteness afford them.  
In contrast, militia men do fear and symbolically fight against changes to national 
identity, to their doctrine of idealized Americanness. Americanness is, for them, a stable 
doctrine, a sacred secular guidepost that allows them to understand other identities whose 
normative expressions may change over time. Said another way, militia men do not feel 
threats to their masculinity or their whiteness as a result of increasing equality for women 
and non-white racial groups, but they do feel threats to their American identity as a result 




 As part of their identity navigation, militia men's focus on Americanness also 
gives them incentive to be attentive to issues of gender and racial equality, especially 
within their own movement. Their experiences as white men, however, limit their ability 
to fully engage with these issues or to have an empathetic understanding of the lived 
experiences of others. Members' idolization of the American Dream similarly limits their 
understanding of how structural barriers limit their own economic advancement, as well 
as the advancement of non-white racial groups.  
Turning to the second question, men's participation in the militia reinforces and 
intensifies their dedication to the nation as they share political perspectives and embodied 
activities with other men who share their concerns. Militia participation also reinforces 
their self-concepts as strong, protective fathers and citizens, but allows them to expand 
the expressive elements of masculinity and be affectionate toward each other and their 
families without fear of sanction. Members' whiteness may be largely invisible to them as 
they participate in trainings with a racially homogenous group, but it nonetheless 
encourages them to think about the dimensions of whiteness when the group weathers 
criticism for that homogeneity. Members' class position is similarly concealed within the 
militia. Some members are able to afford new gadgets more easily than others, but they 
all generally struggle to be consistently financially stable. Their shared class position and 
shared belief in the American Dream prevent class divisions from being salient to them 
within the context of the militia. For these "super citizens," militia activity and 
Americanness are thus intimately and inextricably intertwined and combine to shape 





Previous Militia Studies: Discrepant Findings and Methodological Problems 
 
This appendix includes information about previous militia studies, many of whose claims 
differ from mine regarding militia origins and characteristics. Here I discuss these 
differences and reasons behind them. I argue that most disparities result from various data 
problems in many past studies. 
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH: MILITIA ORIGINS 
Previous militia authors have a variety of explanations for member involvement. Many 
do reference Waco, Ruby Ridge, and the Brady Bill and Assault Weapons Ban as the 
primary causes (Chermak 2002; Crothers 2003; George and Wilcox 1996; Levitas 2004; 
Stern 1996). Others identify the proximate cause not as the events themselves, but the 
sense of alienation experienced after them and brought on by a feeling of betrayal via the 
government (Churchill 2009). This explanation would fit with the theory of power 
devaluation, though no previous militia author uses this term or its implications 
explicitly. 
Still more authors have focused on class-based concerns as initiating the 
movement, especially concerns rooted in the decline of the farming industry in the 1980s 




literature claims that individuals become involved in militias because of a diminished 
ability to maintain an independent livelihood through agriculture and subsequent shared 
economic and identity frustration. In Michigan, however, there is no evidence to support 
this particular farming-based explanation. 
Among my 40 interviewees, 11 (28%) had at least one grandparent whose 
primary income was from farming. No interviewees' parents relied on farming for this 
purpose, nor do interviewees themselves. Three (8%) of interviewees do maintain a few 
animals for their own eggs and milk, but again, this is not a source of income. I have no 
reason to expect that militia members I did not interview differ dramatically on this 
variable from interviewees. Few militia members in Michigan seem to have strong 
feelings about the farming industry, as I have never heard farming mentioned as a 
concern at any militia gathering. Most members live in the suburbs, rather than near rural 
farmland. When I asked and explained the farming connection, some members respond 
angrily, like Adam who sarcastically said, "Oh yeah we didn't have the Industrial 
Revolution, [or] anything like that!" This interviewee's response reveals his belief that the 
farming explanation implies militia members are "backward," or behind the times, and 
his annoyance is not entirely unfounded.  
  When explaining why people join militias, some researchers have also noted that 
many militia members have military experience prior to their militia membership (e.g., 
Ferber and Kimmel 2004; Kimmel and Ferber 2000; O'Brien and Haider- Markel 1998; 
Stern 1996). Few overtly made the connection that militia involvement might be an 
attempt to recapture the experience and comradery of military tenure, but a generous 




consistent with a desire to reinforce or participate in a normative expression of 
masculinity in U.S. culture—military participation—especially during war time. 
Militaristic participation might also be a way to enact a traditional understanding of 
national identity, which again relies on masculinity and shows of military strength. Both 
possibilities are consistent with the power-devaluation model. 
It is worth noting here that a few authors have stated that status loss (the pre-
cursor to the power-devaluation model) is not the cause of right-wing involvement. 
Social scientist Martin Durham (2001) for instance says that some right wing actors 
become involved even in times of economic growth; his formulation, however, fails to 
account for perception of threat, which is accounted for in the power-devaluation model. 
Similarly, James Aho's (1995) work on an Idaho group, considered foundational in the 
militia literature, charts economic growth and recession since 1900 to show that there is 
no correlation with religious right-wing extremism and status loss. Aho's findings 
challenging status loss can be questioned on another level because true militias should 
not be considered religious movements, and religion is the guiding force behind Aho's 
group of interest. Finally, historian Darren Mulloy questions the applicability of Lipset 
and Raab's (1978) status preservatism to militias, but nonetheless attributes militia 
formation to people "trying to assert their right to define Americanism, and in doing so 
[employing] the myths, metaphors, and perceived historical lessons of the American 
experience" (2008:30). My usage of the power-devaluation model takes into account 
nostalgia for the country's foundational myth, which in turn relies so heavily on an 






Table 2. Past Militia Research: Characterizations and Data Sources (*Wright's interviews were with Timothy McVeigh) 
 


























































































































































Abanes 1996 • • • • ‡ ‡ 
Chaloupka 1996 • • • • ‡ 
Ferber 1999 • • • • ‡ 
Ferber & Kimmel 2004 • • • • ‡ 
Kelly & Villaire 2002 • • • • ‡ 
Kimmel & Ferber 2000 • • • • ‡ 
Levitas 2004 • • • • • ‡ 
Barkun 1997 • • • ‡ 
Dyer 1998 • • • ‡ 
Katz & Bailey 2000 • • • ‡ 
Stern 1996 • • • • ‡ ‡ 
Wright 2007 • • •  ‡* 
Aho 1995 • • ‡ 
Crothers 2003 • • ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Dees & Corcoran 1999 • • • ‡ 
Freilich 2003 • • ‡ 
Gallaher 2003 • • ‡ 
Kaplan 2000 • • ‡ 
































































































































































Swain 2004 • • ‡ 
Barkun 1997 • ‡ 
Diamond 1995 • ‡ 
Freilich et al. 2005 • ‡ 
O'Brien & Haider-Markel 1998 • ‡ 
Van Dyke & Soule 2002 • ‡ 
Berlet & Lyons 1995 • ‡ 
Berlet 2004 • ‡ ‡ 
Chermak 2002 ‡ 
Churchill 2009 ‡ ‡ 
Duffy & Brantley 1997 ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Durham 2001 ‡ ‡ 
George & Wilcox 1996 ‡ ‡ 
Karl 1995 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Lo 1982 ‡ 
Mariani 1996 ‡ 
Mulloy 2008 ‡ 
Schlatter 2006 • ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Vinyard 2011 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 





PREVIOUS RESEARCH: MILITIA CHARACTERISTICS 
My findings differ in several respects from those in previous studies. In this section, I 
briefly discuss the areas where this manuscript has major discrepancies from multiple 
past militia studies. Following this section, I consider methodological differences 
between my study and others as a likely source for these disparate findings. 
 
Education 
As summarized in Table 2, much of the previous militia picture paints a different picture 
than that I have outlined in this dissertation, and here I present an account of their 
conflicting findings before offering an explanation for the discrepancy. Whereas I note 
that my interviewees are slightly more educated relative to the average American, many 
previous authors state or at least strongly imply that militia members are undereducated 
relative to the average population (e.g., Kimmel and Ferber 2000; Levitas 2004; O'Brien 
and Haider-Markel 1998). Their evidence for this claim is based on statistics from non-
militia groups, and most do not justify generalizing the statistics to militia groups.  
 
Religion 
Many past studies often describe militia members as uniformly and strongly invested in 
their Christian faith. Other studies indicate that militia members follow a religious system 
called Christian Identity (e.g., Aho 1995; Ferber 1999; Kimmel and Ferber 2000), which 
holds that only Whites are descendants of the biblical Adam, while Jews were spawned 
from a liaison between Eve and Satan, and outgroup animosity extends to all nonwhites 





members are Christians, there are also many who are areligious, religion is not an 
organizing principle for group activity, and there are none I have encountered in 
Michigan who subscribe to the racist and cult-like Christian Identity philosophy or 
anything like it. Although it is possible that other religion trends are present in militias in 
other states, previous data is based on looking at singular groups (e.g., Aho 1995), or on 
unverified rumors from watch groups (e.g., Kimmel and Ferber 2000), so it is not clear 
that the data support claims of religious orientations in militia groups. The only militia 
group in Michigan with a strong religious affiliation was the Hutaree militia, whose 
members were arrested for allegedly plotting to kill police officers in 2010, and other 
militias in the state rejected this group. 
 
Racism 
Many researchers similarly state that militias are necessarily racist (e.g., Crothers 2003; 
Pitcavage 2001; Swain 2004). One goes so far as to say it would be "nearly impossible" 
to not encounter anti-Semitic or other white supremacist literature at militia events (Stern 
1996:246). As Chapter Four of this manuscript explicates, it is my claim that most 
Michigan militias should not be considered racist at the group level, and that the 
prevalence of individual racism does not exceed what would likely be found in other 
gatherings of the same demographic. Past studies offer little evidence that clearly shows 
racism in militia groups, as opposed to in groups with which militias may be conflated. 
One exception to this is political geographer Carolyn Gallaher's (2003) study of a militia 






Relationship to the Government 
The existing literature also tends to agree that militias do not recognize the legitimacy of 
the federal government and plot to take it over, or at least commit acts of terror in protest 
of it. The general consensus seems to be that militias are uniformly involved in anti-
government plots or illegal weapons stockpiling (e.g., Barkun 1997; Crothers 2003; 
Kimmel and Ferber 2000; Levitas 2004; Stern 1996). Some work that does not invoke a 
violent portrait of members still maintains that militia members refuse to vote, or 
otherwise participate normatively in the existing governmental-political system (e.g., 
Ferber and Kimmel 2004; O'Brien and Haider-Markel 1998). In fact, every militia 
member I have encountered proudly says they have voted in every election since they 
were old enough to do so; it is their civic duty, and they look with disgust at fellow 
citizens who have not exercised this right.  
The Hutaree militia, discussed in Chapter Five, certainly serves as an example of 
a problematic militia unit that did discuss violence against the government. This group is 
an exception and was ostracized from the main thrust of the movement long before the 
law enforcement investigation became public knowledge. Other groups' distrust toward 
the Hutaree makes sense when working with an accurate understanding of the militia's 
ideological framework. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN PAST RESEARCH 
I suggest that the discrepancies between my work and previous militia studies are largely 





to understand the militia as it was in the 1990s. As Chapter Two argues, the 
contemporary militia differs substantially from its 1990s form.  
Additionally, there may be a variety of methodological problems in the past 
academic work. A major shortfall is that many past militia studies include no interviews 
or other direct interactions with militia members. Perhaps this is because of fear, or 
because of difficulties accessing members, but primary data from one's population of 
interest in a qualitative, ethnographic study is essential to have an accurate and nuanced 
understanding of the group in question.   
 Other methodological hindrances more broadly relate to the sources that many 
previous studies use. For instance, some previous militia authors conflate militias with 
other groups: patriot groups, white supremacist groups, and the Posse Comitatus. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, these groups should not be considered identical with militia 
groups who have different ideological and behavioral orientations. Examples of work that 
conflate militias with other groups on the right include Michael Kimmel and Abby Ferber 
(2000) as well as Ferber's earlier work (1999) that uses white supremacist literature in all 
their examples of written "militia" ideology. As Robert Churchill says, "The authors thus 
published what purports to be a gendered analysis of the militia movement without 
examining a single militia-generated text" (2009:10). More to the point, if militias are 
completely racist as these authors claim, why not use their own materials to demonstrate 
this fact?  
Taking care to use primary texts may not always be sufficient, however. It has 
been my experience that militia members allow a variety of loosely connected individuals 





such material to ensure it is not racist or otherwise problematic before they allow it, but 
other groups may not be so fastidious. This could easily explain discrepancies some 
authors have noted between relatively egalitarian verbal messages and anti-Semitic or 
other printed materials at large gatherings (e.g., Gallaher 2003). This is echoed in 
observations Richard Mitchell made in his work on survivalists: 
"Advertisements for products and services must not be read as 
destinations, only signposts, not as evidence of survivalists' interests, only 
of survivalist-oriented marketeering. Speeches and handouts must not be 
judged without attention to their dramaturgic intent and subsequent 
interpretations. [...] Those who disregard these cautions may miss 
survivalism altogether" (2002:16). 
 
 Additionally, determining the date of archived materials that are actually generated by 
militia groups can be difficult, since these texts were not generated with archival or 
research purposes in mind, and militia materials printed in 1994 are likely to have a very 
different message than something printed in 2004, or 2011.  
Another potential methodological problem is that even some researchers who 
acknowledge Timothy McVeigh was never a militia member very often begin their books 
and articles with a full treatise on the horror of the Oklahoma City bombing. Violent and 
unpredictable assumptions about militias are thereby solidified in readers' minds as a 
result. This framework also seems to frequently guide the assumptions and tone of the 
writers as well (e.g., Crothers 2003; Wright 2007).  
Other past militia researchers have relied only on online forums or old and 
undated website posts (e.g., Karl 1995; Weeber and Rodeheaver 2003). This is a 
substantial methodological problem since many forums, especially older ones, are public 
and there is no way to distinguish active militia members from non-militia students, law 





between real group webpages, and webpages likely made by a lone, angsty teenager from 
his mother's basement. Even materials posted on official group websites are suspect; 
www.michiganmilitia.com, for example, maintains links to dozens of un-updated pages 
from many years ago. Despite several attempts to clean up and update the site in the past 
few years, group coordinators still urge people to alert them to outdated links that may be 
lingering from nearly a decade ago.  
 
An Extended Note on Watch Group Data 
Researchers who do not rely on internet materials often use data from watch groups such 
as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) or especially the Southern Poverty Law Center 
(SPLC). There has been much written about the political and financial motivations watch 
groups may have for the positions they publish. In other words, the higher the perception 
of militia and other right wing danger among the general population, the more media 
attention and financial donations these agencies receive (Chermak 2002; J. Freilich and 
Pridemore 2005; Silverstein 2000). As Churchill notes, many of these watch groups have 
explicit goals of legally limiting the militia movement, and to use them as sources "is to 
allow the movement's opponents to define it" (2009:9). While this approach is certainly 
an option, it just as certainly leads to only a partial understanding of the movement. 
Part of what these watch groups do is to continue conflating militias with other 
groups, or at least, to very strongly imply that more connections exist among them than 
actually do. Additionally, to call the quantitative data compiled by these watch groups is 
questionable. The SPLC webpage with their most recent list of active militias states, "The 





sources and news reports" (SPLC 2010a). Law enforcement sources and news reports 
alike may only be aware of a biased sample of militia members—those who are prone to 
violence or illegal behavior and only represent a small portion of the movement. 
Although the term "field reports" strongly implies SPLC members conduct first-hand 
research "in the field," this term in fact refers to reports militias themselves generate and 
post online following their training sessions "in the field" that summarize the events of 
the day50. The SPLC's primary source certainly seems to be webpages, and these are 
methodologically problematic.  
Starting in 2010, the front page of the SPLC's online "Hate Map" (SPLC 2010b) 
claims they no longer use wepages appearing to be the work of a single individual as 
sources, and presumably this rule would apply for their listing of militia groups as well. 
However, the 2010 list continued to include sites that most certainly were individual 
pages: sites exclusively using "I" instead of "we" and showing only pictures of just one 
person instead of groups. There are also other sites that are likely to be individual pages 
but are better disguised as group pages: sites hosted on free servers (paid for by ads), sites 
with no pictures and no apparent change in writing style across very limited content, and 
pages that have not been updated in two years or more.  
Looking more closely, the list for 2010 (SPLC 2011b) includes three sites that are 
not militia sites, even under the most generous understanding of the term. Excluding 
those, 22.6% of the remaining 106 sites were inactive as of the report's release date in 
February 2011. Excluding these, another 9.3% are duplicates or subpages of sites already 
                                                 
50 The SPLC has declined to directly define "field report," stating only, "Our research analysts use several 
methods to get information on the various groups we list, including the patriots. We use Facebook, 
MySpace, Google Alerts, monitor their websites, read their magazines and other periodicals, listen to their 
radio shows, watch YouTube, and read field reports,' which we receive from law enforcement agencies 





included in the list; for example, michiganmilitia.com and michiganmilitia.com/SMVM 
were listed as distinct sites even though they reflect the same entity. Yet another 9%51 do 
not reflect anything "beyond the mere publishing of [the groups'] Internet material," 
(SPLC 2011b, 62), meaning these sites do not reflect organizations that meet or train in 
person, and thus may not be militias at all, and should not be included on the list per the 
SPLC's own definitions. This leaves 70 sites, or slightly less than two-thirds of the 
original list for consideration. Of these, 24, or 34.3% are hosted on free, unreliable sites 
paid for by advertisements, and another 10, or 14.3%, are hosted on very cheap sites 
($2.75-$19.99 a month, according to the host sites), which may not be any less temporary 
or any more reliable than the free sites. This leaves only 36 sites (one-third of the original 
list) that are likely on dedicated servers and supported by a functioning group.   
Regardless of whether individual or group sites are included, other 
methodological problems with using the internet as a primary or sole source remain. 
Looking at the SPLC listing of 2010 Michigan militias (SPLC 2011a), which is evidently 
drawn from web searches, there is at least one group that does not exist at all, another that 
exists solely online, several that are missing, and a couple that do not have trainings or 
events separate from those of a larger group. The SPLC listing also has the names of 
militia groups are given alongside counties where they are located, implying that if a 
county is listed, the group has a presence there. This is incredibly misleading. To take an 
example, twenty counties are subsumed under the Michigan Patriot Alliance (MPA) on 
the SPLC list. During my three years of field work, the MPA had at most twenty regular 
members during its peak, and more typically had five to ten. The SPLC takes the county 
                                                 
51 This includes six sites that the SPLC says do not correspond to in-person groups and an additional two 
sites that are unflagged, but clearly meet these criteria—they are online forums with no mention of training 





listings from the group webpages, and the group themselves list counties which they 
"cover," meaning counties to which they have any kind of connection—a lone member, 
or even a friend in an entirely different group.  
Websites also rarely reflect internal divisions and disagreements that are critical 
for understanding group delineations. One of the MPA's covered counties on the SPLC 
list is Jackson. However, prior to this list's creation, the two MPA members who lived in 
Jackson County formed their own group because the distance to MPA events was too far 
and they wanted to operate more independently of MPA leadership. This new group, the 
Jackson County Volunteer Militia (JCVM), disbanded from lack of local interest within 
just a few months of the split, and the former JCVM leaders now occasionally train with 
SMVM. However, the JCVM is also on the SPLC list (though with an incorrect name), 
despite its short life span, and despite its redundancy on the list with the MPA's county 
coverage.  
Militia members take it as a badge of honor if their group makes the list each 
year, even as they laugh about its inaccuracies and low standards for including a group as 
a militia. One exchange on a national forum in which Michigan members participate 
read, for example: 
Person 1: "Heck, they declared me a one man militia. […] I set up a web 
page with just myself as a member. [...] So these boneheads didn't check 
anything more than Google. I will have to send them a note thanking them 
for putting me on the map." 
 
Person 2: "This summer I am considering making my dogs militia 
commanders and giving them their own command and website. When they 
list them next year we will have grown even more."  
 
Person 3: "[…] I will promote my rabbits and a couple of the 







Reliance on watch group and other problematic data sources likely accounts for 
discrepancies between previous studies' characterizations of militias and my study's 
findings. However, it is also possible that earlier studies, particularly those conducted 
before 2000, are more accurate descriptions of the overall militia movement of the 1990s. 
As Chapter Two explains, there are important differences between the movement of 
today and its original instantiation, and prior studies may be accurate reflections of the 
movement's past. Moving forward to discussing the movement of today, however, it is 
important to avoid over-generalization of findings from the 1990s to the present.  
Researchers studying nostalgic groups and militias in particular must further 
carefully consider their data sources. As Table 2 indicates, most studies that use 
interviews with militia members have fewer discrepancies with my findings. There are 
nonetheless two interview-based studies that have some notable differences from my 
findings here and are worth considering briefly.  
First, Aho's (1995) group of interest were proud adherents of Christian Identity, 
an exclusionary, racist, belief system. I question whether groups with any religious 
ideology as their primary focus should be considered militias at all. Millenarian groups 
may be more likely to include religious discussion as part of their gatherings, but most 
still seem to preference political- or government-based concerns and conspiracy theories 
above religious ones (see Chapter Two, Churchill 2009). Most millenarian groups also 
engage in some degree paramilitary training (e.g., target practice, imitating military unit 
movements through the woods). Those who do not, such as the Militia of Montana, who 





themselves, perhaps deserve a different label than "militia." Groups that are singularly 
focused on religion, such as Aho's group, seem most in need of separation from that 
moniker—regardless of whether they adopt it themselves—and perhaps are best 
considered little more than religious sects or even cults. 
Second and similarly, is Gallaher's (2003) study of a Kentucky group active in the 
1990s. This group was comprised primarily of farmers who resented what they perceived 
to be the state government's disinterest in their economic wellbeing. Although they did 
express concerns about United Nations actions and other political events, their actions 
seemed to primarily coalesce around an effort to legalize local hemp farming that would 
presumably increase the farmers' involvement in the agricultural market. It is not clear 
that these farmers ever participated in paramilitary training. They did lobby for various 
gun rights legislation, but this is substantively different from the kind of training most 
militias do, and political support for gun rights is itself not sufficient to constitute militia 
membership or support. As a result, perhaps another label besides "militia" is most 
appropriate for this group, too  
Interviews, ideally, should also be supplemented by observations from militia 
meetings and trainings, in order to understand whether interview responses are largely 
rhetoric, or enacted belief. Access to nostalgic groups can be difficult and time 
consuming, but Table 2 supports my claim that methods are very important for accurately 
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